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Part I 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE 




1. The concept of liability for damage 
Liability always accrues by the breach of some legal obligation. Hence it 
is a legal institution of secondary character. Its purpose is to prevent fu tu re 
wrongful conduct, and it imposes sanctions of educative character on the 
violator to achieve this end. 
One particular form of responsibility is liability for damage. This liabi-
lity materializes in cases of wrongful conduct causing material damage. Un-
like other forms of responsibility, liability for. damage has a dual character. 
One aspect is to remove, to repair the consequences of the wrongful act. The 
other is the sanction, the punishment, which materializes as a compulsory 
reduction of the means of the liable person. 
Considering this dual nature, liability for damage substantially differs 
from other forms of responsibility (e. g. criminal or disciplinary responsibi-
lity). Liability for damage — usually materializes only upon the initiative 
of the damaged person; 
— it is not absolutely conditional on culpability of the damager; 
— the severity of the sanction is usually adjusted to the damage caused; 
— the sanction is of pecuniary nature and , can a lways be expressed in 
terms of. money; 
— compensation imposed" as a sanction is due to the damaged person. 
The various forms .of responsibility are not exclusive of one another. 
Hence several forms of responsibility can materialize in case of one and 
the same wrongful act. For instance, a driver having caused a crash is held 
responsible under criminal law (provided his conduct was highly dangerous 
to society); since he also has violated his obligation as an employee to do his 
work attentively, according to regulations, his employer will hold him res-
ponsible under disciplinary rules in addition; over and above this, having 
caused material damage by his conduct, the driver will be held liable for 
damage. The common purpose of these forms of responsibility is the educa-
tion of the violator, and, thereby, prevention of. similar product. Liability for 
damage has an additional special purpose: compensation, i. e. the complete 
or partial repair of the disadvantage the damaged person has suffered. 
Criminal or disciplinary, responsibility is always regulated and imposed in 
the interest of society as a whole. By contrast, the reparative aspect of liability 
for damage is regulated in the interest of the damaged person first of all, 
whereas the other, sanctionative, educative-preventive ascept considers regu-
lation out of social interest. The proportional relation of these two aspects 
determines the character of the system of liability for damage. Considering 
this dual nature, regulation and imposition of liability for damage are more 
complex than those of other forms of responsibility. \ 
2. Liability for damage caused within the scope of employment 
I. The basis of liability for damage caused within the scope of employment 
is the circumstance that some right or obligation, constituting the purport of 
employment, has been violated. In such cases liability for breach of contract is 
involved. 
According to some views, liability for damage caused within the scope of 
employment is not based solely on the breach of duties undertaken in a 
contract. 
It has been suggested that liability for damage caused within the scope of 
employment might have a dual basis. On the one hand, such liability may 
exist for the breach of some duty arising f rom employment (e. g. the employer 
unlawfully witholds the employee's work-book); on the other hand, liability 
may arise from the breach of general civic duties (e. g. a case of breach of 
general civic duties relating to the protection of human life is involved if the 
employee sustains injury from an accident and suffers loss of earning as a 
result). Consequently two bases should exist simultaneously, i. e. obligations 
arising from employment, and certain general civic duties, which are not 
comprised in the obligations that constitute the contents of employment.1 
Another standpoint is that in the cases mentioned above the obligation con-
tents of employment and general civic duties are violated at the same time.2 
Yet to base the employer's liability for damage partly on the violation of 
obligations of employment, and partly on the violation of obligations outside 
the scope of employment, is actually an undue restiction of the purport of 
employment. Those holding this viéw fail to realize that the general principles 
of law, or their formulation as provisions of law in the Constitution, lay down 
views, requirements, which are valid for the entire legal system.3 These 
views and requirements are being realized within the various branches of 
law. For instance, the principle of protecting human life is of universal vali-
dity and must therefore be enforced in all and any relations of human society. 
So it is realized also in the statutes of labour. The principle of protecting 
human life is realized, first of all, in the rules relating to labour safety. Follo-
wing from their compulsory nature, these rules become constituent parts of 
any type of employment even in the absence of special stipulations to this 
effect. Consequently to interpret liability for damage within the scope of 
labour statutes as the responsibility for violating general civic duties is out of 
the responsibility for violating obligations constituting employment, obligations 
that are the expression of general legal principles, or of the basic principles 
1 Biely K.: Pohladavky na nahradu skody z pracovného pomeru a zák. с .101/53. 
Zb. o prechodnej uprave premlcania. (Právny Obzor 1956. 4.) 
Флейпшц E. А.: Обязательства из причинения вреда и из неоснователсного обогащения 
Ohanovicz A.: Odpowiedzialnosc cywilna pracownika w swietle najnowszego 
orzecznictwa Sadu Najwyzszego. (Panstwo i Prawo, 1956. 5—6.) 
Tomes I.: Zpráva o habilitaci Dr. K. Witze:, Majetková odpovodnost zamest-
nancu za skodu zpusobenou'zamestnavateli." (Právnik. 1958. 5.) 
2 Ignatowicz J.—Stelmachowski A.: Podstawy prawne majatkowej odpowiedzial-
nosci pracowników. (Panstwo i prawo, 1956. 10.) 
Grzybowsky. S.: Rozgraniszenie podstaw prawnych majatkowej odpowiedzial-
nosci pracowników. (Panstwo i Prawo, 1957. 7—8.) 
3 Nagy L.: A munkajog általános elvei. (General principles of the labour law.) 
(Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1960. 1.) • 
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of the legal system to put it in another way, in the field of emplyment. But 
let us add from the outset that the general principles only become constituent 
parts of employment to such an extent as is prescribed by the provisions of 
labour statutes in' the given case. This follows from the coercive nature of 
statuory labour regulations. Thus the view that some obligation within the 
scope of employment and some general civic obligation are violated at the 
5 same time is not tenable either. (What we may admit a t .most is that the 
violation of some rule realizing some general civic duty in respect to employ-
ment, or breach of an obligation arising therefrom, means, indirectly, also the 
breach of some general civic duty. But this is not a case of co-ordination, i. e. 
not the simultaneous violation of two, simultaneously coexisting obligations' of 
identical content. It is rather a relation of the specific and the general. Viola-
tion of the specific comprises — t h o u g h indirectly — the violation of the ge-
neral.) 
II. In the cases discussed above the basis of liability for damage caused 
within the scope of employment has been supposed to exist outside the scope 
of employment. But there are views, too, which place the relation of res-
ponsibility, arising from causing damage within the scope of employment, 
outside the domain of labour statutes, or, more exactly, wish to bring res-
ponsibility under civil law in such cases into operation as well. Several 
variants of these views are known, and some of them are making substantial 
progress towards accepting the special labour-statútory liability for damage. 
Some time ago, , views came up occasionally holding that it is altogether 
incorrect to speak of special labour responsibility. Liability for damage should 
belong to the category, of civil law, and if liability under labour statutes is 
mentioned at all it ought to be considered as specific in a relative sense only 
since it is actually a subspecies of responsibility under civil law. This view is-
now coming up less often, but its remainders still can be found in certain 
standpoints. The same view is manifest is opinions that the provisions of the 
Civil Code should be applied also to questions of liability under labour sta-
tutes.4 Esséntially the same view is reflected in the opinion that compensation 
of the employee for industrial injury — including compensation paid by the 
social insurance system — should be governed not by labour statutes, but 
by provisions of civil law, since the relations involved — are not actually rela-
tions of employment.5 I think that Section 348 of the Hungarian" Civil Code 
under which employee and employer are jointly and serverally responsible 
for damage caused to a third party by a wilful criminal act ought to be re-
garded as the reflection of these former views. 
As contrasted to the views discussed in the foregoing, there is a school 
of thought which places the responsibility for the violation of obligations 
arising, from employment — be it either on the employee's side or no the 
employer's side — within the scope of labour legislation. This position is 
expressed in the literature of Hungarian labour questions.6 This standpoint 
4 Tomes I.: 1. c. • 
5 L̂KHKOB K.: The system of the obligations arise from, damage in the sowiet-
law. (Moscow, 1957.) (Russian.) 
6 Nagy L.: A dolgozók anyagi felelőssége (Worker's material liability.) (Buda-
pest, 1956.) 
Nagy L.: Das Arbeitsrechtsverhaltnis, als Voraussetzung der Arbeitsrechtlichen 
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has recently become dominant also in the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and GDR 
literature.7 It is reflected in the Czehoslovak Code of Labour,8 as well as in 
the German Democratic Republic's Code of Labour,9 and in the Hungarian 
Code of Labour.10 
In my opinion, the latter view is the correct one. Confusion existing in 
respect to this problem is ascribable to several circumstances. One of these 
is the fact that all categories of responsibility are related, since each of them 
is a responsibility in itself and will therefore reveal similar features. But 
this fact does not result in their identity. So we may speak of legal respon-
sibility as the comprehensive category that includes financial liability under 
civil law, labour legislation, or co-operative law. It is obvious that these, 
being categories of responsibility on the one hand, and relating to financial 
liability on the other, will show a number of common features. But these 
features are not those of civil law, or criminal law, but are characteristic of 
certain types of responsibility. This is the point of correlation with the other 
factor, viz. that certain fundamental rules and features of liability for damage 
have been laid down and formulated for the first time in the sphere of civil 
law so the obvious attitude was to see the presence of responsibility under, 
civil law in every case of such liability. The proper place of the employee's 
liability was less controversial because of the fact that it showed features — 
mainly because of a considerable restriction of this libility — which were 
difficult to reconcile with the notion of responsibility under civil law. At the 
same time, the proper place of cases within the sphere of the employee's 
liability — e. g. damage caused wilfully or by criminal act — in which the 
rules of liability bear a high resemblance to responsibility under civil law, 
is still highly controversial. Finally, I should like to mention the former 
• primary character of civil law. This situation prevailed also in Hungary's 
legal system prior to the liberation. As one type of contract for goods the 
contracts of employment figured in the category of contracts under civil law. 
In the socialist legal system the relations of employment are the relations 
of participation in the work of the community. Also the primary character 
of civil law has vanished. Yet at the time labour law became a special field, 
there was no a simultaneous framing and regulation of the aforesaid rela-
materiellen Verantwortlichkeit. (Acta Universitatis Szegediensis. Acta juridica et 
politica, 1958. Tom 5. Fasc. 11.) 
Nagy L.: A Munka Törvénykönyve rendszerének meghatározása. (Definition of 
the system of the Labour Code.) (A. MTA társadalom-történettudományi osztályának 
Osztályközleményei X. 1960.) 
Nagy L.: Anyagi felelősség a munkaviszony keretében okozott károkért. (Material 
liability for damages caused in a labour relation.)) (Budapest, 1964.) Abr.: Liability. 
Nagy L.: Anyagi felelősség. (Material liability.) (Budapest, 1966.) 
Weltner: A magyar munkájog. (The hungarian labour law.) (Budapest, 1962.) 
Abr.: Labour law. 
Weltner—Nagy: Magyar munkajog (Hungarian labour law.) (Budapest, 1966.) 
7 With K.: Ceskoslovenské prácovné právo. (Praha, 1960.) 
Schlegel R.: Arbeitsunfall und Schadenersatzplicht. (Berlin. 1959.) 
Kaiser F.: Einige Bemerkungen zu den Ansprüchen des Werktätigen gegen 
seinen Betrieb bei einer Körperschädigung durch Betriebsunfall oder Berufskran-
kenheit. (Arbeitsrecht, 1958. 3.) 
8 VIII. part. 
0 57—62. §. 
10 98. §. 
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tionships, obviously because of the short period of time available. So the field 
of civil law must occasionally still be resorted to in some form or other. This, 
however, often gives the semblance as if civil law continued to be the basis 
cf labour legislation. 
The employer's liability for violating some obligation arising f rom 
émployment belongs to the sphere of labour law. Being a material liability 
it shows the same features as responsibility under civil law. Yet at the same 
time its independence and dissimilar rules arise from the difference that 
appears between labour relationships and relations of civil law. As the most 
substantial feature of this difference it may be pointed out that the establish-
ment of this legal relationship of labour does not aim at creating or regulating 
some commercial deal, but at putting into effect the participation in the 
work of society. The creation of this legal relationship is influenced on the 
employee's side also by moral motives. Legal relationship in itself usually 
means the creation of a permanent bond, the joining in a collective, and is 
being realized within the scope of this collektive, (What has been mentioned 
here is not the complete set of dissimilar features. I have mentioned chiefly 
those which are of importance in respect to material liability.) Hence the 
views that the material liability of the employer belongs to the sphere of 
civil law, or enjoys but a relative independence from the latter, are not 
acceptable. 
3. Delimination of liability for damage caused within the scope of employment 
a) Delimitation from other consequences of breach of duty 
Liability for damage caused within the scope of employment is a sanction 
of educative nature imposed because of breach of duty arising from em-
ployment. Consequently problems of delimitation may present themselves 
primarily in connexion, with other consequences involved in the breach of 
duty. 
Contracts of employment provide direct possibilities for demanding correct 
performance of the obligations arising from employment, and, in case of non-
performance or faultly performance, for terminating the employment. This 
follows from the purpose of the contract of employment which is to recruit 
labour force for accomplishing the tasks on the employer's side, and to par-
take in the work of society and obtain a share of the national income to make 
his living on the side of the employee. These aims can be realized only 
if the contract of employment materializes. From all this it follows that in 
the field of labour law the primary aim in case of breach of contract is always 
to ensure the performance of obligations and to maintain the contract of em-
ployment thereby. Let us add right away that the aim is always to ensure 
performance as stipulated, i. e. non-pecuniary services must be performed 
in kind, and performance in money can take place only in case of impossi-
bility of performance as specified. 
In case of faulty performance of obligations, the employer, or the employee 
may have claim to recovery, in addition to the claim to performance and 
the right to terminate employment, if either of them sustains material, loss 
owing to non-performance or faulty performance of obligaitons. Even the 
claim to performance proper may convert into a claim to recovery in case 
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of impossibility of performance. But the conversion of performance in kind 
into performance in money does not yet constitute material liability; conver-
sion into a claim to recovery can take place in cases where performance in 
kind becomes impossible, while performance in money is not possible, or may 
be prohibited. 
It often happens in practice that the claims to performance are classified 
in the category of material liability. This phenomenon emerges especially in 
connection with performance in money. For instance, if an unlawful measure 
for terminating employment is annulled, the employee's claim to retained 
wages does not belong to the category of liability but constitutes the claim to 
performance. Namely, annulment of the unlawful measure restores employ-
ment, and the case must be judged as though the unlawful measure had not 
been taken at all. Consequently, the employee is entitled to his wages on the 
basis of employment, so he is entitled, to demand the performance of paying 
wages. This is no liability for damage. If, however, the employee was in need 
of hospital treatment meanwhile, but because of termination of his employ-
ment was not entitled to social insurance services — including medical care 
f ree of charge — and therefore had. to pay the hospitalization costs, his claim 
to recorvey will accrue in respect to these expenses. So this will be a case 
of liability for damage. The discrimination between claims to performance 
and revoyery in connection with the unlawful termination of employment is 
not only of theoretical, but also of practical importance. Thus in case of un-
lawful termination of employment adjudicated wages are distrainable, while 
sums adjudicated as damages are not.11 
b) Delimitation from violation of obligations arising from other legal 
relations that exist between the subjects of employment 
• Not only one, but several legal relationships may exist at the same t ime 
between the subjects of employment. It may happen, for example, that the 
employer commissions his employee to do some translation work at home af ter 
working hours. In this case a relationship of commission is created, in addition 
to employment. It may happen, too, that the same employee's house is leased 
out by the employer for the purpose of a company holiday house. In this case 
a third legal relationship, that of tenancy, is created between employer and 
employee. It may happen within the scope of any of these legal relationships 
that one party causes damage to the other by some activity. (E. g. the com-
pany employees spoil some pieces of equipment in the rented house.) In such 
cases the damaging conduct takes .place between the parties not within the 
scope of employment, but within some other legal relationship. And since the 
violated basic relationship is not the one of employment, .the relationship of 
liability arising therefrom follows the nature of the former, and does not 
belong to the sphere of liability for damage caused within the scope of 
employment. 
In this context the problem of the nature of damage sustained by 
employees staying at workers' homes or company holiday houses has been 
raised in practice repeatedly. Provisions of law contain no specific rules 
concerning this problem. The cases occurring in judicial practice were connec-
11 Supreme Court, decision №796/15. . 
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ted with damage sustained in workers' homes, and in respect to the legal 
ground of such claims the position taken in these matters is usually limited 
to the ruling that the employer is answerable only in case of dereliction on 
his part. Yet the obligations for what particular violation the employer can 
be held liable in such cases are not specified in these rulings. Several solutions 
may be taken into consideration. 
One position may be that possibility of recreation in workers' homes or 
company holiday houses is provided by the relationship of employment. 
The employer establishes these facilities for the welfare of his employes. The 
sources of such facilities usually are welfare funds or, possibly, profit shares. 
Thus the possibility of establishing them arises on the basis of labour regu7 
lations. Moreover, in cases where the employer is under the. obligation to 
provide accomodation — e. g. in the building trade or mining — the establish-
ment of workers' homes is carried out as the fulfilment of one obligation 
within the scope of employment, and pursuant to compulsory rules of labour 
statutes. On the basis of this consideration, the liability for damage caused 
by the employer in the holiday house or the workers' home belongs to the 
sphere of liability for damage caused within the scope of employment. Ruling 
P. 20 155/1956 of the Supreme Court seems to adopt this position. The Court 
has ruled that the employer is not ordinarily obliged to keep guard over 
quarters provided for employees, but in the given case the quarters were 
remote from ; inhabited areas and from the employees' working-place, so 
guarding would have been necessary because of the hazard of burglary; 
since the employer failed to provide a guard, he is liable for damage. 
It may be argued, too, that staying at a workers' home or the company 
holiday house, is outside the scope of employment relationship, so damage 
sustained at these places be judged according to the rules of liability under 
civil law. . 
Finally, there might be a standpoint saying that damage sustained during 
the use of workers' homes or company holiday houses cannot be judged 
•according to the rules governing liability for damage caused within the scope 
of employment, nor can the present rules of civil law be applied to such 
cases. 
As concers the views discussed in the foregoing, the first is right in that 
provision of accommodation in workers' homes or recreation in company 
holiday houses is based on the employer's obligations arising from employ-
ment. But in my opinion a clear distinction ought to be made between the 
availability of a service due to the employee on the basis of employment, 
and its actual use by the employee. Within the scope of employment, em-
ployers are obliged to provide accommodation to employees active in certain 
branches of industry. This accommodation can be provided either by estab-
lishing workers' homes for the employees to live in, or by reservation of 
accomodation in a hotel, or possibly at a private person. The disjunction of 
provision and making use of the services appears clearly in such a case. But 
there are several other comparable cases. For example, the benefit of tra-
velling home very four weeks is due to employees trasferred to some lacality 
where they live away from their families. The employer is obliged to make 
available this travel benefit. If he fails to do so, he violates his obligation 
arising from employment. But if the employee sustains some damage during 
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travel, or the booking clerk issues a wrong ticket, the employer cannot be 
held liable for damage. The employer meets his obligation by making avai-
lable the workers' home to the employee or by issuing to him the transfer 
order to the company holiday house. If he fails to do so — e. g. does not 
reserve accommodation toa recruited worker — he violates his obligation, 
and in case of sustaining damage (e. g. the employee has ti live in a hotel) 
the employee has a rightful claim to recovery. But to make use of accomoda-
tion, i. e. to make use of the service provided by the employer, its utilization, 
does no longer belong within the sphere of employment. Hence if the emplo-
yee sustains damage during such utilization, this event is outside the sphere 
of the relationship of employment. Consequently damage caused at worker 's 
homes or ccmpany holiday houses cannot be classified as damage caused 
within the scope of employment. Yet if this position is adopted, there still re-
mains the problem of what rules should be applied in such cases. On the other 
hand, the view, mentioned third is correct in that the rules governing the 
innkeepers' liability are not suitable in every respect to this case. The circum-
scantes differ from those in hotéls in case of both workers' homes and com-
pany holiday houses. It is therefore that this question calls for regulation. 
In my opinion such rules should be laid down not in labour statutes but ra-
ther in the domain of civil law, since the legal, relationship between the com-
pany running the workers' home and the employee making use of this accom-
modation does not belong.to the sphere of labour, law. It is a practicular sort 
of tenancy. This appears clearly from cases where the workers' home is run 
by some organ maintained for this purpose. The contrary view, i. e. to classify 
these relationships as belonging to labour legislation, would lead too far, as 
tenancy created in case of providing official quarters for a certain activity 
should have to be regulated by labour statutes as a result. 
c) Delimitation from liability for damage caused to or by. a third party 
Liability under labour law is the conseqúénce of the breach of somé duty 
arising from employment. It may happen, however, that the effect of the 
damaging conduct is materializing outside the relationship of employment, or 
a person outside this employment may display an activity whose damaging 
effect materializes within the scope of employment. 
Suppose a burglar steals the employee's chlothes from the locker. In 
this case no relationship of employment exists between the third party — 
the burglar — and the employee or employer, and cannot arise either as a 
matter of course. Thus liability in this case does not belong to the sphere of 
material liability under labour law. But, as a result of burglary, claim for 
damages can accrue between the subjects of the legal relationship of employ-
ment, which claim then belongs to the sphere of labour law (The basis of 
this claim will be the fact that the employer has violated his obligation of 
safe-keeping in respect to the employee's personal belongings, since burglary 
could have been prevented). In a case like this, the employee can claim 
damages from the bulglar pursuant to the rules of civil law, and also f rom 
the employer pursuant to the rules of labour law. (These two. claims do not 
necessarily coincide. It may be that the employer can be held liable only for 
a specified category of personal belongings. But the burglar is liable for all 
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and any damage caused by him.) The employer in turn can bring an action, 
under civil law against the burglar, claiming the sum he has paid for the 
damage. 
The situation is similar if, for instance, the employee suffers an electric 
shock through the fault of another worker working at the same machine. The 
employee then will have a rightful claim for damages against the employer. 
Since the worker causing the accident has acted within the scope of his 
employment, responsibility to the third party — the injured employee in 
this . case — will lie with the employer on behalf of the worker causing 
damage, as provided by Section 348 of the Civil Code. Similarly, the employer-
will be responsible to the social insurance agency and refund the latter with 
the sum paid to the injured employee. At the same time the employer can 
enforce claim for damages against the worker causing the injury, pursuant 
to the rules of liability under labour statutes. 
An example of the opposite case is when the employee suffers a fatal 
accident within the scope of his employment, and his survivor dependents are 
left without support and advance their claim against the employer. This case 
illustrates a seeming exception to the principle that the relationship of liability 
arising as a, result of damage between the subject of employment and a third 
party does not belong to the sphere of liability for damage caused within the 
scope of employment. Namely the claim of the survivors of the employee-
killed, in an industrial accident is governed by the rules of liability under 
labou; law. 
4. Types of damage caused within the scope of employment 
Liability for damage caused within the scope of employment accrues from 
the non-performance or faulty performance of the contract of employment. 
We have clarified in the foregoing that non-performance or faulty performance 
does not in itself result in liability for damage, and that it only does so if 
the employee or the employer sustains damage from this conduct. 
Based on the circumstances in which damage is caused by the employer 
to the employee, we may speak of four types of damage: 
a) the employee is deprived of the possibility to exercise some right due 
to him on the basis of the contract of employment, and sustains damage in 
this case by 
I. the loss of an income 
II. having to bear certain expenses, i. e. suffer reduction of his existing 
means; 
b) the employee's right to work sustains injury, he is hindered in doing 
his work. In this case he may sustain damage by 
I. loss of an income, including loss of income due to him from some other 
place (e. g. in case of unlawful witholding of his work-book), 
II. having to bear certain expenses, i. e. suffer reduction of his existing 
means; 
c) some of the employee's personal belongings are damaged or lost. In 
this case damage may be sustained in that the employee's available means 
are reduced by 
I. shortage, damage, loss of things, possibly 
II. expenses. 
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d) the employee's health or corporeal intergrity is injured (this coincides 
partially with the cases of paragraph b.) In this case damage may be 
sustained by 
I. loss of an income, wages first of all, 
II. having to bear expenses, i. e. reduction of available means; 
(This latted includes the case when the dependents sustain damage 
because of the employee's death. This may materialize in that the dependents' 
I. incomc (support) is lost 
II. available means are reduced since expenses have to be borne. 
In cases of damage caused to the employer by the employee, the following 
types may occur: 
a) the employer is deprived of the possibility to exercise some right due 
to him on the basis of the contract of employment, and the employer sustains 
damage by 
I. loss of an income, 
II. reduction of available means because of expenses; 
b) some property of the employer is damaged, destroyed, or the employer 
is prevented from exercising some right due to him in rescept to others, in 
which case damage may be sustained by 
I. reduction of available means, through 
— deterioration of value of things, • • 
— expenses 
II. loss of income; 
c) in case of damage caused by the employee to a third party the employer 
is obliged to assume responsibility, in which case damage may be sustained by 
reduction of available means, through 
I. paying for damage, repair, 
II. expenses; 
d) the employee cannot give account of material, money given him on 
trust, or cannot return them, in which case damage may be sustained by 
I. loss of income 
II. reduction of available means by 
— the value of things lost 
— expenses. 
The basis of the types of damage enumerated above is the same: non-
performance or faulty performance of the contract of employment. Yet to 
differentiate between types is of importance all the same. On the one hand, 
the Possibility and method of influencing and educating the damager may 
vary on the other. And these circumstances have a substantial effect on the 
framing of the system of liability for damage. After laying down the general 
principles of liability we must therefore decide with what differences they 
can be employed in cases of various types of damage. 
In order to be able to lay down the principles of liability for damage, 
we must define the concept of belonging within the scope of employment, 
the criteria of breach of contract, the conditions under which influencing is 
possible, and the questions involved in imposing sanctions. Finally, beyond all 
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these, we must study the causal relations that provide .a f i rm basis for 
determining the relationship of the various components of liability for damage. 
All these combined constitute the complete system of liability for damage 
under labour law in the broader sense. 
The system of liability for damage — and especially the ratio and content 
of the various components within it — is not exempt from changes. It varies 
in accordance with social and economic progress. The importance of various 
interests protected by the institution of liability for damage may change, 
the other means of influencing and education may increase in weight, the self-
consciousness of people may rise to a higher degree, and so on. All these 
affect the institution of liability for damage. So the effect of these factors 




Liability for damage caused within the scope of employment accrues 
from the violation of obligations arising from employment, and — regarded 
from the other side — from the infringement of rights arising from employ-
ment. From this it follows that Whenever liability id brought into operation 
the first thing to do is to clarify whether , a relationship of employment had 
existed between damager and damaged, i. e. whether the damaging conduct 
actually represented the violation of obligations or rights arising from employ-
ment. Several controversial issues present themselves in this respect. One 
of these groups relates to the problem how this liability is taking shape at the 
time of establishing and terminating employment, and in case of defective 
contracts of employment* The other group of questions emerges whenever 
it is to be decided what damaging conduct represents the violation of obliga-
tions or rights arising f rom employment if different types of causing damage 
are involved. The third group comprises the questions whether the perpetra-
tor or sufferer of the damaging act was or was not a subject of employment 
and in what capacity he had acted. 
B) The existence of employment 
1. Breach of promise to establish employment 
Before discussing the questions connected with the existence of employ-
ment I should like to call the attention to the circumstance that the claim 
raised by the employee for breach of promise to establish employment does 
not belong to the sphere of liability for damage caused within the scope of 
employment. Here the facts of the case are that the employer had made 
a promise to emyloy somebody, but employment has not been created for 
reasons beyond the interested person's control. Considering this promise, 
the interested person was justified in relying on the creation of employment, 
has accepted no other employment as a result, and has austained damage 
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from the non-materialization of the relationship, of the promised employment. 
No labour relationship whatsoever has therefore emerged between the par -
ties. Hence violation of obligations undertaken with a contract of employ-
ment is out of the question. The employer's conduct of not having employed 
the interested person in spite of his promise to do so constitutes an extra-
contractual, wrongful, damaging attitude, consequently the liability arising 
therefrom must — in my opinion — be jedged pursuant to the rules of 
civil law. This position has been taken also in judicial practice.1 
2. Causing damage within the scope of employment based 
on a contract of employment null and void 
The voidness of a contract of employment may be raised in connection 
with liability for damage in two aspects. On the one hand, it may be prob-
lematic in what manner the damage sustained by one party as a result 
of the voidness of the contract of employment should be repaired. On the 
other hand, it may be open to debate what rules are governing the repair 
of damage caused during the existence of employment, i. e. damage not 
arising from voidness, if such employment has resulted from a contract null 
and void. At present, neither of these cases is regulated under labour legis-
lation. 
As concerns the first case, i. e. damage resulting from the voidness of 
the contract of employment, liability for such damage lies within the sphere 
of labour law. But the rules governing liability for damage caused within 
the scope of employment, must be applied to such cases with certain diffe-
rences. The reason for doing so is that damage has not been caused within 
the scope of employment, but in. connexion with establishing employment. 
As concerns, the second case, i. e. liability for damage caused during the . 
eixistence of employment based on a contract null and void, the generally 
accepted view in literature and practice is that such damage must always 
be judged pursuant to the rules governing liability for damage caused within 
the scope of employment. The reason is that the actual legal status of the 
subjects at the relationship of employment does not differ in anything during 
the existence of the void employment from that of a valid contract. Hence 
labour law attaches the same legal effects to void contracts of employment 
— during their existence — as to valid contracts (e. g. the employee is entit-
led to wages, days of rest, to leave if employment has lasted long enough, 
etc.). It would be a contradiction of principles if in this case of liability rules 
other than those of labour law were applied. 
3. Damage caused during the period between creating employment 
and actual starting of work 
It may happen that damage is caused during a period of time that passes 
from the coming into existence of employment and the starting of actual 
work. E. g. the employee calls on the employer to be informed exactly where 
roys some of the employer's material or equipment. 
1 Supreme Court P. 6949/1949. 
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it is he hes to report for work and suffers an accident when leaving the 
workshop. The question is whether in such cases the rules of iabour law 
or the rules of civil law should be applied for judging liability for damage. 
During the period that passes from entering the contract of employment 
and the starting of work, the employee or the employer can sustain damage 
in two ways. One case is when the employer violates his obligation under-
taken in the contract of employment by not actually creating employment, 
or creating it after the due date; or the employee fails to meet his obligation 
and does not enter service, or enters it after the due date only. The other 
case is when the employer injures the life, health or corporeal integrity of 
the employee, or the employee's personal belongings brought to the emplo-
yer's premises are damaged or destroyed; or the employee damages or dest-
In the first case, sausing damage constitutes violation of the contract 
of employment beyond all question. Hence liability for damage is governed 
by the rules of labour law-
The situation is different in the second' case. Here the circumstances, 
which necessitate a regulation that differs from liability under civil law 
in respect to liability for damage caused within the scope of employment, 
do not yet exist. -
Let us first study this problem from the angle of the employer's liability.. 
In case of injury to the employee's. life, corporeal integrity, or damage or 
destruction of some of his personal belongings, the employer's liability for 
damage rests on the requirement that the employer is under the obligation 
-to create within-the scope of employment such circumstances in which the 
employees can do their work undisturbed, need not be afraid of their. health 
or corporeal integrity being injured, their belongings brought to the pre-
mises lost or damaged. Within the scope of this obligation the employer is 
expected not only to set up the necessary equipment, take the necessary 
measures, but also to instruct the employees as to. the order or working, 
conduct within the premises, and to supervise the observance of these rules. 
Adequate instruction of the employee cannot take place before he enters ser-
vice, as he is not yet assigned to some unit of the enterprise, and, as a result, 
no proper supervision can be exercised over him. As concerns circumstances, 
such an employee does not differ from a person who is not employed there 
t>ut stays at the employer's premises for some particular purpose (visit, shop-
ping, etc.). (Dangerousness of the unit is present also in respect to this person, 
he does not know the regulations, etc. This situation is not affected by the 
fact that this person might posses qualification by which he is familiar with 
the machinery, equipment of the given workshop. For example, a lathe ope-
rator inspects and tests the lathe at which he is going to work and suffers 
an accident before entering service.) Any visitor of the premises may possess 
technological qualification which makes him fiamiliar with the machinery 
and operations of the workshop he is visiting. This circumstance will be 
taken into account by the court in an action for damages brought by such 
person, and this person's possible instrumentality in sustaining damage might 
be established by the court exactly on account of his qualification. By cont-
rast, in case of employees the emphasis lies not only on qualification, but 
•on familiarity with the given place of work, machinery, on instruction recei-
ved in these matters and, first of all, on the fact that constant supervision 
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can and must be exercised over employees actually doing work on the pre-
mises. All this does not apply to employees who appear at the premises be-
fore entering actual service. It would not be justifiable in any respect to 
impose a different responsibility on the employer towards such persons. This 
would not be justified by the requirements of reparation, nor by those 
of education. By the same token, there cannot be any obligation on the em-
ployer's part to keep safe or protect from damage the personal belongings 
qff such persons over and above the ordinary liability for damage to any 
other person entering the premises. 
Similar conclusions are reached if the problem is viewed from the angle 
of the employee's liability. Circumstances that justify the regulation of the 
employee's liability within the sphere of labour legislation emphasize two 
points. One is the particular nature of employment, and the circumstance 
that the employee is doing work within a collective, by which the possibility 
is given to get acquainted with the employee thoroughly, and to apply dif-
ferentiated means of education if he causes damage. The other is the fact 
that within the scope of employment the possibility of causing damage is 
increased. Until and unless the employee enters actual service, neither of 
these circumstances exist. Hence during the period in question, the employee's 
legal status does not differ from that of any other person who is not em-
ployed there. 
It follows from the foregoing that in case of damage caused during 
.the period that passes from making the contract of employment to the time 
actual work is started, the rules governing liability for damage caused within 
the scope of employment cannot be applied. 
C) Damage becoming manifest 
after the termination of employment 
From the circumstance that the employer's or employee's liability only 
applies to damage caused within the scope of employment it follows that 
the provisions of labour statutes cannot be applied to damage caused af ter 
the termination of employment. 
Two questions present themselves in this respect. First, whether the pro-
visions of labour law can be applied to cases where damage has been caused 
during employment, but is detected only after the termination of employ-
ment. Second, whether the provisions of labour law can be applied to cases 
where the act entailing damage has been performed during employment, 
but actual damage arises and is detected only after the termination of em-
ployment (e. g. the employee sustains an industrial accident f rom which he 
recovers in a few weeks, after which he terminates his employment by giving 
notice: Some months after, symptoms of paralysis appear in his leg. Medical 
examination establishes that paralysis is the sequel of the preceding acci-
dent but could not be predicted at the time of the accident.) 
In my opinion, it is the time at which the causative act of the damage 
was performed that must be relevant in respect to the application of rules 
of liability. The essential factor is that damage resulted from the fact that 
the employer's or employee's right arising f rom employment has been viola-
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ted. The causative process had set in during employment. The causal nexus 
between conduct and damage subsists, only the occurrence or detection of 
damage takes place within this causal succession at a time by which employ-
ment had been terminated. 
D) Damage caused within the scope of employment 
In the foregoing we discussed cases in which the existence of obligation 
and resulting liability for damage were disputable because the existence of 
employment was questionable, i. e. it had to be decided whether on the basis 
of a contract of employment the employer or employee was under the obli-
gation to perform. 
It may happen, however, that the coming into existence and the subsis-
tence of employment is beyong question, but the question arises whether at 
a given time or situation the employee or employer was entitled to some 
right, or was under the obligation of performance. Whether some right or 
obligation constitutes the purport of the relationship of employment is not 
the question in these cases; the question is whether or not the employer or 
the employee was entitled in the given case to exercise some right, or de-
mand some performance, while the latter two were constituent elements 
of employment beyond question. 
As concerns the time of performance, the rights and obligations cons-
tituting employment Can be divided into several groups. There exist obliga-
tions whose performance, fulfilment, aré the constant, incessant duties of the 
party concerned for the entire duration of employment. For instance, one 
of these duties is the employer's obligation to keep the employee's work-
book in his custody until the termination of employment. On the other hand, 
there are obligations whose performance — considering their nature — is 
binding on the obligov only during a specified period of time. The majori ty 
of rights and obligations constituting employment belong here. Thus the 
obligation to keep the employee working, constituting the escense of employ-
ment, is binding on the employer only for a specified section of the week 
or the day, and only within a specified length of time. Finally, there are 
certain rights and obligations which can be exercised and must be met at 
a specified time or event taking place. Such obligations are to pay jubilee 
rewards, or to return to the employee his work-book upon termination of 
employment. 
Cases in which the party concerned can exercise some right or must 
meet some obligation on a constant basis, or some performance is due a,t 
a specified time or following some specified event, present no problems in 
connection with liability for damage. Where most problems arise from is the 
performance or breach of obligations, or exercise and infringement of rights, 
connected with doing work and keeping employed or other closely related 
rights and obligations (e. g. the right to healthy and safe working conditions). 
In such cases it is often questionable whether in the given instance the sub-
ject of employment was entitled to insist on performance, whether such 
performance was due or not. For instance, whether the employer was or 
was not under the obligation to provide healthy and safe working conditions 
in the case and at the time the employee sustained injury. Since these ques-
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tions present themselves differently at various types of damage, they will be 
discussed there. It should be noted as a general principle that in drawing 
the limits we must start f rom the function of liability for damage. Liability 
for damage can be brought into operation in cases where compensation, i. e. 
the imposition of sanctions, is actually fit to influence the employer or emplo-
yee to avoid improper conduct in the future, and safeguard to the fullest 
extent the other party's exercise of rights. Wherever this possibility is not 
given, bringing into operation liability for damage is not justified. (If the 
situation calls for some intervention, measure nevertheless, this ought to be 
effected not through the liability for damage, but in some other way). 
E) The subjects of employment 
We may speak of damage caused within the scope of employment only 
if both the damager and the damaged are subjects of the relationship of 
employment. An exception to this general principle is the case when the 
employee suffers a fatal accident and his dependents and heirs — i. e. per-
sons outside the scope of employment — sustain damage (through the loss 
of support, burial expenses, etc.) and can enforce their claims within the 
scope of liability for damage under labour law. This is not a case of the 
damaged person becoming subject of the employment, or being judged in the 
same manner as the subject; it simply means that in case of responsibility for 
damage to persons outside the scope of employment liability is governed by 
the rules of labour law. 
Yet in realizing liability for damage it may become questionable whether 
the damager or the damaged can be regarded as a subject of the relation-
ship of employment. On the side of the employee this problem arises in case 
of certain special types of employment. On the side of the employer the 
problem is present in cases when the employer is a juristic person. 
a) The employee aspect 
On the side of the employee, only a natural person can be the subject 
of employment, and only one person for any one employment. Thus the 
person of the employee, i. e. the subject of employment, cannot be doubtful 
on the employee side. There is no problem here: what may give rise to prob-
lems is that in certain types of employment the employee is permitted to 
have recourse to the help of his family members in performing his duties. 
Such possibilities exist, for instance, with keepers of agricultural cooperative 
shops, house-porters, linesmen of the Hungarian State Railways. Apart f rom 
a few exceptions, family members in such cases do not become subjects of 
employment, nor subjects of any other legal relation with the employer. Yet 
at the same time they might sustain damage while performing the tasks of 
employment (e. g. the family member may fracture his leg while answering 
the house-door, or may spoil his clothes), and might cause damage as well 
(e.g. damage the starting device of the lift). The question in such cases is 
whether the family member can advance his claim directly against the emplo-
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yer, or the employer directly against the family member, and whether the 
claim is to be judged on the basis of provisions of labour law or of civil law. 
In answering these questions we must start from the circumstance that 
in cases mentioned above the performance of the employee's duties usually 
requires a helper's cooperation as follows from the nature of these duties, 
since they hardly can be met by one person alone. (In case of railway lines-
men the inspection tour of their stretch and issuing tickets may coincide. 
In case of house-porters the duties are distributed over 24 hours of the day 
so certain duties must be attended to by family members to ensure some 
hours of rest to the employee). At the same time, the necessity of helping 
arises at greatly varying times and amounts, so it would be difficult to estab-
lish special employment for these duties with some other person, and, regar-
ding the nature, of accommodation, especially in case of linesmen and house-
porters, it would hardly be possible to employ as a helper a person not belon-
ging to the family. Hence the performance of duties of employment requires 
the work of family members, who thereby co-operate in performing the tasks 
of employment. And their co-operation is not only permitted and consented 
to by the employer, but the latter acually expects them to co-operate in the 
proper performance of duties. Thus, in essense, we are confronted with a 
covert, irregular type of employment. But from all this it follows, too,, that 
all the conditions the employer is obliged to provide to his employee during 
work on the basis of employment, must be provided to the helping family 
member as well. (Further rights and obligations arising from employment 
are due and binding on the employee within the scope of his employment. 
Namely the full performance of duties of employment is derived from the 
co-operative work of the employee and his helping family member. So the 
employee's wages and other benefits comprise also the equivalent of the hel-
per's work.) If the employer fails to provide proper conditions to the family 
member, and the latter sustains damage as a result, the employer is directly 
liable to the family member. As follows from the foregoing discussions, the 
employer will be liable pursuant to the rules of labour law. We reach the 
same conclusion also if we consider that in case of damage sustained by the 
employee — especially as concerns injury to health, corporeal integrity, da,-
mage to belongings — it is justified to have a regulation differing from 
civil law if only because of the circumstance that the employee is familiar 
with the situation prevailing in his employment, that several circumstances 
that may be increasingly dangerous to an outsider are not, or much less, 
dangerous to him; or, vice versa, any change in routine circumstances cons-
titutes much greater danger to him since he cannot possibly foresee them, 
is much more exposed to their effect during his work since there is no possi-
bility of his avoiding them. The situation of the helping family member is 
similar. The circumstances are known to him, their change takes him unawa-
res, unprepared, the possibility to avoid them is reduced also in his case. 
Considering this similar situation, it seems justified to apply also in his 
case the rules of liability for damage caused within the scope of employ-
ment. 
We reach the same conclusion if we study the problem from the angle 
of damage caused by the employee. As appears from the' foregoing argu-
mentation, the helping family member actually, performs some part of the 
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•activities to be performed by the employee on the basis of his employment. 
If he causes damage in the course of these activities, this constitutes —as 
concerns the employer — damage caused in the course of performing duties 
arising from employment, even if damage has been caused not by the 
employee but by the family member acting on his behalf. If the employee 
had not called in his family member to help in his work, and damage would 
have resulted during the employee's working, he would be liable under the 
rules of labour law. So it seems unjustified that liability arising f rom 
damage caused by the fámily member while helping in the employee's work 
should be subject to a different regulation. And it would seem especially 
unjustified if we consider that the obligation to compensate would reduce 
the family income even in case of a different regulation. Moreover, in cases 
where the helping family member has no income of his own, compensation 
will be paid by the employee from his earnings. Hence, if the family mem-
ber were liable individually, the paradoxical • situation would arise that the 
employee would come of better if he denied the family member having 
caused damage, and persented it as caused by himself. Considering all this, 
only the employee is held liable even if damage has been caused to the 
employer by the helping family member. 
b) The employer aspect 
In a socialist society, the employer is usually a juristic person. A juris-
tic person displays its activities through the acts of natural persons. In this 
context, we must study the question whose acts can be considered as the 
juristic person's own activity. 
Some time ago the view prevailed that an employing enterprise is only 
answerable for the activities of a certain limited number of persons (its 
organs, leading employees, possibly other authorized persons) as activities 
of its own, and is answerable beyond this sphere only on the basis of res-
ponsibility for and to others because of some neglect in selection and super-
vision. 
Today both jurisprudence and practice accept the view that the activi-
ties of any employee must be regarded as the activity of the employer 
enterprise, and that the employer is answerable for such activities in the 
same manner as for his own. This position is reflected in the Hungarian 
Civil Code and appears from the provisions of the Hungarian Code of Labour, 
where the obligations and duties of the employer enterprise figure at every 
instance. 
The basis of the present prevailing view is that in case of social owner-
ship of the means of production the member of society couples his working 
ability with means of production that are his own. Even if the form of this 
structure is similar to capitalist labour contracts of commercial character, 
the purport is basically different. Socialist enterprises are units of the socia-
lits society's assets and are set up for the purpose of realizing better mana-
gement, better organization of the social division of labour, and fir the 
organized performance of society's work. The employees of the enterprises 
are members of this collective that carries out production. The leader of a 
socialist enterprise is not a person managing his own property, or some 
capital in private ownership; he is the member of society, and, within this, 
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member of a collective performing a given task of production, who has been 
assigned the task to direct the work of an economic unit within the scope 
of organizing the work of society and the participation in such work. And 
the employee of the enterprise is not an economically and politically depen-
dent person who sells his working ability on the labour market; he is ano-
ther member of the collective, and shares the work of society within this 
economic unit. The employee is obliged to comply with the instructions of 
the assigned leader while doing his work. This is the foundation of any 
organized work. But, irrespective of this, he is entirely of the same rank 
as the leader, and is the same sharer of social property as the leader. The 
consequence of this situation is that the individual employees of the enter-
prise, and, first of all, the collective as a whole and its representatives, 
enjoy wide consultative and controlling rights in respect to the activities 
of the enterprise. It follows from this in turn that the activities of any 
member of the collective cannot be detached from the activities of the col-
lective as a whole, and that no order of rank can be established by which 
the activities of certain members represent the activities of the collective, 
while those of others do not. Within the framework of a socialist enter-
prise, no discrimination can therefore be made to the effect that only the 
activities of certain persons represent the activities of the enterprise. 
The conclusion that the activities of any employee of the enterprise 
represent the activities of the enterprise at the same time needs some addi-
tion. Those advocating the view that the activities of any employee must be 
regarded as the activities of the enterprise always add that this applies to the 
activities of the enterprise always add that this applies to the activities con-
nected with the employee's duties and sphere of work. This provision is also 
contained in Section 348 of the Hungarian Civil Code. But this definition in 
itself is not explanatory enough. Disputes arising in practice usually raise the 
question whether certain activities of an employee are or are not connected 
with his scope of duties or employment. 
Concerning the liability of enterprises, judicial practice takes the posi-
tion — not entirely consistently though — that the enterprise is liable for 
the activities of its employee even in case of a transgression of the sphere 
of duties or authority. It happened, for instance, that the works manager 
of the Electric Power Supply Enterprise wished to test the work of the 
switch lever of a transformer. He switched on the current and an electrician 
working on the unit suffered an electric shock. In a lawsuit brought by 
the Social Insurance Centre against the enterprise, the latter pleaded that 
the switching on of transformers was not within the works manager's scope 
of duties, it is reserved for electricians, consequently the enterprise could 
not be held liable for. the accident. The Supreme Court established the lia-
bility, of the enterprise. The Court ruled that ,,the correct interpretation 
of the term ,scope of duties' implies that the employer's liability for his 
employee's acts prevails in any case . . . where the employee causes damage 
to a third party while doing his work." In the cited instance the works 
manager caused damage while inspecting the works, i. e. while doing his 
work.2 Likewise, the Supreme Court established the liability of the enter-
prise for its employee's acts in a case where the enterprise delegated one 
2 Supreme Court P. torv. I. 20 364/1961. 
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of its mechanics to do some repair work at another enterprise, and this 
mechanic got on a tractor — which had been left unguarded by its driver — 
started the tractor, and caused an accident. Here too, the reasoning was 
that the mechanic entered the premises of the other enterprise to do his 
work, and caused damage while doing his work. Although this was not 
directly connected with his scope of duties, it suffices. as the basis of the 
liability of the enterprise, since the only prerequisite of this basis is that 
the employee is placed under circumstances where he caused damage follo-
wing from his scope of duties.3 
In my opinion this question must by approached from the angle which con-
siders the extent to which the enterprise is able to influence its employees 
in merit. And this influence only operates in connection with performing 
work in the strict sense, i. e. in connection with doing work as stipulated 
in. the contract of employment, as well as with tasks performed beyond the 
scope of duties in compliance with instructions, or without such instructions. 
Enterprises accomplish their tasks — including the performance of con-
tracts of employment — through their employees. In doing so the scope 
of duties is determined for each employee. The enterprise can organize 
work and supervision of work adequately, provided that the scope of duties 
is defined for every employee. Hence the employees perform the activities 
cf the enterprise when performing their duties. But it often happens that, 
in the interest of efficient enterprise work, the employee is under the neces-
sity of departing f rom prescriptions governing his scope of duties (often 
because such prescriptions are incomplete, or because cases arise that could 
not have been foreseen). On the other hand, the employee's scope of duties 
comprises — theoretically and obviously — only lawful activities. Causing 
damage usually presupposes a violation of rights. Thus, logically, damage 
could never be caused in the capacity of an employee if we took the position 
that activities sannot be qualified as the activity of the enterprise if the 
regulations governing the scope of duties are violated. And if such conduct 
'were outside the scope of employment, disciplinary liability could not be 
brought into operation either. Hence activities implying the transgression 
of the scope of duties, violation of regulations relating to duties, must also 
be regarded in general as the activities of the enterprise itself. Besides, 
this position may have the effect to compel enterprises to define correctly 
the working regulations, to select their employees carefully, and to orga-
nize control and supervision properly. 
Activités outside the aforesaid field — such as using dressing-rooms, 
baths, engaging in social activities — cannot be interpreted as the activities 
of the enterprise itself. Yet there may be exceptions even here. For instance, 
an employee's activités in the canteen during taking meals is not an activity 
of the enterprise; but if the employee, when having his lunch, gives some 
instruction relating to work to one of his subordinates, this is an activity 
originating in his scope of duties and must therefore be regarded as the 
enterprise's own activity. 
If an employee causes damage to one of his fellowemployees, but his 
activity is not within the field mentioned above, i. e. not connected with his 
duties, his activity cannot be regarded as one of the enterprise. Yet the 
3 Supreme Court P. tôrv. I. 20 724/1962. 
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liability of the enterprise might prevail nevertheless. The basis of liability in 
such a case may be the circumstance that the damaging conduct of the 
aforesaid employee was rendered possible by some activity, possibly neglect, 
of another employee who acted within the scope of his duties. Thus the 
activity of this latter employee, having acted within the scope of his duties, 
must be regarded as the activity of the enterprise. 
i n . 
UNLAWFULNESS 
1. The concept of unlawfulness 
As we have seen in Chapter I, liability for damage is the consequence of 
the breach of contract of employment, i. e. of an unlawful state of affairs. 
Hence unlawfulness is the prerequisite of liability for damage. 
Unlawfulness is of an objective character. This is manifest in the circum-
stance that the state of unlawfulness exists independent of our consciousness 
on the one hand, and that it materializes in the outside world, on the other. 
(Unlawfulness contains also underlying factors that do not materialize in 
the outside world. The manifestation of thèse, appears as the externally visible 
factor. This aspect is usually defined as the subjective facet of unlawfulness. 
But, actually, this definition is not entirely accurate. This factor is truly 
subjective, as'it contains internal — psychic — manifestations; but i t is objec-
tive, too, at. the same time in that it contains phenomena existing in reality.) 
In the literature on law the controversy has arisen repeatedly whether 
unlawfulness requires the violation of some legal relationship — i. e. subjec-
tive right — in addition to the violation of some objective right. As concerns 
liability under civil law, the prevailing view is that a conduct can be qualified 
as unlawful if it violates an objective right and some-person's subjective right 
at the same time, and causes damage in addition. 
In respect to liability for damage-caused within the scope of employment, 
this controversy is of no consequence. Namely in such cases the consequences 
of violating a contract of employment are involved. The employer or the 
employee have not performed, or not properly performed, the contract. This 
means that the employee's or the employer's rights constituting employment 
have not been realized, and this results in damage which is manifest in the 
loss of an income, or the reduction of available means. Hence liability for 
damage caused within the scope of employment always accrues from the viola-
tion of some personal right. 
2. The proper exercise of rights 
In our discussion of unlawfulness Wè have so far start ed from the premise 
that the subject of employment violates rights or obligations constituting 
employment, is at default in performing the obligations arising of the contract 
of employment. That is to say, there is express opposition, transgression, on 
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part of employer or employee. It may happen, however, that the subject of 
employment performs his obligations, or exercises his rights arising out of 
employment, yet the result envisaged in defining these obligations or rights 
fails to materialize. The reason of this outcome is that the party concerned 
has made use of his right .not in the manner and not for the purpose as he 
might have been expected. In other words, he did not exercise his rights 
properly. 
The proper exercies of rights is an essential requirement. This originates 
from the view that in a socialist society the purpose of law is the promotion of 
socialist, social-economic progress. Hence legal regulation serves specified ends. 
From this necessarily follows that the rights granted on the basis of provisions 
of law to citizens or organs are not ends in themselves, but are due to them 
in order to realize this specific end. Otherwise the provisions of law could 
not operate, contradictions would arise between the provision of law proper 
and its enforcement. This principle is expressed in Section 2 of the Code of 
Labour, saying „the rights granted under this Act shall be exercised in 
accordance with their social purpose." 
The purport of the principle of the proper exercise of rights differs f rom 
that of the principle of prohibition of the misuse of rights. The principle of 
prohibition of misuse of rights means that the exercise of rights must not violate 
without good reason the interests of others, i. e. some other private interest or 
the interests of society. This is only one, the negative, aspect of the principle of 
proper exercise of rights. Yet proper exercise of rights also comprises a 
positive obligation. One must not only be careful that the exercise of one's 
rights does not violate social interests or any personal interest, but care must 
be taken also to exercise rights actually in conformity with the purposes for 
which these rights have been granted, i. e. proper exercise should promote the 
realization of interests and ends that such rights are intended to serve. This 
additional function of rights appears especially clearly in the domain of labour 
legislation, in connection with managing matters belonging to the sphere of 
authority of deliberation. 
Hence improper exercise of rights means that the exerciser oversteps 
the limits- set for him, although it seems as if he had remained within them. 
In such cases the exerciser of the right has actually assumed a right not due 
to him. Thus, essentially, improper exercise of rights is equivalent to a conduct 
by which somebody commits breach of obligation. Naturally, bringing into 
operation liability for improper exercise of rights and for the consequences 
depends on the. nature of the given system of liability. Thus, for example, 
liability for damage is relevant only in cases where pecuniary disadvantage 
has resulted, whereas disciplinary liability may operate in other cases, too. 
On the other hand, disciplinary liability can be brought into operation only 
if the improper exercise of rights has taken place by dereliction, while liability 
for damage may possibly accrue independent of dereliction. 
Provisions of law are intended to achieve certain ends; this is being 
realized within the scope of various legal relationships, in the course of the 
exercise of rights granted to individual citizens and public bodies. If the 
exercise of rights does not take place, this jeopardizes the realization of 
aims that had been set when the provision of law was framed. It follows 
from this that improper exercise of rights can consist not only in making 
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use of some right for some purpose other than for which it had been granted 
to the exerciser, but can materialize also by not exercising it at all. This is 
especially valid for the rights granted to the employer. Thus unlawful conduct 
can materialize not only in that, say, a manager of an enterprise exerts 
improperly the rights granted to him, but also in tha t the improperly fails to 
exercise such rights. 
The proper exercise of rights, and the study of this issue, is of extreme 
importance in labour law, and within the latter, also in connection with the 
liability of the employer. Numerous provisions of labour statutes define the 
scope of authori ty of enterprise by drawing certain limits. This is necessary, 
on the one hand, because greatly dissimilar circumstances can arise in the 
course of enterprisal operations, and it is not possible to regulate them with 
a general validity for any case in advance; thus smooth operation can be 
ensured only if the managers are given broader powers of disposition within 
the scope of employment. On the other hand, this is necessary also because 
the employer enterprise is invested with a number of educative measures 
within the scope of employment (the typical case is disciplinary action). To 
take proper, really educative masures — taking into account all circumstances 
of individual and collective — is possible only if the enterprise is authorized 
to make a choice f rom among several possible measures. The broader powers 
of disposition, the possibility of consideration in respect to various measures, 
requires the exerciser of rights to keep in mind the ends to which these rights 
had been granted to him. 
3. Release from unlawfulness 
a) Concept and effect of release 
Pursuant to the rules of liability under civil law, there may arise, pheno-
mena in connection with damaging conduct which preclude the unlawfulness 
of such conduct. Such factors precluding unlawfulness, are the exercise of 
rights, performance of duty, consent of the damaged, justifiable defence, and 
exreme emergency. 
These are part ly cases where the law itself provide the possibility of 
realizing damaging conduct; or in case of the in jury or collision of two 
legally procted interests, one of these interests is qualified under the law as 
more important originally and permits the causing of damage to protect 
the more important interest. Hence if damage is caused in such cases, no 
liability for damage will accure. In cases where damage must be repaired 
in spite of the prevalence of circumstances that preclude unlawfulness, com-
pensation cannot be regarded as the sanction of unlawful conduct ; quite the 
contrary, it is- a consequence of an action tolerated by law.1 This is substan-
tially the same case as legally permitted damage; e. g. expropriation. 
The jurisprudence of labour law does not concern itself with the question 
of release f rom unlawfulness. Nor does legal regulation deal with the release 
f rom unlawfulness. So we must make a study of the problem whether we may 
1 Luby S.: Systém a zâkladné tézy obcianskoprâvnej zodpovednosti. (Prâvnicke 
Studie, 1957. 2.) 
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speak of circumstances releasing from unlawfulness in connection with liability 
under labour l a w — including liability of the employer — and, if so, whether 
the conclusions of civil law can be applied to such cases. 
In finding a solution, we first must answer the question whether conducts 
to which civil law attaches release from unlawfulness can or cannot occur 
within the scope of employment. I believe that the answer is clearly yes. Be 
it the exercise of rights or performance of duties, be it the damaged person's 
consent, or extreme emergency, conducts similar to any of these may occur. 
In this context there will be a dissimilarity according to whether such conduct 
is realized by the employer or by the employee. But, at the moment, this need 
not concern us, as this will be of consequence, if at all, only at the solution 
of detail problems. 
Obviously, if in the field of labour law conduct which entails release 
from unlawfulness in case of liability under civil law is . also, possible, the 
necessity of similar measures can arise also in' the domain of liability under 
labour law. Yet employment is a contractual relationship created between 
employer and employee. So its effect results in differences in several respects. 
We must keep in mind, first of all, that one purpose of establishing 
employment is to secure to the employee his share of the national income, 
and to provide means of living to him thereby. In this connexion it must be 
emphasized, too, that the wage or salary is the basis of the employee's and 
his family's subsistence, and that any pecuniary disadvantage jeopardizes 
this subsistence. 
Second, we must take into account that, within the scope of employment, 
provisions of law, or the contract of employment, regulate over a wide field 
the cases in which one party is authorized to take measures, directed at the 
other,, which entail pecuniary disadvantage. Consequently, such cases are not 
in the conceptual sphere of unlawful damage, so the question of release, f rom 
unlawfulness cannot arise either. Similarly, the problem of collision of rights 
is regulated by provisions of law on a wide basis (e. g. the provision that 
transfer — taking also into account the necessitating circumstances — must 
not ential disproportionate injury to the employee). 
Finally, we must keep in mind that in the domain of labour law the 
parties' possibility to exercise rights is considerably resticted as compared to 
civil law. 
From these circumstances follows: 
On the one hand, that in case of damage caused within the scope of 
employment the occurence of factors releasing from unlawfulness is substan-
tially rarer and their importance lesser than in civil law. On ther other hand, 
that the situation in such cases will be somewhat similar to the relationship 
existing between the parties to unlawful damage governed by the rules of civil 
law. Namely the employer's damaging activity does nos usually result f rom 
the exercise of some right arising out of the relationship of employment that 
exists with the employee; it rather follows from some other activity of the 
employer. (The damaging result of this activity then affects the employee 
active within the scope of his employment.) 
Another difference is that in every case where on the employer's side a 
circumstance releasing from unlawfulness prevails, the damage sustained by 
the employee must be repaired, nevertheless, for maintaining the subsistence 
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of the employee. This will be no longer compensation for damages, it will be 
refunding. The reason of refunding will be that carrying out the enterprise's 
damaging activity is "usually in the interest of society, or more precisely, in 
the interest of the employer enterprise. It would be hardly tenable that the 
employee be placed in a disadvantageous situation because of some act per-
formed out of enterprisal interests. The exception to this principle is — as 
follows from what has been explained — if the employee has given cause or 
possibility for such conduct of the employer. For instance, the employer had to 
take measures to counter the employee's act — e. g. unlawful attack — or the 
employee has consented, if he was in a position to do so, to the employer's 
activities entailing damage. 
What has been outlined above will therefore constitute the scope within 
which the causes releasing from unlawfulness may play a role in connection 
with the employer's liability for damage. 
In the following I shall discuss only two of the circumstances that result 
in the release from unlawfulness, since these two are frequent occurrences in 
the field of employment relations. 
b) Exercise of rights and performance of duties 
The mere exercise of rights must not be confused with proper exercise of 
rights. The "exercise of rights takes place as a case relasing from unlawfulness if 
and when a provision of law grants somebody the possibility to cause pecuniary 
disadvantage to some person by exercising his rights, and the person entitled 
to do so avails himself of this possibility. Hence in this case proper exercise 
of rights leads to damage. 
We speak of the performance of duties if a provision of law prescribes 
some activity, and the doer meets this obligation by which he might cause 
damage. Thè basis of release from unlawfulness is that this conduct is in the 
inter est of society, or for a purpose considered important by society 
It is here that it differs f rom the exercise of rights. In caset of 
exercising rights, the law expressly provides the possibility to cause damage. 
By contrast, in case of performing duties the possibility of some conduct or 
act is given, legally, with the tacit understanding that this may imply damage. 
This is the case, for instance, when the works fire-patrol damages the belongings 
of employees in the dressing-room when fighting fire. 
As has beeen stated in the introduction, the employer is obliged to com-
pensate the employee for his damage in such cases. But this is an obligation 
to compensation independent of liability for damage. 
c) The damaged person's consent 
If anybody consents to some act, he is not estitied to make, protest after 
the act for the reason that it entailed consequences disadvantageous to him. 
From this it logically follows that if somebody had consented to some conduct 
that causes damage to him, he is not entitled to claim compensation. This 
principle is correct in the general sense. Yet consent has some limits, especially 
within the scope of employment. 
The rights of the individual are resticted to some extent by society. This 
restriction acts in two directions; first, the damage caused to the individual, 
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or the damaging conduct, may violate the interests of society; second, the 
individual might possess important rights in respect to which society wishes to 
protect the individual from waiving these rights out of carelessness or some 
other reason, or from consenting to their infringement. Thus the individual's 
power of decision is restricted in these two aspects. This restriction is expres-
sed by Section 342 of the Civil Code, pursuant to which „no compensation is 
due if damage has been caused with the damaged person's consent, and da-
mage does not violate or endanger social interests." 
For instance, a case where the manager of the employer enterprise 
consents to using the enterprise's material for building the employee's house, 
belongs to the first group. In this case also the damaged person behaves 
unlawfully and will therefore be liable together with the person causing 
damage. 
Protection of life and corporeal integrity, as well as rights arising f rom 
employment, should be mentioned in the second group. Protection of life 
and corporeal integrity are so important that society will protect them even 
against the will or carelessness of the individual concerned. The rights arising 
out of employment are of similar importance. In a socialist society the basis 
of livelihood is work. Income or other provisions resulting from work serve 
only the employee's subsistence, but also that of his family. It is therefore that 
labour statutes grant rights to employees by coercive provisions. Waiver of 
these rights is not recognized as legally effective under labour law. It follows 
f rom this that any consent to acts that might result in damage to life or 
corporeal integrity (except for medical intervention), or in the reduction of the 
employee's wages, or curtailment of his rights arising f rom employment and 
ensuring his living, is null and void. For instance, if the employee consents 
to doing work high above ground without using the safety devices, the 
employer is obliged to prevent him from doing so. And if the employer fails 
to prohibit such work, and the employee suffers an accident, the employer 
cannot be released from liability by pleading. that the accident has occurred 
within the scope of work undertaken by the employee. 
If, however, the employee has been in the position to consent to the 
employer's damaging conduct, the employer cannot be held liable for damage. 
In connection with the damaged person's consent it must be clarified, too, 
whether this consent was not given in circumstances which perclude the 
validity of the consent. Whether there was some error, whether consent 
was not given as a result of misrepresentation or under duress. It is mostly 
the latter that is often referred to within the scope of employment. For 
example, the employee declares that he had accepted termination of his 
employment by mutual consent only because the manager had threatened to 
dismiss him summarily if he would not accept such termination. It should 
be kept in mind in such cases that duress and threat cannot be constituted if 
reference is made to a rightful claim. Accordingly, if the employee has ac-
tually committed a disciplinary offence, and this offence is so severe that it is 
punishable with summary dismissal, no threat that would entail voidness 
of the mutual consent can be established to have existed. (Needless to say, 
making reference to a rightful claim cannot serve as a basis for compelling 
the employee to waive one of his rights granted him by a protective provision 
of law. For instance, an employed woman has committed breach of duty; the 
prospect of taking disciplinary action, or possibly not taking it, is then held 
out to her for making her waive her right to being transferred to an easier 
job to which she is entitled as a pregnant woman under provisions of law. 
In such a case the employer's conduct is unlawful.) 
IV. 
THE SYSTEM OF LIABILITY 
A) The basis of principle for the system 
1. Introduction 
The establishment of liability always means social judgment over a con-
duct, or result produced by that conduct. This comprises three factors. First, 
that said conduct, or its result, is incorrect, since it contravenes requirements 
set by society. Second, that said conduct is incorrect also because some other 
conduct would have been possible in the given case. Third, that calling to 
account serves the purpose of influencing the violator to behave in the fu ture 
in similar cases in conformity with the requirements of society. 
The conclusion that conduct contravenes requirements set by society is of 
an objective nature. It compares the conduct, or the result produced by it, 
to the social requirement without regard to the subject of such conduct. 
(Thus it is irrelevant in this respect whether the violation of law or a legal 
right has been committed by a child, an adult, by an insane or a sound 
person.) This is a question of unlawfulness. This is the case if obligation ari-
sing out of employment is violated. 
The second factor compares the conduct to the social requirement the violator 
is expected to fulfil. It is considered here whether the violator ought to have 
behaved in some other way, or if a different conduct could have been reaso-
nably expected from him. 
One of the sharpest controversies in literature on law dealing with liability 
for damage is the definition of the system of liability. Debates about the sys-
tem are going on in the literature of civil law first of all, since in labour 
law such issues have not yet emerged, partly because of the recent nature of 
this branch of law. But the fact that in the field of labour law, even in the 
statutory material, regulation and discussion was so far practically limited to 
the employee's liability, also played a role here. And the latter is based on 
liability accruing f rom. dereliction. Another contributing factor is that the 
scope of liability is restricted in cases of employees' liability, and not even 
the ful l exhaustion of this restricted legal possibility is compulsory, since both 
employers and the courts have power of discretion. This restriction, or the 
possibility of reduction, can often bridge difficulties that might arise in con-
nection with the objective forms of the employee's liability. This situation, 
too, reduced the possibility of controversies in respect to the system of liability. 
It follows from all this that, compared to civil law where debates are focussed 
on the nature of the system of liability, the principal issue in labour law is 
the definition of the scope of liability and the manner of its restriction. Since, 
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however, it seems advisable to clarify the basic principles of the system of lia-
bility under labour law, we first must get acquainted with the views adopted in 
civil law. The more so, since the liability for damage caused within the scope 
of employment is still largely regulated by the codes of civil law, even in so-
cialist conuntries. 
2. Views relating to the system of liability 
I. The present positions taken in the science of civil law can be divided 
into three groups. One is that liability for damage must be established irres-
pective of dereliction. This is the objective system. The other is that the general 
form of liability for damage must be the system based on dereliction. The 
third tries to reduce the differing systems to a common basis of principle and 
to create thereby a uniform system of liability. Apart from opposite stands 
emerging in the Soviet literature in the beginning, the system based on 
dereliction is dominating in socialist literature on civil law. It should be noted 
here that even those adopting the principle of dereliction admit that this 
principle fails to provide satisfactory solutions in certain cases. In such cases 
— e. g. compensation for damage arising from a source of increased dan-
gerousness — they accept the application of objective liability. This, however, 
is regarded by them as an exception to the general rule. 
The arguments adduced in favour of the dereliction system in socialist 
jurisprudence can .be summed up briefly as follows: 
a) Only solutions which hold liable only persons who were aware, or 
could have been aware,. of the wrongful nature of their conduct are compatible 
with socialist principles. 
b) If the damager would be held liable also for his unintentional acts 
whose consequences he was not able to prevent, this would have a negative 
effect, and the fear of being held liable even for unintentional acts would 
impair his activity, would result in inactivity, a fatalistic attitude. 
c) Applying the principle of dereliction constitutes an incessant stimulus 
to disclose and eliminate misconduct. The awareness that bringing into opera-
tion liability can be prevented by proper circumspection serves prevention 
much better than does the objective system. 
Views advocating the exclusion of dereliction have not been adopted de-
cisively in socialist literature. The arguments of the adherents of objective 
liability can be summed up as follows: 
a) dereliction as a decisive factor is uncertain, as it is a criterion that 
rests on internal, psychic, motives which cannot be perceived directly and 
externally, whereby the presence of this factor is difficult to prove. 
b) It follows from this uncertainty that attempts are being made at 
referring dereliction to some absolute, general standard whereby it would 
become objective. 
c) A system of liability constructed without the principle of dereliction 
protects social property much better. It must therefore be preferred under 
the socialist conditions of production. 
d) With the given high degree of mechanization in modern society, the 
system based on dereliction provides no satisfactory solutions. 
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Several attempts have been made at eliminating the dual character of the 
liability system. This has been suggested not by insisting on the exclusiveness 
of the one or the other principled basis, but ra ther by making the two systems 
operate as two steps within one uniform system of liability.1 Others t ry to 
create a system resting on a uniform basis not by discriminating the subjective 
f rom the objective system, but by discriminating between groups of facts 
based on the evaluation of conduct and its influencing. Such discrimination 
would also eliminate the central role af dereliction, since it would be repla-
ced by the central position of social judgment on human behaviour. This 
judgment becomes manifest in imputableness, which comprises dual evalua-
tion. One is that the conduct is judged unfavourably by society. Second, that 
society believes nevertheless that the given conduct can be improved by legal 
means. Thus liability under civil law can accrue only f rom an imputable 
breach of duty. Imputableness means a) mala fides, d). dereliction, and c) 
failure to take protective measures in situation calling for special protection, 
especially failure to prevent provoked or existing danger. The instances of 
objective liability are summed up in the latter.2 
II. Literature on labour law deals with the system of liability mainly f rom 
the angle of the employee's liability for damage. The general view is that in 
case of damage caused by the employee tö the employer, liability must be 
constructed on the basis of the system of dereliction.3 The only . exception 
to this rule appears — with no general character — in case of liability for 
custody.4 
As concerns the employer's liability, the problem of the system receives 
less attention in literature. There is hardly any standard work available. Most 
principled positions relate to damage caused by industrial accidents. These 
are based partly on the principle of liability by dereliction,5 part ly — especially 
recently — on that of objective liability.6 Emphasis on objective liability is 
motivated by the protection of the employees' interests and livelihood. 
1 Világhy M.: Opponent's report in an academie disputation (21. Sept. 1955.) 
2 Eörsi Gy.: A jogi felelősség alapproblémái, a polgári jogi felelősség. (The 
ground problems of the judicial liability, the liability on the civil law.) (Budapest, 
1961.) Abr.: Liability. 
3 Nagy L.: A dolgozók anyagi felelőssége (Worker's material liability.) (Buda-
pest, 1956.) 
Nagy L.: Liability. 
Nagy L.: Anyagi felelősség (Material liability.) (Budapest, 1966.) 
Weltner A.: Labour law. 
Александров H. Г.: Советское трудовое право. (Moscow, 1967.) 
Каринский С. С.: Материальная отвественность рабочих и служащих по советско-
му трудовому праву (Moscow, 1955.) Abr.: Liability 
4 Е. g. In Hungary Nagy L.: A dolgozók anyagi felelőssége, (Worker's material 
liability), Nagy L.: Liability. Weltner: Labour law. Weltner—Nagy: A magyar mun-
kajog. (The Hungarian labour law.) 
5 Флейшиц E. А. Возмещение имущественного вреда, соединенного с повреждением здо-
ровья. (Moscow 1957.) Abr.: Commentary 
Майданик JI. А.—Сергеева Н. Ю.: Материальная отвественность за повреждение 
здоровья. (Moskow, 1953.) 
Schlegel R.: Arbeitsunfall und Schadenersatzplicht. (Berlin 1959.) 
6 Nagy L.: Liability 
Nagy L.: Anyagi felelősség. (Material liability.) Budapest, 1966. 
Witz—Tomes J.: Nekteré theoretické otázky kodifikace ceskoslovenskáho pra-
covniko práva. (Stát a pravo 1957. 2., 11.) 
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Nor is there uniform legislation. Soviet provisions of law relating to com-
pensation for industrial accidents rest on the principle of dereliction.7 The 
Czechoslovak,8 GDR9 and Hungarian Codes of Labour estabilish the employer 's 
liability for industrial accidents irrespective of dereliction.10 
As appears f rom the foregoing, both jurisprudence and s ta tutory law 
. contain very little material in respect to the system of the employer's liability, 
and not even this scanty material reflects any uni form view. 
3. Definition of the system of liability under labour law 
a) The system of liability in general 
If we are to define the system of liability under labour law, we f i rs t mus t 
clarify the basic principles of the system of liability. 
In the controversy between the followers of the dereliction and the ob-
jective system, those insisting on .the exclusive prevalence of either system 
are clearly wrong. To define a system of liability must not be an end in 
itself. The purpose of liability is the best possible protection of interests safe-
guarded by law. Hence the system of liability is satisfactory only if it serves 
this purpose in the most efficient manner. 
The purpose of bringing liability for damage into operation is to ensure 
compensation to the damaged on the one hand, and to reform the person 
causing damage, to change his conduct, on the other. The adequacy or ina-
dequaci of any system of liability depends on whether it is possible to ensure 
compensation and to influence damaging human behaviour by applying it. 
Liability for damage is based on social judgment to the effect tha t dama-
ging conduct is wrong since it collides with requirements set by society, and 
that the violator ought to have behaved differently. Establishment of derelic-
tion comprises the additional fact that the violator was aware, or could have 
been aware of the wrongfulness of this conduct. The followers of the derelic-
tion principle are right in saying that one important guarantee of mending is 
the violator's awareness of his wrongful conduct. But f rom this they draw the 
incorrect general conclusion tha t succes of reforming can be expected only 
where we are confronted with intencional wrongful conduct. This would lead 
to a situation in wich both compensation and calling to account would remain 
absent in the most important categories of damage — as appears f r om the 
number and consequences, f rom the seriousness of damage — since dereliction 
on part of the damaging person could not be established in a large proport ion 
of these cases. Those who try apply the dereliction principle to such cases all 
the same, actually distort its substance and in fact apply the objective p r in -
ciple.11 Conversely, if they do not wish to misinterpret the substance 
of the dereliction principle, they cannot but accept the existence of 
objective liability. Emphasizing the principle tha t in the socialist system 
liability can accrue only in case of dereliction, this would mean the mainte-
7 Decision of the Commission of Labour — 22. 12. 1961. — § 1 
8 190—J 92. § 
9 116. § 
10 62. § 
11 <5jieftmim E. A.: Commentary. 
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nance of a constant contradiction. And this contradiction is rendered even, 
more profound by the fact that many of the adherents of the dereliction 
principle must admit — on the basis of practical experience — that also 
objective liability can have a reformative, preventive effect. 
It was this situation that prompted some distinguished representatives 
of jurisprudence to give a definition to the uniform basic principles of lia-
bility under civil law. As we have seen, part of these attempts were limited 
to state tha t dereliction and objective liability do not exclude each other, 
but form parts of the uniform system of liability under civil law. These' 
attempts brought some progress in that they tried to put an end to the de-
bates — often not too fertile — going on between the followers of the two 
systems. Another step forward is made by the view which interprets dere-
liction and objective liability as the lower and upper step of the liability 
system and tries to create a uniform system this way. New roads are sought 
for by the theory that sees the uniform principled basis . in the concept of 
imputableness. Three aspects are summed up in the latter i. e. mala fides, 
dereliction, and omission of protection. The latter comprises the cases tha t 
usually belong to the category of objective liability. This theory starts f r o m 
the premise that liability for damage should be operative in cases where , 
according to social judgment, it is possible to exert influence in this way 
to prevent fu r ther damage. Accordingly, society would establish requirements 
that may vary with the types of facts. Anybody who fails to meet these requi-
rements, or violates them, commits dereliction thereby and this conduct 
is then imputable to him.12 Hence imputableness is the collective concept 
of conducts by which somebody fails to meet the requirements that have 
been imposed on him by society. 
I believe that both theoretical disputes and experience of legislation 
have shown so fa r that based merely on dereliction it is not possible to build 
up a system that would satisfy all needs of a modern society. It must be 
admitted a the same time that the reformative nature of the dereliction 
system is more direct. For in this system the faul t committed is disclosed in 
the course of calling to account and imposing sanstions, the person causing 
damage is informed of where he has acted wrongly. If dereliction is disre-
garded, the faul t is not disclosed, only the wrong result is presented, and 
the person held liable is induced by means of the sanction to investigate 
the circumstances of damage himself and to draw the necessary lesson. 
So here education takes place in a more indirect way. Consequently, if 
in case of a direct damager the possibility exists to establish dereliction 
conclusively, and this ensures compensation and sufficient mobilization for 
preventing fu r the r damage, the system based on dereliction conclusively, 
and this ensures compensation and sufficient mobilization for preventing 
fur ther damage, the system based on dereliction should be chosen. Where, 
however, these conditions are not given, a different solution must be found. 
This might be, f irst of all, to disregard the aspect of dereliction. But other 
solutions might be possible, too; e. g. to hold liable, instead of the direct 
damager, the person who is in a position to prevent damage more eff i -
ciently (his is the case of holding liable the person exercising supervision, 
12 Eorsi Gy.: Liability 
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or the person running the enterprise). But this lat ter solution cannot be 
applied in cases of damage caused within the scope of employment. 
The most important group of cases where disregard of the aspect of 
dereliction is called for is the activity connected with machinery, and 
damage resulting therefrom. In civil law this is chiefly the sphere 
of damage resulting f rom the use of sources of increased dangerous-
ness. But a considerable proportion of damage arising within the scope 
of employment is of such nature. In such cases these activities are not 
wrongful, they are most useful and must be developed. I t has been suggested 
tha t in such cases increased danger results f rom working with machinery 
and natural forces over which man has not yet complete control, and these 
forces, quasi escaping occasionally, cause damage. But this viey is not cor-
rect.13 Some time ago, and to a smaller extent even today, the. greater 
frequency of damage when putt ing to use novel equipment or sources of 
energy resulted f rom the fact that the improvement of protection did not 
keep abreast with the rapid technological progress producing novel machi-
nery. Today the „dangerous na ture" of sources of increased danger chiefly 
arises f rom the circumstance that the use of such sources has become wide-
spread, and — although the possibilities of protection have increased too — 
the absolute number of damages rises even if it has decreased when com-
pared to the number of such sources. Owing to the wide use of machinery, 
the amoung of damages has also risen, and damage of considerable amount 
may arise in a single case. In using machinery, exploiting the forces of 
nature, technological progress creates new situations practically every day. 
Not only novel machinery, novel equipment is constructed incessantly, but 
the possibilities of protection grow constantly, too. The widening scope 
of employees' and workers ' initiaves — especially the innovation mo-
vement — yield new accomplishments hour by hour. Various re-
gulations cannot keep up with this ra te of progress. The consequence is 
that in case of damage resulting from sources of increased danger it would 
often be very difficult to ascertain if somebody has commuted dereliction or 
not; and very often there is actually no dereliction a t all. At the same 
time experience shows that the use of specially dangerious equipment 
does not lead to damage in comparable circumstances m every 
case. Hence damage is not an inevitable consequence of operating 
sources of increased danger.. On the contrary, the necessary consequence of 
the correct application of modern technology is the relative decrease in 
damage. Hence damage can be avoided. 
Before proceeding, let us consider whether it is correct at all to invoke 
liability in cases where no dereliction can be established. Put t ing it in ano-
ther way: is the system of liability suited for reforming, . influencing in 
cases where the doer of the unlawful act has committed no dereliction, 
i. e. was not aware, and could not have possibly been aware, of the wrong-
fulness of his conduct. 
As we have seen, liability means the imposition of sanctions. Essentially, 
it means social disapproval, social censure. In cases of criminal and disci-
plinary liability the sanctions are expressly attached to the person; very 
13 Eorsi Gy.: Liability 
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often they mean the curtailment of the individual's most personal rights 
— in case of criminal liability the right to personal freedom, in case of 
disciplinary liability the right to work is restricted to a certain extent — 
and their effect may be felt even for a, longer time after the sanction has 
been imposed. (Former criminal or disciplinary punishment may be the ob-
stacle to assigment tó certain posts or to granting certain benefits.) Consi-
dering these circumstances it is obvious that criminal and disciplinary lia-
bility can operate only where the violator could have been aware of the 
wrongfulness of. his act. (This accounts for the fact why the dispute on 
objective and subjective liability does not arise in connection with criminal 
or disciplinary liability.) 
The case is different with liability for damage. Here we need not insist 
unconditionally ón dereliction. This is justified by two circumstances. First, 
liability for damage does not affect the individual's most personal rights 
to such an extent as does criminal or disciplinary liability. It only reduces 
the violator's available means. Second, the wrongful act has caused damage 
to somebody. So it is considered proper to place the burden on the person 
who, in human terms, had opportunity to avoid causing damage, and not 
on the person who has suffered and could not avoid damage. And liability 
for damage has a most efficient influencing force even in such cases, and 
even in several directions. Compensation paid by the employer figures in 
the balance of the enterprise, in conformity with the principle of economic 
accounting. So, in given cases, this indicates towards the supervisory organ 
that there is something wrong with management, including productive or. 
other activities. On this basis the possibility is given to inspect enterprise 
operations and eliminate faults. But liability for damage has also a more 
immediate effect. Reduction of enterprise profits affect the provisions due 
to the collective (e. g. profit shares). Thiw will stimulate the collective of 
employees to create, or making the management create, conditions which 
prevent damage in the future. In doing so the opportunity arises to disclose 
the employees' possible misconduct underying damage, and to shift dama-
ges, or part of them, to other persons according to the rules of liability. 
As appears from the foregoing, liability for damage is the most suitable 
of all legal means for exerting influence in cases where there was no dere-
liction, but, according to social judgment, damage could have been avoided 
objectively. This means is the most suitable because, compared with other 
legal means, it can be employed over a much wider field, and because it 
exerts its effect in a most differentiated manner and affects human beha-
viour at several levels at the same time. In a given case it therefore rea-
ches the human will authorized to dispose or control, and influences it in 
• the direction of finding the possibility which prevents fu ture damage. (As 
has been shown, the field of application of criminal or disciplinary liabi-
lity is much narrower, and their effects are much more restricted too. The 
sanctions only affect the person who has committed the offence or breach 
of duty. They do not affect the superior organ, especially not the collective 
as a whole, to such an extent as does liability for damage. So it is there-
fore that to maintain and bring into operation the system of liability for 
damage is important, especially in the cases discussed above.) 
In connection with disregarding dereliction it might be argued that this 
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is substantially a smuggling in of the principle of being liable for the out-
come of an act, and also that it makes people fatalistic, curbs initiative. 
Neither argument is well-founded. They are not, because disregarding dere-
liction can take place only in cases where, according to social judgment, 
the possibility of avoiding damage exists on the general, social level. Em-
ploying liability for damage — i. e. sanctions — is the means by which w'e 
wish to encourage the person held liable to detect, organize protection, the 
possibilities of preventing damage, and to make use of them. Liability for 
damage would make people indifferent, fatalistic, would curb initiative only 
if the person causing damage were deprived objectively of taking protective 
measures, preventing damage. It it were left to mere chance whether fu ture 
damage can be prevented or not, then the institution of liability for damage 
would render people actually indifferent. Since, however, damage can be 
prevented — and not by chance, but because the required technological, 
organizational, etc. means are available — this circumstance itself will make 
people active, will mobilize them and induce the damager to find and use 
all devices and means by which he is able to prevent damage. It is this 
very feautre that makes liability for damage superior to other legal means 
that are also intended to prevent damage. 
We have concluded that in constructing a system of liability we must 
start from the requirement that this institution must ensure compensation 
and must result in the most efficient influencing to prevent future damage. 
In cases of causing damage within the scope of employment the system 
of liability is easier to define than the system of liability under civil law. 
Under civil law the person must be found in the various types of cases 
(e. g. runner of the enterprise, owner of the building) whose holding liable 
is the most efficient measure for preventing fu ture damage. In cases of 
damage within the scope of employment, we only have to consider the. rela-
tionship of employer and employee. Consequently we need not look beyond 
the subjects of employment — the enterprise in our case — to find the 
person to be held liable. So the only question that may arise here is to 
decide if liability by dereliction is suitable, or some other solution must be 
chosen. This question will be studied from the angle of the employer's lia-
bility. . . 
Since today the employee's incomes and means are acquired by work, 
b) The system of the employer's liability 
I. The importance of reparation 
When the system of liability is devised, the importance of reparation 
is of great consequence. Let us study this aspect. 
Damage suffered by the employee may be manifest in the following: 
a) Absence of wages and other allowances serving the employee's and 
his family's livelihood (the term livelihood is used in a. broad sence and is 
to denote not only the means required for subsistence in the strict sense, 
but also other services and benefits required for raising material and cul-
tural standards). 
b) The employee's available means are reduced (outlays, damage, des-
truction of belongings). 
» 
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reduction of means can usually be retrieved only from wages paid for work. 
Hence the above types of damage indirectly result in a drop of living stan-
dards, and, if considerable, even endanger the employee's and his family's 
livelihood. Consequently damage violates most substantial interests in such 
cases, and therefore great emphasis must be placed on the reparation of 
damage. 
II. Determining the system, of liability 
We have agreed that, as far as possible, the system of liability must 
be built on the condition of dereliction, The problem is whether in the 
cases discussed in the foregoing such basis of liability ensures reparation, 
and is efficient enough for preventing future damaging conduct. 
As concerns. damage suffered by the employee, the general rule is that 
the employer is held liable. So what we have to consider first is whether 
— with regard to the great importance of reparation — the mere circum-
stance that the employer is liable warrants a departure from the system 
of dereliction. 
The material means required for meeting obligations arising out of em-
ployment are available to the employer. To establish employment, .to keep 
employees working, is permissible only if the required funds are available.. 
Yet the funds available to the employer, the provisions of law defining the 
employer's obligations, create' only the possibility to meet the obligations 
toward the employees. So it is on this basis that the work of the employer 
enterprise must be organized in such a: manner that obligations arising out 
of employment be met faultlessly. Thus it is the employer's duty to make 
arrangements for. satisfactory performance of obligations. Owing to diffe-
rence in organization, or circumstances varying daily, there is often no pos-
sibility to issue detailed, centralized regulations; but in order to devise 
measures, organization, etc. best adapted to local demands and promoting 
the operations of the enterprise, too detailed regulations are not expedient 
in many cases. From these circumstances it follows that provision of good 
working conditions, efficient organization and punctual provision of services 
greatly depend on enterprise management, and also on the efficient work, 
initiative and discipline of the entire collective. These circumstances illust-
rate at once why it is often extremely difficult to establish the fact of dere-
liction in case of damage caused by the employer enterprise. And this is 
especially difficult on the part of the employee. Not only employees, but 
also persons or organs acting acting in disputes are often confronted with 
difficult problems. 
Yet the difficulties outlined above do not in themselves justify to dis-
regarded the system based on reliction in cases of damage caused by the 
employer. These dificulties can be overcome by applying the presumption 
of dereliction. The. real difficultly lies elsewhere. 
The concept of dereliction always comprises social judgment. Namely 
that the person involved failed to meet social requirements he is expected 
to satisfy. It should be added right away that — as will be discussed in 
more detail in connection with dereliction — the standard, the social requi-
rement is always related to a type and never to the individual. So whenever 
evaluation is made, the basis of comparison is the social requirement to be 
met not by the individual causing damage, not by the abstract „citizen", 
but by the type of citizen with a. specified duty, qualification and practice; 
and not by the „employer causing damage", not by the abstract „socialist 
enterprise", but by the type of enterprise belonging to a specified branch 
of industry, of specified size, equipment, etc. 
It is at this point that the difficulty arises. Protection of the employees' 
interests, the great importance of reparation, and the necessity of uniform 
judgment would hardly permit reparation of damages differing with the 
various types and potentialities of enterprises. The immediate conclusion may 
be that, in order to avoid such solutions, the social requirements to be met 
by enterprises should be made stricter, which is the solution of the problem. 
There exist, indeed, possibilities to make requirements stricter, i. e. to raise 
the standards to be applied to dereliction. But this is only feasible until the 
requirement is imposed not on the type, but on the entity of the highest 
standards within the type. In this case we still can say that the conrete possi-
bility to prevent damage was available to the damager, and so was the 
opportunity to realize his fauld and display a different conduct in the fu ture . 
But as soon as we go beyond this level, we actually transform subjective 
liability based on dereliction into objective liability. Yet this is a distortion 
of the very essence of dereliction liability, without offering any advantage 
in return. Hence the circumstances outlined above would suggest to desist 
f rom the condition of dereliction — as the basic type at least — in case 
of liability for damage of the employer enterprise. 
In cases of damage suffered by the employee within the scope of employ-
ment, society has therefore to impose on the employer the requirement to 
prevent damage. In doing so, society is not concerned with the circum-
stance whether the employer in the given case, or an employer of similar 
type, is or is not in actual command of the concrete mans of prevention. 
But when this requirement is defined, another circumstance must be taken 
into account. 
In the centre of the socialist system of society stands man. The purpose 
of socialism is to provide to him, in given circumstances the highest mate-
rial and cultural standards possible. It follows from this that society imposes 
on the employer enterprises the requirement to prevent within the scope 
of employment the occurrence of damages. But the standard of material and 
cultural provision due to the individual depends on the possibilities and 
means available to society similarly, the efforts and measures to prevent 
damage can go only as far as the funds available to society permit. In a 
socialist society, the employer enterprises are economic society, the employer 
enterprises are economic units which operate on the basis of economic ac-
counting. Since, at the same time, they are parts of the national economic 
plan, their measures taken in the course of economic operations are relying 
not only on the means derived from the production and from market ing 
products of their own. For outlays, investments, etc. in excess of their 
own resources they receive assistance from central means (the illustration 
to what extent this affects the profits of the enterprise, or the funds due 
to the working collective, is beside our point). Yet is is as well obvious 
that no enterprise can get shares from centralized funds to such an extent 
as would jeopardize the planned, proportioned progress of the national eco-
nomy. This applies also to investments or other measures required for pre-
venting damage that may arise within the scope of employment. Not even 
in such cases is it possible to insist on measures, or provide possibility of 
measures, for which the means would have to be drawn off from other 
sectors, as a consequence of which the accomplishments would result in 
considerable recession elsewhere, which would disrupt the desirable propor-
tions. The results achieved would not be proportionate to the disadvantage 
arising elsewhere. Consequently, the social requirement to prevent, the occur-
rence of damages affecting employees by making use of the objective possi-
bilities of the employer enterprise, is limited by the given potentialities 
of society. Exploitation of possibilities is not permissible if this would result 
in disproportionate burdens on society. It should be emphasized, however, 
that in determining the disproportionate burden departure must never be 
taken from the potentialities of a given enterprise. So, for instance, the 
allegation of an enterprise that some measure of this nature would result 
in the deficit of operations for the currant year cannot be accepted. Whe-
ther some measure would entail disproportionate burden must always be 
judged from the angle of society as a whole. If the own potentialities of 
a given enterprise would be taken into account, we actually would adopt 
the basis of dereliction, even its incorrect, subjective, interpretation. And 
in this case the system of liability would not serve its purpose, would not 
encourage to prevent damaging conduct. 
Considering the differences outlined above, I think it justified to aban-
don the term objective liability. The more so if we take, into account that 
— as will be discussed later — this may lead to a solution differing from 
the conventional in respect to discharge from liability in various types of 
damage. The term I suggest for this type of liability is „liability of in-
creased protection". The purport of this type is the requiremnt that the 
person to be held liable is under the obligation to make use of the highest 
standards of technology, science, organization, etc. to prevent possible da-
mage in a manner that no disproportionate burden be imposed on society. 
This change of term is not merely of a stylistic character, it implies a sub-
stantial difference. It expresses that society expects greater efforts f rom 
the person concerned than may be expected ordinarily when the question 
of dereliction is to be decided. And by abandoning the term objective lia-
bility it is indicated at the same time that the upper limit of this require-
ment is below objective liability. 
Thus I believe that employer's liability should be regulated on the 
basis of the system of liability of increased protection. My conclusions relat-
ing to the system of liability are of general character for the time being, 
so I do not study it by comparison to the various types of damage. But 
owing to the more than average importance of reparation on the one hand, 
and to the operations of enterprises on the other, this system should be laid 
down as the general rule. An investigation into the various types of damage, 
the nature of employees' sosses occurring at a given type, will determine 
to what extent departures from the general rule are justified in particular 
cases, be it in the direction of increase of severity, or in the direction of 
mitigation. This will be manifest mainly in regulating discharge from lia-
bility, or possibly in the application of the dereliction system in some cases. 
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B) Liability of increased protection 
1. The concept of discharge from liability 
As has been discussed in the foregoing, the underlying principle of lia-
bility of increased protection is that in such cases the prevention of damage 
is objectively possible, and the system of liability for damage is therefore 
intended to induce the damager to make operate forces, change his conduct, 
in such a manner that fu ture damages are prevented, or, at least, their occur-
rence reduced. This basic principle determines the scope of the liability sys-
tem at the same time. This cannot extend beyond actual, objective possi-
bilities to prevent damage. If such possibilities are not given, liability for 
damage cannot fulfil its influencing function. If there is no possibility to 
prevent damage, the damager is called to account in vain, as he will not 
be able act differently in the future either. 
If we accept the conclusion that the system of liability of increased 
protection can be applied only in cases where prevention of damage is ob-
jectively possible, we must face consequences in two respects. One is the 
aspect of framing provisions of law. It would be mistaken to establish lia-
bility for damage in cases where the possibility of prevention is not given. 
The other is the occurrence of actual damage. For, if the basis of holding 
the damager liable is the circumstance that objective possibilities of pre-
vention exist, the person held liable must be given the opportunity to prove 
that the objective possibility of preventing damage did not actually exist 
in the given case! To put in another way, this means that the person held 
liable must be given the opportunity to discharge himself f rom liability by 
alleging that damage could not be prevented, 
What are the criteria in case of the employer's liability for damage 
under labour law. on whose basis it can be ascertained that damage was 
not preventable? Causal nexus must be examined in this connection first 
of all. If damage has been caused by a certain person, it would be obviously 
unwarranted to call to account some other person. Yet this is but one facet 
of the questions to be studied. The point is that damage arises within the 
scope of a certain activity, within the scope of employment in . the cases 
of our concern. As a result of damage, the employee's rights — belonging to, 
and protected within, the scope of employment — are violated. Rights due 
to the employee within the scope of employment materialize as correspon-
ding obligations on the part of the employer. To meet these obligations is 
the employer's responsibility. It follows from this that the employer is ob-
liged to do everything in his power to meet, these obligations. So he is net 
supposed to remain passive when some external activity or conduct inter-
feres with the fulfilment of obligations; he is expected to act to prevent 
such interference in order to have the obligation fulfilled and to prevent 
infringement of the employee's rights thereby. Consequently, he can be dis-
charged from liability only if he is able to prove conclusively that he had 
no possibility to prevent such interference. 
Thus discharge from liability has two criteria. One is activity by some 
other person which prevents the fulfilment of some obligation arising out 
of employment. The other is the unpreventability of such activity. (If the 
activity of such other person was not unpreventable, the causer of damage 
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will no longer be this other person; it will be the one who failed to prevent 
this activity. So causation will be manifest in the failure to take action neces-
sary for prevention.) 
Before discussing these two criteria in more detail, let us make a brief 
survey of the positions taken in literature on law, and by legal regulation. 
2. Conditions of discharge in case of liability for damage caused 
by the employer within the scope of employment 
In connection with defining the conditions of discharge, there exist, 
essentially, four views in jurisprudence and in legislation. The first accepts 
as a reason for discharge only the damaged person's constributory act. The 
other accepts vis maior and unpreventable external causes as possibilities 
of discharge. The third defines unpreventable external cause and the emplo-
yee's unpreventable exclusive causation as reasons for discharge. The fourth 
only' recognizes unpreventable external causes. 
Let us now make an attempt at defining reasons for discharge. 
As concerns the employer's liability for damage under labour law, it is 
correct — in my opinion — to accept as the basis of discharge from liability 
the allegation to unpreventable external causes, which comprise both vis 
maior and other. external causes. (An explanation will be given in the de-
tailed discussion of this concept later on.) 
In respect to damage caused by the employer within the scope of em-
ployment it is, however, not sufficient to make allegation to unpreventable 
external cause. The reason is that, viewed from the angle of the employer, 
the activities of his employees can never be regarded as an external factor, 
i. e. one that, represents conduct by an outsider. Consequently, if allegation 
would be made only to unpreventable external causes, this does not include 
the conduct of the damaged employee. Hence the unpreventable sonduct of 
the damaged must be given due regard in addition. 
I. should like to add that the reasons for discharge mentioned here 
— i. e. external cause and the employee's causation — represent the basic 
type. The facts in given cases of liability may extend or restrict their scope 
as required. 
What we have to do next is to give a closer definition of these concepts. 
I first shall give an analysis of „external cause", then discuss the concept 
of unpreventability: the problem of the damaged person's conduct vill be 
dealt with in a special part. 
3. The concept of ,,external cause" 
The term external cause means that the causer of damage is outside 
the person held liable, is alien to the latter. . 
In case of the employer's liability for damage caused within the scope 
of employment, we may speak of external cause only if this cause is outside 
the employer enterprise. In this respect the term outside is not only a ter-
ritorial, local definition. It has a threefold meaning in, this case: partly per-
sonal, partly territorial, partly relating to some activity. 
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The first, „personal" ascept means that the causation of damage must 
not originate in a person whose activity is to be regarded as the activity 
of the employer enterprise. For if such activity is to be regarded as the 
activity of the enterprise, we are no longer faced with an external cause. 
In the foregoing we have clarified that any employee's activity that is within 
the scope of his employment must be regarded as the activity of the em-
ployer enterprise. It follows from this that the conduct of the employee, 
if he has caused damage within the scope of his employment, cannot be 
qualified as external cause. 
The „territorial" meaning of the term external cause is of an auxiliary 
character to a certain extent. The point is that in given cases outsiders 
— really external persons — may be staying at the premises of the enter-
prise. These persons can be divided into two large groups. The one compri-
ses persons who stay at the premises with the permit or consent of the 
enterprise. Consent may be tacit, or may be inferred from relevant facts, 
which is a very frequent case (e. g. opening of the shop, fixing office hours, 
in such a manner that customers can enter without special permit, etc.). 
Such persons may be connected with, or participating is, the operations 
of the enterprise — e. g. experts or are staying there as visitors, or for 
doing business with the enterprise, or for some similar reason. The second 
group comprises persons who are staying at the premises without a permit 
from the enterprise, but the latter is not in the position to prohibit them 
from staying there. These are persons who are there legally, although pos-
sibly without the permit or consent of the enterprise (e. g. official persons 
who are entitled to enter the premises without permit). Finally there may 
be persons who are staying there illegally, without the permit of the enter-
prise, maybe despite express prohibition. 
The employer enterprise is under the obligation to do everything to 
protect its employees from suffering damage. This is an obligation arising 
out of employment. This involves another duty of the employe^ i. e. to 
instruct — if necessary — outsiders entering the premises, before they are 
admitted, to observe rules of conduct required for preventing damage, and 
to take appropriate measures lest outsiders should cause damage to the em-
ployees. (Whenever damage is mentioned, I do not only refer to accidents. 
The term comprises cases where, say, a person admitted to the premises 
steals some employee's belongings, or a person applying for a job steals 
a leaving employee's work-book from the desk of the clerk with whom 
he is talking.) Considering the employee's obligations, it is justified not to 
regard such persons as outsiders, not to regard damage caused by them 
as having resulted from external causes in any case where the employer's 
liability for damage caused within the scope of employment is implied. 
The case is different with persons who are staying at the premises 
without the permit or consent of the enterprise, be their staying legal or 
not. The enterprise cannot be held liable for the damaging acts of such 
persons, since the latter are present without the employer enterprise's per-
mit and consent, and the latter is not in the position to influence their 
conduct. (A fur ther problem may arise here, i. e. in such cases it has to be 
decided whether damage was unpreventable or not.) What has been said 
above applies even to cases where official delegates are present and the 
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enterprise is aware of their staying there, since the enterprise is not in the 
position to restrict the activities of such persons (liability for damage caused 
by such persons lies with the commissioning organ). Consequently, if da-
mage is caused by persons staying at the premises without the permit or 
consent of the enterprise, such damage must be regarded as having resulted 
from external causes. 
In connection with the term „territorial" it should be noted that it 
indicates not only the premises proper, but any other area, building, means 
of commucation, etc. under the control of the enterprise and serving enter-
prisal operations. The criterion is that the enterprise must exercise actual 
control over all these areas, etc., must be in the position to prohibit persons 
from entering them, to instruct admitted persons as to conduct, to keep 
a check on their movements, activities. For instance, the area of some field 
work carried out by the enterprise qualifies as the premises of the enter-
prise if the above conditions are fulfilled. Railway-trains, buses belong to 
this category; by contrast, the street in which the scavenger is working 
cannot be regardes as the premises of the Street Cleansing Department, nor 
can the room of some enterprise in which the man of the postal service 
repairs the telephone be regarded as the premises of the Post Office Admi-
nistration. 
. Finally, the term „external" also relates to activity. This is to mean 
that in cases where the cause of damage lies in the activity of the employer 
enterprise, no allegation to external causes, can be accepted. While the for-
mer — the personal and territorial sences — refer to human factors, the 
sence relating to activity comprises all other causes, including forces of 
nature, etc. For instance, bursting of a boiler is correlated with the activi-
ties of the employer enterprise and is therefore no external cause. If, how-
ever, fragments resulting from the explosion hit the premises of some other 
enterprise and injure an employee there, this will be an external cause in 
respect to that other enterprise. 
In connection with causes that cannot be qualified as „external" I 
should like to emphasize that this distinction has the effect at the same 
time that in such cases it need not, or must not be considered whether damage, 
was unpreventable or not. The employer is liable for such causes. The rea-
son is that we regard these as the employer's own activities. Consideration 
of unpreventability is permitted only in cases where it can be shown con-
clusively that the cause was truly „external". 
4. Unpreventability 
a) The concept of unpreventability 
I. The conditions of unpreventability 
To judge preventability and unpreventability gives rise to much more 
disputes than any of the problems discussed so far. An event may be Unpre-
ventable because there is no possibility whatsoever to prevent its taking 
place; or because, although such possibility exists, prevention is not possible 
in given circumstances. The latter may occur because in the given case no 
adequate means of prevention are available; or because, although such means 
are available, there was no possibility to employ them owing to the unex-
pected, sudden occurrence of the event. Two criteria must therefore be exa-
mined when the question of preventability is to be decided. First, whether 
there exists a possibility to avert external action directed at causing damage. 
If no such possibility exist, the employer must be discharged f rom liability. 
If prevention is possible, the damaging action may have happened so sud-
denly that there was no time enough to avert it although the objective 
possibilities existed. This is the second criterion that must be examined 
within the scope of unpreventability. 
II. Views relating to the determination of unpreventability 
Whichever of the two criteria of unpreventabili ty we wish to study, we 
are at once confronted with the question of the standard, the basis of com-
parison. Must unpreventabili ty exist in terms of an absolute standard, ab-
solute possibility, that applies to everybody, be it regarded f rom the angle of 
means or of possibility in time? Or must it exist in terms of the person 
alleging to reasons of discharge? In other words, must unpreventabil i ty be 
judged on an objective or on a subjective basis? In the objective view, 
discharge must be established if at present there exist no means within the 
power of man to prevent the event. The subjective view holds that the means 
existed, but the person pleading for discharge had no acces to them. Con-
cerning the possibility of prevention in time, the objective view is this: the 
external action was so sudden that any measure within the power of man 
was impossible: the subjective view holds that measures would have been 
possible in human terms, but not in terms of the abilities, in the circumstan-
ces of the person pleading for discharge. . 
The dispute about the objective or subjective judgment of unpreventa-
bility is not a recent one. It has been going on for quite a t ime now, al though 
not over such a wide range, but mainly about the valuation of vis maior. 
A detailed discussion of these debates is beyond the scope of this paper, 
so I limit myself to present the essential features. 
In respect to judging vis maior, socialist l i terature on law accepts the 
objective view, according to which vis maior is a cause which cannot be 
averted by any means within the power of man.14 The subjective view 
appears, too, this regards as vis maior also events for the prevention of 
which the possibility actually existed, but prevention was not possible in the 
given case owing to the abilities and circumstances of the obliged person.15 
In view of the fact that the application of either method encountered diff i -
culties in practice — objective valuation was too strict, subjective was too 
mild and, essentially, became identical with the subjective interpretat ion 
of liability based on dereliction — several at tempts were made to improve 
them. It was tried to introduce the distinction of the inevitable f r o m the 
accidental, and it was suggested that vis maior is always objectively acci-
dental as conserns the person pleading for discharge (at the same time, the 
advocators of this view regard accidental events — the casus — taken in 
the everyday cense as belonging to the chain of the unconditionally necessary 
14 E. g. Luby. 
15 This phenomenon is observable in the earlier judicial practise. 
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causality.16 Others reject the aforesaid stands in part , and emphasize the 
extraordinary nature1 7 or destructive nature1 8 of vis maior. Again others 
t ry to overcome the difficulties by making subjective views stricter and by 
introducing objective elements.19 Another opinion seeks solution in the cor-
rection of the objective school of thought.20 
In looking for a solution we obviously must start f rom the circumstance 
that the system of liability based on the requirement of increased protection 
was devised on the premise that in cases coming in this sphere liability 
based on dereliction can provide no satisfactory solution, whereas the pre-
vention of damage is objectively possible at the same time. It follows f rom 
this that to . establish discharge and unpreventabil i ty in a given case is 
possible only on the basis that causing damage cannot be prevented objec-
tively. Hence we must start f rom the objective basis when unpreventabili ty 
is to be considered. 
b) The manner of prevention 
We have agreed that we must s tar t f rom the objective basis in judging 
unpreventability. Thus the prerequisits of prevention, i. e. the availability 
of the means of prevention, must be valuated in the same way. Yet, at the 
same time, the view making reference to the somewhat relative character 
of the objective category of preventability, is also correct.21 
This relative character originates f rom the fact that the manner and 
bossibility of prevention are incessantly changing and improving. Technical 
progress, which produces novel machinery and methods, creates also the 
possibility to prevent the action of natural forces, to eliminate hazards en-
tailed in the operation of machinery or in human interference, which used 
to be unpreventable not so long ago. This progress is reflected also by 
judicial practice. 
Thus objective potentialities must be taken as the basis whenever 
unpreventabili ty is to be determined. But this objective basis is relative in 
that it is changing and improving incessantly with technological, organi-
zational, etc. progress. 
It should be noted here that activities aimed at prevention are not 
supposed to be just formal acts; they must be actually suitable for exploiting 
given possibilities to prevent damage. Soit is not sufficient to post waning-
boards such as „No admittance" or the like is situations where the hazard of 
damage is extreme. Entrances must be kept locked or guarded constantly in 
such cases.22 
16 E. g. Генкин. Лунц, Антимонов. 
17 Иоффе О. С.: Отвественность по советскому гражданскому праву 
(Leningrád, 1955.) Abr.: Liability 
18 Туманов В. А.: „Случай" и „непреодолимая сила" з советском гражданском праве. 
(Виюн, Moscow, 1951.) 
19 Агарков М. М.: К вопросу о договорной отвественности (Moscow, 1945.) 
Агарков М. М.: Вина потерлевшего в обязательевах из принения вреда. (Советское 
Государство и право, 1940. 3.) 
20 Eörsi: Liability. 
21 Eörsi: Liability. 
22 Municipal Court of Szeged Pf. I. 20 968/1967. 
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c) Temporal possibility of prevention 
Two circumstances may be relevant here. One is that prevention did not 
take place beause measures had not been taken in due time. The other, 
that the event occurred so suddenly that there was no objective possibility 
to act.23 In judging foresight, a relative valuation of objective possibilities 
must be made, similar to those discused in connection with the manner and 
means of prevention. So it is not foresight or estimation connected wi th the 
category of dereliction that must be considered in such cases. 
In valuating temporal possibility, it must therefore be considered 
whether or not the means available for prevention at the present s tandards 
of progress could have been put into operation during the t ime available. 
As concerns discharge f rom liability, it is altogether irrelevant whether 
damage was due to natural or human factors, or possibly caused by animals. 
d) Vis maior 
It follows f rom the foregoing that in case of discharge f rom liability 
based on allegation to „external causes" the category of vis maior is of no 
use. To make use of the concept of vis maior would be of importance only 
if it would be applied as an absolute and objective concept. If so, the question 
of preventability would be irrelevant, since mere allegation to such a cause — 
qualified as a superior, irresistible force — would be an unconditional excuse. 
Yet the situation ist not like that. At the present state of technological prog-
ress, a considerable part of elemental events that might be qualified as i r re-
sistible force can be averted in a very wide field. Where the event proper 
cannot be averted, the imminence can be known in most cases (this is the 
situation in countries with adequate flood-warning systems). Thus the possi-
bility exists to take precautionary measures for preventing damage. And in 
places where the hazard of such events is increased, it is everybody's duty to 
prepare for preventing or mitigating their consequences (in regions where 
earthquakes are frequent , this is taken into account in building). Today the 
sphere of cases where unpreventability is obvious without any special inves-
tigation — e. g. an earthquake — is rather limited in practice; this applies also 
to cases where the event could not be foreseen to prevent damage thereby. 
The correctness of my suggestions appears also f rom judicial practice. For 
instance, a wind-storm does not qualify as vis maior except if in the expert 
opinion of the Meteorological Office it is not only of rare, but simply of 
unprecedented velocity.24 But I think that, investigation into the question of 
preventability cannot be discarded altogether even in such a case. Suppose 
there is such a wind storm. Mere allegation to this fact is no excuse, for it may 
well be that warning had been given. If so, there was possibility to prevent 
damage. There may be cases where not even such a wind-storm will serve as 
excuse. If, however, in the given region such stroms are unusual, i. e. had 
not to be expected, but sprang up so suddenly tha t it was impossible to pre-
vent damage, this circumstance, as an unpreventable external cause, will 
serve as a reason for discharge, irrespective of the fact whether it is otherwise 
23 Eörsi Gy.: Kártérítés jogellenes magatartásért. (Indemnity for unlawful! 
conduct.) (Budapest, 1958.) Abr.: Indemnity. 
34 Supreme Court Áf. V. 23 762/1953. 
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qualified as irresistible force or not. Hence the category of vis maior is unne-
cessary, even harmful, for it might induce to omit investigation into un-
preventability. This, in turn, might lead to an unwarranted discharge from 
liability. 
C) The system of liability based on dereliction 
1. The concept of dereliction 
In connection with the employer's liability for damage, the basis of 
dereliction only serves auxiliary purposes. Considering, however, that we 
int£d to build up the system of liability partially on the principle of derelic-
tion, we now must clarify what we mean by dereliction. 
We have agreed in the foregoing that dereliction is a subjective factor. It 
expresses the damager's relationship with his unlawful conduct and with the 
result. 
The relationship with our own conduct, i. e. our guilt, is determined by 
two components. One is volition, the other is consciousness. I. e. did the 
perpetrator will the consequences of his conduct or not, was he aware, did 
he foresee the consequences of his conduct or not. Both components can act 
in the. negative direction, and — more intensely or less intensely — in the 
positive direction. The volitional component is negative if neither the con-.-
sequence, nor the conduct was willed; in tensely positive if the conesquence 
was willed; slightly positive if the consequence was not willed, 
but the conduct was. The foresight component is negative if 
the consequence was not, and could not have been, foreseen; intensely positive 
if the consequence was foreseen; slightly positive if the consequence was not 
foreseen, but could have been foreseen. The combination of positive and ne-
gative effects determines the degree of blameworthiness. The two extreme 
cases are these: both components are positive, !, e. the perpetrator willed and 
foresaw the consequence, which is the most severe degree of guilt; both 
components are negative, i. e. the perpetrator did not will the conduct, nor 
•the consequence, did not foresee and could not have foreseen the consequence, 
which means guiltlessness. Depending on the nature of the components, the 
various degress of dereliction are determined within these two limits. 
The obligations entailed in the employer's liability for damage are not 
affected by the degree of dereliction, so this will not be discussed here. If the 
question is to be decided whether the employer can or cannot be held liable 
at all, the differentiation of dereliction from guiltlessness is of importance. 
2. Diferentiation of dereliction from guiltlessness 
This is a controversial issue of jurisprudence. The various views can be 
divided into two major categories, the objective and the subjective school of 
thought, and into categories resulting from the combinations of these two. 
The objective view compares the damaging conduct and foresight to an 
average standard. Whoever acts in accordance with this standard is guiltless.-
This view has many adherents in socialist literature on law.25 
25 Иоффе, Новицкий, Лунц, Генкип. 
4 Nagy László 
Yet the objective view was confronted with a number of difficulties in 
practical application. It is not the average man that exists in real l i fe; real 
people are different individuals, having dif ferent cultural at tainments, tech-
nical grounding, certain habits, experience, physical conditions. To neglect all 
this has led not wrong decisions. Some were excused f rom liability, others were 
held liable without good reason. The subjective theory wished to eliminate 
these difficulties by establishing the fact of dereliction compared to the indi-
vidual's abilities, potentialities. It was argued at the same t ime that it is only 
this solution that is proper f rom the viewpoint of socialist law, since people 
should be called to account only if they have committed a fault . And a fau l t 
is committed only if the person in question had the capacity and the oppor-
tunity to act in a different manner.26 
The subjective view, however, was going to the other extreme; it gave sup-
port to various manefestations of backwardness and ignorance, weakened the 
reformative effect of rules relating to liability, diminished their role and im-
portance in the fu r the r economic consolidation of socialist organisations in the 
development of moral and mental capacities of people, in the t ransformat ion 
of their moral and spiritual structure.27 
Recognition of the shortcomings of these two views gave rise to never 
theories, part ly resulting in the combination of the former. Some of t hem 
take the subjective view as a basis and t ry to introduce objective elements, 
some of them try to correct the objective depar ture by means of subjective 
elements. Some of them suggest that in the valuation of the average citizen 
the age, physical condition, cultural standard, etc. of the damager should be 
taken into account.28 Others start f rom the capacities of the damager, bu t 
introduce as the objective standard of evaluation the particularities of t he 
given case,29 the objective importance of the phenomenon in connection wi th 
which the causer of damage had been active.30 There is a school of thought 
which tries to establish the fact of dereliction or its absence by valuat ing 
several factors, which are part ly objective (the nature of the activity in con-
nection with which the violation of law was committed, requirements arising 
therefrom circumstances of the case), and part ly subjective (personal t ra i ts of 
the causer of damage, his preparation for his activity).31 Another theory is 
reforming the objective view by taking as a basis for judging conduct not the 
average citizen, but compares the individual's conduct to averaged and 
abstract requirements which society imposes on similar persons.32 
Thus in making a distinction between dereliction and guiltlessness, w e 
compare a situation of consciousness (foresight or its absence) connected 
with a concrete unlawful conduct to the predetermined standard. In one case 
— in case of the subjective theory — the predetermined standard is t he 
26 Schneider R.: Die materielle Verantwortlichkeit der Arbeiter und Angestellten 
in den sozialistischen Betrieben. (Berlin, 1954.) 
27 Иоффе О. С.: Liability. 
28 Шварц X. И.: Значекие вины в обязательствах из причнения вреда. (Moscow, 1939.) 
20 Антимонов Б. С.: Гражданская отвественность за вред причиненный источником по-
вышенной опасности. 
30 Шлифер В. .Г.: Вопроси о договорной отвественности з советском гражданском праве 
(Советское Государтсво и Право, 1956. 9.) 
31 Иоффе О. С.: Liability. 
32 Eorsi Gy.: Liability. 
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individual's capacity, his possibility to foresee. In the other — the objective 
theory — the standard is the capacities, the potentialities of any average man, 
or — in the corrected view — of a similar person. In this connection it should 
be mentioned hat not even the terms subjective or objective theories are in 
entire accordance with the facts. Namely even the extreme subjective view, 
i. e. comparison to the individual's own capabilites, is actually objective to a 
certain extent. For the elements of consciousness cannot be grasped per se, 
they can only be evaluated on the basis of certain external criteria, manifes-
tations. Any evaluation of the capabilities, potentialities of the causer of 
damage will only be of approximate accuracy. It will be a certain average, 
although one that is very near to the person concerned. (Even the best psycho-
logical tests give their results on thé basis of the averages of former test, 
former experience, conclusions from certain phenomena, so they only approxi-
mate reality.) This example, too, illustrates why the argument of the adhe-
rents of the subjective view, by which they protest against any objective 
comparison from the outset, is not tenable. The dispute actually is focussed on 
the degree, extent of objectivization. (Some believe that the dispute arises from 
the circumstance that the objective wiew approaches the problem from 
the social angle, the subjective from the individual angle. But this interpreta-
tion is not correct. The interests of society are best served by the standard 
which best ensures education, influencing, since it is the sanctions imposed on 
this basis that will turn the causers of damage most efficiently in the direc-
tion of future irreproachable conduct. In this respect the view taking as the 
basis the abstract citizen, possibly the model citizen, will yield just as wrong 
solutions, will violate the people's sense of justice, i. e. will actually be in 
contradiction with realistic socxial evaluation, just like the extreme subjective 
view.) 
In solving this problem we must start from the understanding that society 
imposes requirements on its members. The difference between the systems 
of liability based on dereliction and disregarding dereliction lies exactly in the 
fact that in the latter society contents itself with stating that abstaining from 
unlawful conduct is possible in the field of similar cases, but does not investi-
gate whether in the given case the violator could have been aware of this 
possibility, and why he had not abstained from unlawful conduct; in the 
former cases it is investigated whether the violator inteded to commit an 
unlawful act, whether he knew that he commits one. (Preceding causative 
factors, i. e. what had elicited these elements of volition and consciousness, 
are usually not investigated in case of liability for damage. One purpose of 
the sanctions imposed on the basis of liability is to induce the damager to 
disclose these preceding factors and to try to eliminate their effects in the 
future. Such preceding causative factors are subject to investigation mostly in 
criminal and disciplinary procedure. This is justified also because of the fact that 
the sanctions imposed in cases of such liability affect the perpetrator's person 
to a much greater extent than do the sanctions of liability for damage.) When 
society imposes on its citizens the requirement to abstain from unlawful 
conduct, it essentially shapes a conviction at the same time —- or constructs a 
state of affairs, to put it in another way — and it is the deviation from the 
latter that entails the imposition of sanctions. Such conviction is actually a 
generalization abstracted from social processes. Given processes take place in 
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given persons in given circumstances, and the result of these processes is a 
certain conduct. So if we are to evaulate the individual's conduct, we must 
compare it to this generalization, to the social requirement derived f rom this 
generalization. 
This purpose is served neither by the subjective, nor by the objective 
theory. The subjective view compares the individual's behaviour to the indi-
vidual itself, i. e. not to a social requirement, but to one of the phenomena 
that serve as the basis for determining such requirement. Thus, essentially, 
two processes or phenomena are compared which are accidental in the given 
case. It is exactly therefore that this operation can yield no result that would 
be adequate f rom the social point of view. Yet it is equally true at the same 
time that the objective view, which determines the social requirement uni-
formly for everybody, is actually nothing else but a repetition of the require-
ment formulated in the provision of law. Namely the objective requirement 
of proper circumspection, attention, etc. is expressed by provisions of law. 
Hence the objective theory actually eliminates the principle of dereliction, 
although it seemingly maintains it. 
As we have seen, whenever society imposes requirements it always gene-
ralizes, draws conclusions from certain spheres of cases, from the conduct 
of certain persons, Conclusions and generalizations will yield results that 
differ with the scope of cases taken. as a basis. The wider and more ramify-
ing the sphere observed, the less features an,d conclusions will 
be contained in the generalization, the more differences will appear when 
individual cases, conducts are compared to the conclusions and generalizations. 
If the field of observation is smaller, the result will tend to be the opposite, 
generalization will show more features, will be richer, and the individual 
cases will show much less deviation from the results of generalization. The 
question is how broad the basis of generalization — determing the social 
requirement — should be for establishing dereliction in order to make liability 
for damage serve its purpose properly. 
The solution must start from the premise that the institution of liability is 
not intended to reform citizens in general. Life of society, social production, 
require a very high degree of division of labour. It is not people ,,in general" 
that participate in the work of society; the participants are workers, engi-
neers, accountants, judges, etc. And these are not moving and acting in a 
vacuum, they are interacting amidst the many other phenomena of this world. 
It follows from this, too, that whenever social requirements are defined, we 
cannot start from people from the citizen in general; we must start f rom 
people of specific occupations and positions. Moreover, not only from people 
of comparable occupations and positions, but from people living and being 
active in similar circumstances. Only on the basis of such a restricted sphere 
is it possible to define concrete requirements. which actually have a directive, 
reformative nature, and only in this way is it possible to show conclusively 
the wrongful nature of unlawful conduct. 
As concerns the employer's liability for damage, our above conclusions 
will have the 'effect that the requirements to be met will evidently be diffe-
rent in case of an enterprise with one seat and one operating with several 
scattered seats, or an old enterprise with many branches and a new small one. 
When defining requirements, we must proceed from the average requirements 
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to be met by the enterprises of a similar sector, or of a similar branch of 
industry. 
Buth what has been said so fa r is only one aspect of defining requirements. 
We might say that this indicates the width of the bases of comparison. We must 
study the other aspect, the depth of requirement, as well. This means that 
it must be decided whether average or better than average conduct should be 
imposed as a requirement within the various types. The relevant views are 
not in agreement and not clear-cut either. The preamble to the Civil Code 
refers to a measure above the average stating that „the Bill does not consider 
average diligence to be satisfactory as a rule".33 Another group of views sets 
as the standard the average within a given type34 
I believe that we should discriminate between increased diligence and 
conduct above the average. Increased diligence wishes to express that in case 
of certain types the requirement stricter than the average is taken as the basis 
within the given type. This would be the case if the conduct of outstanding 
persons were taken as the social requirement. As we have seen, the definition 
of the social requirement means to draw certain general conclusions. It follows 
therefore f rom its na ture that it usually, must represent the average. In my 
opinion, average, and not the better than average, must be taken as a basis 
for defining the social requirement. The better than average standard would 
be equivalent to the realization of the objective view in a considerable par t 
of the cases, and would thereby distort the purport of dereliction. (That 
higher requirements are expected to be met by outstanding workers, by t rade 
union functionaries or old skilled workers, is another question. Namely in 
such cases the scope serving as the basis of the type is being restricted, and 
not all workers, but only those mentioned above are considered when the 
social requirement is defined. In certain respects — e. g. maintaining discipline 
— the requirements to be met by such persons will be higher than case of 
ordinary workers. The situation \yill be reversed in other respects, e. g. 
speed or physical working capacity.) 
So we conclude that the average must be taken into account also in 
respect to the employer's liability for damage under labour statutes. 
Thus the establishment of dereliction in case of liability of increased pro-
tection will be subjective, since it will not be considered if the objective pos-
sibility of preventing damage existed; what will be investigated is whether 
such concrete possibility was available to the person causing damage. Howe-
ver, the subjective category of dereliction will be relative at the same time. I t 
will be relative in that conduct is always compared to the social requirement 
determined on the basis of the average of similar types in similar circumstan-
ces. And this social requirement is relative also inasmuch as it is not constant, 
but is changing incessantly. The requirements imposed on employer and 
employee are getting stricter. This is the result of technological progress by 
which it is now possible to prevent damage which seemed inevitable not so 
long ago. The increasing self-respect of the employees acts in the same direc-
tion; growing co-operation and mutual helpfulness of people f ree f rom exploi-
tation permits the imposition of ever stricter requirements to have more 
respect for interests of society and its members.36 
33 Preamble to the 339. § of the Civil Code. 
34 Eorsi Gy.: Indemnity. 
35 Eorsi Gy.: Indemnity. 
3. The proof of dereliction 
A fur the r question arises in connection with applying the principle of 
dereliction: is derelict ion.on the par t of the damager to be proved by the 
damaged, or is the damager expected to prove that he is guiltless. The fo rmer 
is the probative system, the latter the exculpatory system. 
There are views according to which this distinction is unnecessary. It is 
argued that pursuant to the rules of socialist civil procedure, the Courts are 
obliged ex officio to bring to light the t ruth , so the provisions of law in this 
respect are irrelevant as it is the judge's duty to order the parties to adduce 
proof, and to do all steps to f ind the truth.3 6 This position clearly is wrong. 
The importance of the burden of proof is that if the par ty obliged to adduce 
proof is unsuccessful, he must bear the consequences. If, therefore, the dama-
ged were obliged to prove the guilt of the damager, and he would not be able 
to do so, the damager would be discharged of his obligation to compensate. 
Under the exculpatory system, the damager is obliged to compensate if he 
is not able to prove his guiltlessness. The settling of this question is not in 
contradiction with the procedural principle tha t the judge himself is obliged 
to do everything to establish the t ru th . This duty exists even if 
provisions of law contain instructions in respect to the burden 
of proof. There may be cases where t ru th cannot be brought 
to light conclusively despite a most "careful and circumspect procedure. It is 
here that the question arises who is to bear the consequences of such outcome. 
Settling the problem of the burden of proof plays a role here, as it can deter-
mine which par ty ist to suffer disadvantage f rom the fai lure to prove the 
t ru th conclusively in cases with an unsatisfactory outcome. 
The settling of the problem of burden of proof, especially the manner of 
settling, has another aspect, too. Namely it may aggravate considerably, or, 
quite the contrary, alleviate the position of one par ty in enforcing his claim 
for compensation or in his defence against such claim.37 Thus in case of the 
probative system, where the damaged must prove dereliction on the par t of 
the damager, the former may find himself in a very difficult position in m a n y 
cases, e. g. he is not able to collect the facts of proof; this might keep him 
back f rom trying to enforce his otherwise r ight fu l claim, as he is unwilling to 
run the risk of paying the costs of proceedings in case of an unsuccessful 
lawsuit. So the other role of the burden of proof should be not to place 
either par ty in a disproportionately difficult position, and to impose on the 
one party the proving of those facts which the other cannot know and disclose 
sufficiently. This may vary with the different cases of liability.38 It should 
be added tha t this method is also suitable to reveal more clearly the short-
comings in the operations of various employer organs or enterprises. It will 
not be in the interest of the enterprise to obscure the issue, to conceal the 
t ru th in such cases; having to bear the burden of proof, it will do every-
thing within its power to disclose the circumstances. And this may contri-
bute considerably to the measures to be taken by the supervisory organs 
in oder to eliminate the shortcomings brought to light. 
36 Иоффе О. С.: Liability. 
37 Eo-'i Gy.: Indemnity. 
38 Иоффе О. С.: Liability. 
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If we wish to decide whether the probative or the exculpatory system 
should be applied in cases of the employer's liability for damage caused 
within the scope of employment, we must start from the conclusions we 
have made in the foregoing. The aim is to apply a system which puts no 
obsttacle in the way of enforcement of claims, and which induces either 
party to prove the facts to which it has better access. 
As regards the relative position of employer and employee, it is obvious 
at the first glance that the employee has usually but scanty possibilities 
to adduce proof of the employer's dereliction. In simple cases, or if the em-
ployee concerned is in a leading position, the chances may be better; but 
in intricate cases, or if the employee holds a subordinate post, this may 
encounter difficulties. And this often might have the result that the employee 
would not even advance his claim. Hence it seems absolutely desirable to 
choose the exculpatory system in cases of the employer's liability where the 
proof of dereliction is required to establish liability. 
D) Taking into account the damaged person's conduct 
1., Introduction 
It very often happens that the employee's conduct contributes to his 
suffering damage. The employee's contributory action raises the question 
of causal nexus first of all. Two types of case can emerge in this connec-
tion. One is where damage has resulted exclusively from the employee's 
conduct. The other is where the employee's conduct is only one of the causes 
bringing about the damage, or increasing existing damage. This is substan-
tially similar to cases where damage is caused by several persons. . 
This category comprises also the cases of so-called mitigation of damage, 
since the'employee is instrumental in increasing damage through his failure 
to take measures which could have prevented such increase. 
The employee's dereliction and guiltlessness can be involved in either 
case. So it may happen that damage was caused exclusively by the emplo-
yee's faultless conduct. But it may as well be that his conduct amounted 
to dereliction. It may happen that his contributory action was faultless, or 
amounted to dereliction. All these types of conduct may occur in cases of 
the employer's liability arising from increased protection, or in liability based 
on dereliction. Let us have a look at such cases. Let us first study the exclu-
sive causation by the damaged, then cases of his contributory act. (I should 
like to emphasize once more that there is no difference between the two 
typs of case, except that in one case th damaged is the sole causer, while 
in the other he is only one of the causers. The difference in judging these 
cases originates in the latter fact.) 
2. Exclusive causation by the employee 
In cases where the employee's own conduct is the cause of damage, the 
employer is no causer at all. Considering, however, that damage resulted 
in the course of the operations of the employer enterprise, damage appears 
as if having been caused by the employer. It follows from this that the 
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employer can be exculpated by the employee's conduct only if the latter 
was actually the sole causer of damage. Hence it must be ascertained in 
such cases whether the employer was or was not able to prevent the da-
maged employee's conduct. This must be decided in accordance with the 
system of liability to be applied. 
In case of liability of increased protection we must therefore ascertain 
in connection with the causation of the damaged whether the possibility 
of prevention existed objectively or not. Both aspects must be investigated 
ii> such cases, i. e. if adequate means and possibilities of prevention were 
available, and if prevention was possible in terms of time. This differs in 
no respect from cases where we are faced with other „external causes". (It 
makes no difference in this respect — i. e. from the angle of investigating 
preventability — that in connection with the employer's liability of increased 
protection we have mentioned in the category of reasons for discharge the 
causation by the damaged employee in addition to „external causes". We only 
have done so because in case of damage caused within the scope of employ-
ment the employee is never „external", never a person outside the enterprise 
as concerns the relation to the employer.) 
In case of the liability system based on dereliction we have to ascertain 
whether the concrete possibility of prevention had existed or not, i. e. whe-
ther the person to be held liable has, or could have, foreseen the damaged 
person's conduct, and could have prevented damage thereby. Both in the 
present and the former case the employer cannot be exculpated if it turns 
out that the possibility of prevention had existed, since by omitting to make 
use of the possibility to prevent he had become a causer of the event. 
(Whether he can partially be discharged owing to the damaged person's 
possible contributory action, is another question.) 
In case of the exclusive causation of the damaged, the question whether the 
damaged employee was guility of dereliction or not is irrelevant. This is ob-
vious, since in case of exclusive causation by the damaged there exists no causal 
nexus between the conduct of the person to be held liable and the damage 
suffered, so there exists no basis for calling the latter to account. And the 
correlation between the employer and the damage suffered is not affected 
by the nature of the damaged person's — i. e. the real causer's — conduct. 
This position is taken also by judicial practice: in connection with the 
employer's liability for damage, in cases of the employee's exclusive causa-
tion, it is never investigated whether the causer's conduct should be quali-
fied as dereliction or not. 
In connection with discharge from liability on the basis of exclusive 
causation by the damaged, I should like to emphasize that such cases must 
be distinguished from those where the claim for compensation is rejected 
because the demeged has omitted o take some step in the course of enfor-
cing his rights (e. g. has submitted his claim afer the fixed deadline has 
expired). In such cases there is no calling to account not because the person 
to be held liable was not causer of the damage, but because the damaged 
person failed to enforce his claim properly. 
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3. The employee's contribution to causing damage 
a) The concept oj contribution 
As we have seen, cases where the employee himself is the exclusive 
causer of damage present no particular difficulties. Since damage is ascri-
bable exclusively to the damaged person's conduct, it is justified to make 
him bear the burden alone, and not to hold liable the employer, who did 
not take part in causing damage. Cases where the damaged employee only 
contributed to the occurrence of damage, present a number of problems. 
The damaged person's contribution to damage means that the partial 
causer of damage is the damaged person himself; Two problems must be 
solved in this connection. One, does, or shoul, such a situation affect repa-
ration? Two, if so, in what manner ought this circumstance to be taken 
into account. 
In connection with the purpose of liability for damage we have con-
cluded that this institution is intended to encourage through reparation the 
elimination or reduction of unlawful, damaging conduct in the future. It 
would follow from this principle that if the damaged person also was 
a causer of damage, and his contribution to damage, be avoided. Since 
in our case the damaged person has caused damage to himself, his influen-
cing within the scope of liability for damage means that he can demand 
compensation for the damage caused only from himself, i. e. he is not 
entitled to claim compensation from any other person for the damage that 
has resulted f rom his conduct. Thus damage suffered by him will not be 
compensated for the part in question. This solution seems to be self-expla-
natory, yet the situation is not so simple as that, 
b) Violation of the social requirement 
The contributory act of the damaged person means that the latter him-
self has also destroyed, damaged, i. e. reduced his property. Provisions of 
law prohibiting citizens from damaging or destroying their own property 
dp not exist as a rule. If they exist at all, they do not prohibit destruction 
of property, they only contain restrictions as to the manner of destruction. 
If somebody, for example, burns down his house, this is unlawful conduct. 
If, however, he destroys his house by demolishing it, this does not violate 
prohibitions. (Administrative or building regulations which may make demoli-
tion of certain buildings conditional on special permits need not be discussed 
here.) Exceptions to this general rule are cases where property is a protected 
monument or has artistic value, and the owner has therefore no right of 
free disposition. But in such cases it is not destruction or damaging that are 
prohibited; the owner's ri^ht of disposing is restricted in general. Conse-
quently, if somebody damages or destroys his property and this conduct is 
not prohibited, not even disapproved, it obviously cannot be qualified as 
such if the owner only co-operates in damaging or destruction. This con-
clusion would seem to have the effect that the damaged person's contribu-
tion to causing damage must not be taken into account. This contradictory 
situation has led the scholars of jurisprudence to t ry to find a satisfac-
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tory solution for bearing the loss resulting f rom damage caused b y the 
damaged person's conduct. 
Several views have emerged from disputes about this problem in civil 
law. One view holds that the damaged person's conduct by which he causes 
damage to himself, is unlawful conduct. Although he does not violate the 
personal rights of anybody else, he does violate the interests of society.39 
Another opinion is that by contributing to damage, the damaged person 
violates the rights of the other person causing damage. (This would mean, 
essentially, that the damaged person increases damage by his own conduct, 
and causes damage thereby to the other person causing the damage, since 
the latter would be held liable for greater amount of damage. So this addi-
tional amount should be refunded to the person causing damage, i. e. par t 
of the compensation would be returnéd. In practice this is carried out by 
reducing compensation accordingly.40 Another theory holds that the damaged 
person violates the rules of socialist coexistence by not devoting suff icient 
care to his rights. So the violation of the rules of socialist coexistence jus t i fy 
that he should bear the consequences of damage caused by himself, a l though 
his activity was not unlawful.4 1 Finally, there is a four th view holding that 
the damaged person's own fault is not unlawful conduct, but is judged 
unfavourably by society and considered at the same t ime a conduct tha t 
could be reformed. Thus the aims of preventive legal policy wa r r an t the 
•imposition of sanctions.42 In my opinion, the views which t ry to establish 
unlawfulness in cases of the damaged person's contributory action a re ar t i -
ficial and not tenable. If the first view were accepted, it would follow 
logically that causing damage to one's own property ought to be considered 
an unlawful act even if it is not combined with any other person's un l awfu l 
conduct. But this is not so. There exists no such general restriction of pro-
prietary rights. The second view is extremely artivicial and based on a non-
existent right. The third and four th are substantially identical, and both 
make a correct approach to the problem. The point is that, within the pa t -
tern of socialist society, the co-operation of the members of society is a social 
requirement. This co-operation must be manifest also in that nobody is sup-
posed to behave in a way that would violate others without good reason, 
would place unwarranted burdens on others. (It follows f rom this principle 
tha t in case of un lawful assault nobody is supposed to fehave in a manne r 
that would aggravate the consequences of such assault and place u n w a r r a n -
ted consequences on the assaulter.) In other words, society expects everybody 
to do everything in his power to prevent or mitigate damage. A suitable 
means of inducing people to observe this social requirement would be to make 
them bear that par t of the loss to which they had contributed. 
This suggested solution would be acceptable also for civil law, and also 
39 Антимонов Б. С.: 1. с. 
40 Иоффе О. С.: Liability. 
41 Флейшиц Е. A.: Basic issues of the liability on the civil law for the damage 
caused in the state of health. 
ség alapvető kérdései. (В01011- Moscow, 1955.) АЪт.: Basic issues. 
Szpunar A.: Zachowanie sie poszkodowanego jakopodstawa dozmniejszenia odsz-
kodowania. (Nowe Prawo, 1957. 6.) -
Luby S.: Systém a základné tézy obeianskoprávnoj zodpoveddnosti (Právnicke 
Studie 1957. 2.). 
42 Eörsi Gy.: Liability. 
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for cases of the employee's contributory action within the scope of the 
employer's liability for damage under labour law. But in respect to the 
employer's liability for damage caused to employees this conclusion must 
be widened. First, it must be kept in mind that the contributory act of the 
employee often implies breach of his duties, which might result in a dis-
ciplinary action. Second, that employees often suffer damage because they 
are not able to utilize their working capacity on account of the employer's 
un lawful conduct. For example, the employer withholds the employee's work-
book and this prevents the employee f rom entering another employment; 
or he has been disabled partially by an industrial accident, which prevents 
him f rom continuing in his original sphere of work. In a socialist society, 
every member of this society is under the moral obligation — so this is also 
a social requirement — to participate personally in the work of society. It 
follows f rom this duty, too, that if anybody is prevented f rom doing his 
usual work, or f rom utilizing his working capacity, because of some unlaw-
fu l measure, he is obliged to do everything in his power to join in the work 
of society in some other way. So he is not supposed to wait inactively for 
the removal of the obstacle,. is not supposed to become resigned to being 
unalbe to do his former work because of his partial disability; he is expec-
ted to look for some job he is able to perform (e. g. jobs for which no work-
book is required, or for which reduced working capacity is sufficient). 
It follows f rom the foregoing that within the scope of employment the 
social requirement imposed on employees in respect to the prevention and 
mitigation of damage is of increased content. 
Another question must be studied in connection with the contributory 
act of the damaged person. This is discharge f rom the consequences of vio-
lating the social requirement of preventing and mitigating damage. It may 
happen that the employee suffering damage does not meet the above requi-
rement under the influence of some other, more important, social requirement. 
In this case he must be excused f rom the consequences of his conduct, and 
the person causing damage cannot be discharged f rom liability for the rele-
vant proportion of damage. Such cases occur especially when damage is 
suffered as a result of gallant acts connected with work, or of help given 
to others.43 The Czechoslovak statutes on liability for industrial accidents 
and occupational diseases contain provisions for sUch cases.44 Pursuant to 
these provisions, if the employee's action is inteded to avert immediate dan-
ger to his or somebody other's l ife or health, or to prevent a damage, his 
contributiory act cannot serve as an excuse for the employer. 
c) Dereliction on part of the damaged person 
So fa r we only have clarified one component of the valuation of the 
damaged person's contributory act, i. e. the violation of a social requirement . 
In the following we also must study, the question whether the possibility 
of preventing damage was actually available to the damaged, i. e. whether 
by making him bear a proportion of the loss it is possible to influence him 
43 Ignatowicz J.: Odpowiedzadnose materialna zakladu pracy za wydpadki. 
(Warszawa, 1955.) 
44 Szpunar A.: Zachowanie sie poszkodowanego jakopodstawa dozmniejszenia 
odszkodowania (Nowe Prawo, 1957. 6.) 
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for a better future .conduct. The problem in this connection is what standard 
should be applied to establish the above fact. 
As we have seen at the definiton of systems of liability, sanctions im-
posed for some reprehensible conduct will have the best reformative effect 
if the perpetrator is aware, or could be aware, of the reprehensible nature 
of his conduct, i. e. his conduct qualifies as dereliction. The employee's lia-
bility for damage caused by him within the scope of employment will be 
in accordance with this principle. Although we are not concerned here with 
the establishment of liability, it would not seem warranted to abandon the 
prerequisite of dereliction. Thus the employee's contributory act should be 
taken into consideration only if his conduct had amounted to dereliction. 
Section 123/A of the Code of Labour contains provisions to this effect, and 
the same position is reflected by judicial practice, The question is, however, 
whether all conclusions drawn in connection with dereliction in the foregoing 
can be applied fully to the valuation of dereliction shown in the course 
of the contributory act. 
Relating to the contributory dereliction of the damaged, two views 
— essentially completing' each other — are found in the domain of civil law. 
One is that it makes no difference whatever if dereliction is to be imputed 
to the damager or the damaged. This position is usually found in Soviet 
civil law.45 The other view is that dereliction of the damaged must be 
judged more leniently than that of the damager. So the social requirement 
will be different. The reason is that the social requirement to take utmost 
care not to cause damage is binding on everybody, whereas people cannot 
be expected to. be on the alert constantly and to the same extent to prevent 
the occurrence of damage.46 
The position that it is not possible to be on the alert incessantly to 
prevent damage to the same extent as not to cause damage, is correct by 
any standard. The social requirement itself is milder in the first and stricter 
in the second case. Whenever the contributor's dereliction is considered, com-
parison is being made to types, like in valuating dereliction as has been 
discussed. The difference is. that the individual's conduct is compared in 
terms of a milder requirement to the average conduct of the type. 
It should be added right away that in cases where the social require-
ment relating to the prevention and mitigation of damage is extended in 
scope, i. e. other factors — duties arising out of employment, the duty 
to participate in society's work — appear in addition, the standards of 
judgment become stricter as a matter of necessity. True, the requirement 
to prevent and mitigate damage is binding on everybody, but it cannot 
be demanded reasonably that everybody be prepared and concentrate all 
his attention on this. On the other hand, the obligation to participate in the 
work of society does not require such a negative, defensive attitude — the 
latter involves difficulties, for one never can know from where and when 
some menacing event might come — it rather requires positive action. The 
obligation to participate should govern everybody's attitude anyway. (Society 
condemns work-shirkers more severely than a person, say, who is not eff i-
45 E. g. Агарков, Антимонов, Иоффе, Флейшиц. 
46 Eorsi Gy.: Liability. 
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cient enough in fighting fire.) This situation assumes special emphasis in 
cases where the damaged employee's contributory act involves breach of his 
duty arising out of employment. (The breach of duty proper must be judged 
by the same standards in every case, be it connected with damage or con-
tribution to damage, or not.) 
I should like to note that even those advocating the view that derelic-
tion should be judged by the same standards both for the contributory act 
of the damaged and the act of the damager himself, are aware of the fact 
that the basis of equality is somewhat defective here (except for cases where 
the contributory act involves breach of duty of employment). What has been 
said above can also be inferred f rom the fact the holders of the above view 
do not . usually content themselves with a lower degree of dereliction, but 
insist on the establishment of gross negligence as a prerequisite of holding 
liable the damaged person for his contributory act.47 This position is reflec-
ted also in Soviet civil law,48 as well as in the regulations governing claims 
for damages resulting f rom industrial accidents.49 I think that similar con-
siderations were in the background of Czechoslovak statutory regulations 
on liability in case of industrial accidents, according to which the employer 
must compensate for a larger proportion of the damage than has to be 
borne by the employee, even if the latter has contributed to damage.50 In my 
opinion, it would seem to serve better the aim if the liability for contributory 
act were not made conditional on the degree of dereliction, and if the stan-
dard of judgment were changed depending on the nature of the contri-
butory act. * 
4. Valuating the employee's contributory act 
In the foregoing we have clarified how the conduct of the damaged 
person should be valuated. Let us now consider how the contributory act 
of the damaged person affects the employer's liability. We shall consider 
cases in which contribury acts are involved, i. e. both employer and employee 
were instrumental in causing damage. (Cases, in which the employee is the 
exclusive causer , have been discussed in paragraph 2.) . . . 
. Let us first consider the case where the employee is not to blame. In 
case of the employee's contributory act, the starting factor of damage is the 
employer's injurious conduct. It is justified to call him to account therefore, 
in order to influence him towards proper conduct. Since, at the. same time, 
the damaged person is not to blame, it would be unnecessary and unfair 
to take steps against the latter. So the conclusion is that the employer alone 
must be held liable for damage in such cases. Whether his liability is based 
on the requirement of increased protection, or on dereliction, is irrelevant. 
There is a seeming contradiction here. As we have agreed, if the em-
ployee . is the exclusive causer of damage, the employer will not be held 
liable, even if the employee was not to blame for the damage, while in case 
47 <E>JieHiiiHii E. A.: Basic issues. 
48 Basic principles of the Sowiet civil law 76—79. §. 
49 5. §. : 
50 150/1961. Sb. 
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of the empleyee's contributory act the employer is liable if the employee 
was not guilty of dereliction. But, actually, there is no contradiction here. 
In the first case, the employer has not displayed any such activity as would 
have led to damage; so it would be unfair to call him to account in w h a t -
ever manner. This would have no effect to improve conduct. Yet in the 
second case the employer's conduct is disapproved by society, hence calling 
him to account is justified. One objection to this reasoning might be tha t 
to hold the employer liable is correct, but how should it be justified to hold 
him liable also for that portion of the damage, which was caused not by 
his, but rather by the employee's activity. This objection possesses some 
rationality. Yet the difficulty lies in the circumstance that is is usually im-
possible to ascertain what the ratio of the various causations is, to wha t 
proportion they contributed to damage. Damage occurred constitutes an indi-j 
visible unity, which cannot be dissociated according to the ratio of causation.51 
It must be taken into , account at the same time that damage would not have 
occurred without the employer's reprehensible conduct. Comparing this with 
the employee's irreprehensible conduct, the requirements of both reparat ion 
and reforming warran t to hold the employer liable for damage in full . If a 
solution to the contrary were applied, the guiltless employee's damage par t ly 
would not be repaired. 
Let us now consider cases where the employee is guilty of dereliction 
in contributing to causing damage. In such cases, the conduct of both em-
ployer and employee is reprehensible. The purpose of reforming requires 
.influencing of both employer and employee to improve their conduct in the 
fu ture . It follows f rom this that both of them will be liable for damage. 
This is manifest in practice in that the employer repairs the portion of da-
mage imputable to him — both in the liability system based on the requi-
rement of increased protection, and in the system based on dereliction — 
while the employee has no claim to compensation for the rest of the damage. 
This solution is a correct expression of the principle that everybody has to 
bear the consequences of his reprehensible conduct.52 And it induces at the 
same time the person concerned to a better performance of duties arising 
out of employment. 
5. Determining the degree of the contributory act 
We have seen that if the contributory act involves dereliction, the da-
maged person is also liable, and is not entitled therefore to partial compen-
sation. The fu r the r problem to be decided is in wha t manner that proportion 
of the damage should "be determined which must be compensated for, or 
which must be borne by the damaged employee himself. 
In cases where the damaging conduct and the contributory conduct rest 
on the same basis, the solution is simpler. This will be the case when the 
employee's contributory act is to be judged in case of the employer's liability 
established on the basis of dereliction. Two homogeneous situations have to be 
51 Иоффе О. С.: Liability. 
52 Eorsi Gy.: Indemnity. 
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compared here. They are homogeneous because, concrete, real faults are im-
plied in both, i. e. that both employer and employee had acted in a reprehen-
sible manner, not in accordance with social requirements, and that they could, 
or should, have been aware of the wrongful na ture of their actions. But 
this homogeneity will be relative only inasmuch as the standards for judging 
these wrongful conducts will be different, as we have seen. They will be dif-
ferent, on the one hand, because the employer's. and the employee's conduct 
are compared to different types, and, on the other hand, because the judg-
ment of contribution is usually more lenient even within these types. But, 
despite this relativity, the two instances of dereliction can be compared, can 
be proportioned to each other as basically homogeneous entities. The ratio 
of these two will determine also the ratio of sharing the loss, i. e. the ratio 
for which the employer is liable, and the one to be borne by the employee.53 
The si tuation' is more complex under the system of liability based on the 
requirement of increased protection. We do not have two homogeneous, com-
parable conducts in this case. To overcome this difficulty it has been sugges-
ted to distribute damage. Yet this is not feasible. Damage occurred represents 
an indivisible unity which cannot be dissociated by the ratio of causation. 
Distribution of damage on the basis of causation would substantially thwar t 
the operation of liability. Namely the damaged person is nearly always invol-
ved in the causation of damage. Thus liability and discharge f rom liability 
would rest on the same set of objective causes.54 
It happens — instances are found especially in judicial practice — that 
in such cases attempts are made to prove the dereliction of the employer 
causing damage. The two instances of dereliction would form a homogeneous 
basis of comparison in this way. Yet this is no correct method either. Firts, 
it contradicts the principle tha t the employer's dereliction need not be proved 
to hold him liable. Second, proving dereliction would be artificial in many 
cases. It would often result in the interpretation of the „objective" possibili-
ties of prevention — constituting the basis of liability — as subjective possi-
bilities, i. e. would result in the objectivization of dereliction. If, by contrast, ' 
this were not done, it would very often impossible to prove dereliction on the 
side of the par ty causing damage; and this would lead to a situation where 
the employer causing damage would practically be discarged f rom liability 
as a result of the distribution of damage, despite the fact that the objective 
possibility of preventing damage had existed, and he, the employer, should 
have been liable therefore. Namely there will be found dereliction on the 
employer's part , but there will be found such conduct on the employee's part , 
so the proportioning of the two instances of dereliction would only result 
in the employee's liability, i. e. the employer would be excused and the employeé 
would have to bear all the loss, or a considerable portion at least. Such a 
solution would turn the entire system of .liability upside down.55 
53 Флейшиц E. A.: Basic issues. 
Szpunar 1. c. 
Eorsi Gy.: Liability. 
Иоффе О. С. Liability. 
54 Eorsi Gy.: Indemnity. 
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55 Eorsi Gy.: Liability. 
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A correct souliton can be reached only if we give up the idea of comparing 
the two conducts. This means, then, that the dereliction of the damaged mus t 
be valuated in se. Thus, substantially, we must determine to what extent he has 
become unworthy of compensation as a result of his conduct or dereliction. 
This position is dominating in jurisprudence.56 
V. 
Causal nexus 
1. The importance of causal nexus 
Causal nexus is usually enumerated among the prerequisites of liability 
for damage. This means that a causal nexus must exist between the conduct 
held liable and the damage caused, i. e. only that person can be held liable 
whose conduct was the causative factor of damage. Indeed, the existence of 
causal nexus appears most clearly here, but, as concerns liability for damage, 
it plays a role elsewhere, too. 
Reference to the causal nexus means that there exists a relationship 
between two phenomena, and in such a manner that one phenomenon consti-
tutes the basis of the occurence of the other. But there exists relationship 
not only between wrongful act and damage. Causal nexus must exist also 
between the various elements. — prerequisites — of liability for damage, 
moreover within these elements themselves. 
The views relating to causal nexus are answering the question in wha t 
cases it is possible to ascertain whether such causal nexus actually exists 
between the various elements. Thus a real nexus, and not a seeming one is 
involved here. 
It should be added that the existence of such nexus must be ascertained in 
.a manner which the jurist, too, can make use of. Hence the views relating to 
causal nexus do not interpret such nexus as the precondition of liability for 
damage; they rather provide the method by which it is possible to determine 
whether or not causal nexus had existed in reality — in real life — between 
the various elements of liability, or, to put it in another way, between the 
factual prerequisites of liability. I t is at this point tha t difficulties arise in 
solving this problem. 
As concerns causal nexus, the method of determining the existence of 
nexus, the provisions relating to liability for damage, contain no directives. And 
no regulation to this effect is contained in. provisions relating do disciplinary 
liability, nor in the provisions of criminal law, whereas the establishment of 
causal nexus is one prerequisite of holding somebody liable also in these fields. 
Yet there is a very sharp and long-lasting theoretical controversy in the back-
ground of the lack of such legal regulation. 
The disputes going on in the scientific field are made .difficult by the 
fact tha t the problem of causal nexus is, primarily, philosophical and not a 
legal one. Thus, essentially, the disputes are going on at two levels. First 
56 Eorsi Gy.: Liability. 
<l>jiefcimii E. A. Basic issues. 
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it must be clarified if and how the existence of causal nexus can be ascertained, 
and the philosophical criteria for doing so must be defined; second, it must 
be determined how the conculsions of philosophy can be applied to the field 
of law. The latter problem is aggravated by the fact that a formula must be 
devised which the practical jurist can use in his daily work, and by which 
he is. able to differentiate promptly and clearly between the cases coming 
up in practice. 
2. Socialist theories relating to causal nexus 
As concerns the problem of causal nexus, socialist jurisprudence stands 
on the basis of dialectical materialism. Causality is interpreted as an objec-
tive connexion that exists outside and independent of human consciousness. 
Yet despite the generally accepted theoretical basis, there are several views 
in socialist jurisprudence how to establish and evaluate in respect to law the 
relationship of two phenomena. The difficulty lies in the circumstance tha t 
whenever we t ry to study some phenomenon we must detach it f rom the uni-
versal context, we must isolate it. The controversy emerges in how we should 
detach the various phenomena f rom the universal context, f rom what precon-
ditions we must start to be able to regard one phenomenon as the cause, and 
the other as the effect of this cause, af ter having isolated the two phenomena. 
In order to reach a correct standpoint, we must make a short survey of the 
theories developed in socialist jurisprudence. 
a) Let us mention first the view based on the differentiation of the ine-
vitable f rom the accidental, which is widely accepted in socialist jur ispruden-
ce. The followers of this view1 hold that liability only can result f rom a con-
duct of which the effect is an inevitable consequence. Accidental consequen-
ces preclude liability. The reason of this view is that, since calling to account 
is intented to reform, to hold liable for non-caused or accidentally caused 
effects would be ha rmfu l and would make no sense.2 
There are minor or major dissimilarities between the views based on the 
• differentiation of the inevitable f rom the accidental. But these only relate 
to questions of detail. Thus, for instance, some writers identify the concept 
of cause with that of inevitableness,3 others define different criteria for dif-
ferentiat ing the inveitable f rom the accidental.4 the latter are mainly conse-
quences of the fact that at tempts have been made to disprove the arguments 
of those opposing this theory, and to answer the cases adduced by them. 
These additions did hot change the substance of the theory, but the concept 
of inevitableness was sometimes distorted in order to parry attacks, and some 
writers even adopted the subjectivistic view. 
The tehory of the causal nexus of the inevitable and the accidental has 
been exposed to severe attacks. The opponents of this view can be divided 
into several groups. 
1 E. g. Пионтковский. Лунц, Матвеев, Антимонов, Генкин, Шаргородский, Сергеева, 
Флейшиц, Lu'oy 
2 Шаргородский М. Д. Некоторые вопросы причинной связи в теории права 
(Советское Госу дарство и Право.) (1956. 7.) 
3 Provaznik V.: Odskodnovanu. (Soudce z Lidu, 1952. 9.) 
4 Шаргородский M. Д.: 1. c. 
5 Nagy László 65-
The one refers to the notion that inevitable and accidental are in dialec-
tical interaction, that accidental is the manifestat ion form inevitable. I t 
is therefore that no discrimination can be made between accidental and ine-
vitable causality. This distinction is of no use for the jurist.5 
The other group believes that the distinction on the inevitable and ac-
cidental basis of the nexus of two phenomena is correct and possible, but 
does not regard it as suitable for solving the problem of legal liability.6 
mányi Intézet Értesítője 1958. I. 2.) Abr.: Causality. 
It was probably this criticism that prompted the adherents of this the-
ory, to t ry to f ind various criteria for the differentiat ion of inevitable f r om 
accidental, easier to recognize in practice. 
b) Discrimination between inevitable and accidental is rejected by the 
theory that starts f rom the concept of different degrees of causation. Accor-
ding to this theory, the act causing the effect is not homogeneous, it can 
produce the effect to different degrees, and there may be principal as well 
as less important, secondary causes.7 
c) The discrimination of inevitable f rom accidental is rejected also by 
the view constructed on the categories of possibility and reality. According 
to this view, the conditions must be studied and those only creating the pos-
sibility of the effect must be isolated f rom those 'which have turned possibi-
lities into reality. It is the circumstances turning possibility into reality tha t 
lend their causative force to the individual particularities of the consequences 
preduced. If these circumstances have a na ture of objective repetition and 
are correlated with human conduct, the inference must be that this has crea-
ted the concrete possibility of the effect. If the same circumstances do not 
repeat themselves objectively in a given situation, the conduct correlated 
with them only creates the abstract possibility of the effects, precluding the-
reby liability.8 
d) Another view, having found acceptance in criminal law, considers a 
discrimination between the inevitable and accidental categories of causation 
as unnecessary. The only importance it attaches to such distinction is tha t 
the former is easier to predict. Otherwise, if an objective cáusal nexus exists, 
the question of liability must be decided by examining the question of cul-
pability.9 Considering the fact that the adherents of this view studied the 
problem only f rom the angle of criminal law, where the examination of cri-
minality is always necessary, they rather oversimplified the problem. Hence 
their theory cannot be used in respect to liability for damage. 
e) Another theory makes attempts at selecting the causes in a d i f ferent 
manner . Leaving the objective character of the chain* of causality, unchan-
ged at tempts are made here at selecting a point, based on evaluation coming 
f rom outside, where the jurist has to cut through the chain of causality ex-
tending into infinity. This method does not introduce evaluation, upon the 
5 Иоффе О. С. Liability. 
6 Eörsi G.: Az okozati összefüggés a polgári jogi felelősség területén. (Causality 
in the domain of the civil liability.) (Állam és Jogtudományi Intézet Értesítője. 
1958. I. 2.) Abr.- Causality. 
7 Трайнин А. H.: Состав преступления по советскому уголовкому праву. 
8 Иоффе О. С. Liability. 
9 Gerő Т.: Az okozati összefüggés a büntetőjogban. (Causality in the criminal 
law.) (Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1958. 1—2.) 
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overt pretext of subjectiveness or objectiveness, to the causal nexus; it emp-
hasizes certain causes, and disregards others, f rom among equivalent ones 
that cannot in themselves be arranged into ranks; in doing so, it imploys 
evaluation coming f rom outside and not affecting the objective character of 
the chain of causation. This selected cause is the „cause in the legal sense", 
which is always human conduct. The underlying principle of selection is de-
termined by the objective rules which also determine in the given field the 
attempts at reflecting and changing reality.10 
3. Criticism of theories relating to causal nexus 
As has been shown in the foregoing, the problem of causal nexus has 
provoked wide disputes and given rise to various views even in socialist li-
terature on law. 
To find a correct solution of the problem we must start f rom the premise 
that there is a cause behind every phenomenon, and that there exists an ob-
jective relationship between cause and resulting phenomenon. Hence a certa-
in conduct can be regarded as the cause of a certain affect if, pursuant to 
objective laws, this conduct must produce the resulting effect. It ought to be 
emphasized here that what is involved here is not that, according to experi-
ence, similar conducts produce similar effects several times or often, but that , 
according to objective laws, a certain consequence must result f rom such 
conduct. Judicial practice is correct in pointing out that to establish a causal 
nexus it is not sufficient to refer to common knowledge11 or to invoke pre-
sumption.12 
Yet the question is whether we may content ourselves with objective, i. 
e. really existing, nexus as a criterion, or have to go far ther . And if we have 
to go far ther , on what basis should fu r the r differentiation be made. As we 
have seen, the controversy between the various theories lies just here. It is 
obvious at the first glance tha t the acceptance of the mere existance of an 
objective nexus defines the sphere of liability ra ther widely. As we also have 
seen, criminal law tackles the problem ra ther lightly saying that studying the 
question of culpability confines accountability within realistic limits anyway. 
In case of liability for damage — be it under civil law or under labour law 
— problems arise in instances where dereliction, i. e. the subjective element, 
is not considered. The limits can be narrowed down in two ways: either we 
interfere more or less arbitrarily with the causative process, or we view the 
process as it is, but take into account only certain phenomena for establis-
hing liability. 
The first method was chosen be the adherents of the theory based on 
the discrimination of the inevitable f rom the accidental; but this is the case 
also with the theory built on the different weights of causes, or on the cate-
gories of possibility and reality. As we have seen, none of these theories were 
able to provide a staisfactory solution. The differentiation of the inevitable 
f rom the accidental renders the field of liability too narrow. I t is therefore 
10 Eorsi Gy.: Causality. 
11 Supreme Court Af. II. 20 724/1953. 
12 Municipal Court of Budapest 41 Pf. 21288/1964. 
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that its followers try to widen it. Yet this either falsifies inevitableness, or 
yields a solution only by drawing into this orbit the study of prevision; or 
they have no other choice but to come to the decision that considerations of 
legal policy may render necessary to establich liability independent of causa-
tion.13 Yet this latter is out of the question in case of objective liability. 
Nor do the solutions based on the d i f ferent weights of causes, or. the 
theories based on the. categories of possibility and reality, provide adequate 
help. The followers of the former fail to reveal, how the categorization devi-
sed by them is to be applied in practice. The latter view leaves it entirely to 
the administrators of law to decide whether there exists causal nexus or not. 
A different method was chosen by the theory which tries to f ind within 
t h e causative process — leaving the lat ter intact — the conscious-volitional, 
unf lawfu l human conduct that can be influenced theoretically. This is the 
„legal cause". If such a cause is found, liability is established. The chief ad-
vantage of this theory is the criticism of the various selective theories — in-
cluding the theory of the inevitable and accidental that holds a dominating 
position. Namely this criticism exposes the shortcomings of these theories in 
a most lucid manner, and in addition, points out the contradictions of the 
a t tempts known so far . 
When giving the reasons of their stand, the advocators of the theory ba-
sed on the distinction of the inevitable f rom the accidental confuse the spe-
cific with the general, or, more correctly, t ry to evaluate the specific by the 
criteria of the general. Yet the general must play a role in the course of ma-
king law, and not in establishing the concrete causal nexus of a specific 
case. Having found that in real life there exists a correlation that is conside-
red as harmful , the State takes measures to eliminate the causes tha t produce 
such correlation. One method of elimination is the introduction of the insti-
tution of liability for damage by which it is tried to influence people not to 
display an at t i tude whicht gives rise to the correlation considered ha rmfu l . 
The regularity, which induces the State to take defensive measures, becomes 
manifest in the large number of accidental events. To establish regulari ty 
means to make abstractions f rom these events, to extract the substance. In 
the last analysis, the law demonstrates how the relationship of two pheno-
mena would appear if they were brought into connection with each other de-
tached f rom their universal contexts. Indeed, it is possible in the realm of 
the phenomena of nature to induce processes that take their course isolated, 
and to prove tehereby the operation of rules. There is usually no possibility 
to do so in the field of social sciences. Whenever a provision of law is f r amed 
af ter the recognition of regularities, we always must keep in mind that such 
regularities usually cannot be found in the i r pure state in real life, but tha t 
they appear in some particular form affected by a universal context. (The 
movement of celestial bodies is a similar case. Knowing the data of a planet, 
we are able to compute the data of its revolution round the sun, period, orbit, 
and the like. Yet in reality we never find the computed, values, since the data 
.are modified by the effect of the other celestial bodies.) Hence, if the provi-
sion of law only considered the regularites, and, in particular, only their fo rm 
manifest in inevitableness, and excluded accidental correlations, this would 
mean to disregard a considerable proportion of cases. As though somebody 
13 IIIapropoflCKHH M. 1. c. 
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tried to scoop out water from a barrel by using a sieve, to use a rough-and-
ready example. Thus legal regulation defines the type and system of liability 
since the possibilities of influencing will be different which must be evalua-
ted legally whenever the undesirable effect realizes, and in doing so the cir-
cumstance whether the nexus between the conduct to be evaluated and the. 
effect was inevitable or accidental is disregarded. 
The theory based on the „legal cause" reaches correct conclusion. Only 
I do not think that the term „legal cause" is felicitous one. It would seem 
to pretend as if the chain of causality proper contained a phenomenon among 
others that bears the label „legal cause" and the only problem involved 
would be to discover it. Actually the thing in question is that there exists a 
chain of causality expressing objective correlations. In connection with lia-
bility for damage, the legal approach evaluates only some of the innumerable 
phenomena, attaches consequences to certain phenomena only. When liability 
for damage is being established and the yardstick devised by law is applied 
to study the cause figuring in the chain of causality, one cause, the one ser-
ving the purpose of our yardstick, is selected. Yet if the yardstick chan-
ges, the selected phenomenon, the cause, will change too. Even within 
liability for damage, the yardstick will be different, we will select 
and evaulate some other type of human conduct, depending on the 
system of liability and on the circumstance whether we are confronted 
with liability under civil law or under labour law. The phenomena and causes 
selected in case of disciplinary or criminal liability will, be even more dis-
similar. So there exists no particular legal cause in the chain of causality, or,, 
more correctly, there exists a specific „legal cause" in each case; but these 
causes are not identical, they are different „legal causes" according to the 
nature and system of liability. The use of the term „legal cause" tends t& 
conceal these differences and may result in misinterpretation of the writer 's 
intentions. 
The correctness of what has been said so far can be tested easily in con-
nection with liability for damage resulting from the use of sources of increa-
¿ed dangerousness. Here the theory based on the discrimination of inevitable 
rrom accidental does not take us anywhere. Suppose the driver has been care-
less and has therefore knocked down a pedstrian. It would be extremely 
difficult to show that the owner of the car has caused this damage as a mat-
ter of inevitableness, It may be that causation was not evitable even on part 
of the driver, and that it was only accidental. In such cases the maker of law 
detects the involved human conduct that can be influenced, and that 
in this case this conduct is to own and operate the car. This 
cause is remote, but it is expedient to invest it with legal relevance. So this 
will be the „legal cause". That upkeep of the car will figure among the causes 
is obvious, hence several types of human conduct will be comprised in the 
chain of causation. So the activity of the driver is a human cause, and so is. 
the conduct of the keeper. Within the scope of liability for a source of increa-
sed dangerousness, civil law evaluates the conduct of the keeper. So, in this 
respect, this is the legal cause. But if the driver has caused damage inten-
tionally, his conduct will possibly be evaluated also by civil law, whereby 
it may become the „legal cause". Thus it is not the causal nexus that changes,, 
or contains some legal cause; it is the provision of law that lays down fur ther 
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conditions which are necessary for establishing liability and which evaluate 
this or tha t phenomenon. In the case discussed it will be the conduct of the 
employer that we select f rom the chain of causality for studying. 
So, af ter all, we must conclude that we are not able to bring about any 
change in the objective causal nexus proper. Hence any theory that tries to select 
f rom among the causes in any manner, is wrong. Not even the jurist can t rans-
form, can remove correlations existing in reality. He, too, must work with 
objective reality. But he possibly submits to evaluation only certain elements 
of this objective correlation. So he does not change real correlations, he only 
pays attention to some of them and not to all. In a given case these a re 
certain human conducts. But only in a gives case, since — as has been indi-
cated in the introduction to this chapter — causal nexus and correlations a re 
present also in certain prerequisites of liability — in case of damage for 
example — and the theory relating to causal nexus, as the method for establi-
shing the prevalence of real correlations, must be applied also here. 
It also follows f rom what has been said here that the distinction between 
direct and indirect cause, often appearing in l i terature on law, must be re-
jected, or that the view ascribing importance only to direct causes is wrong. 
This in turn, raises a problem reffered to by several authors,14 viz. how f a r 
we can, or should, proceed on this line. This problem appears especially if 
damage arising in the second, third or fu r the r steps is considered, mainly 
because of unlawful conduct. In view of the fact that it is not possible to 
annihilate, to make dissappear, the objective chain of causality proper, it is 
only the provision of law that can provide a solution here. This can be accom-
plished in two ways. One is, if the provision of law itself prescribes how f a r 
we must go back on the chain of causality. This is usually effected in the 
indirect way, by determining the types of damage caused (e. g. only damage 
caused within the scope of employment can be considered, or unrealized 
profits must not be taken into account). The other method is that the maker 
of the provision of law — possibly by giving certain guidance of principles 
— leaves it to the administrator of law to come to a decision in the given 
problem. The combined application of these two methods usually appears 
in practice. It should be noted, however, tha t not even this latter method 
represents any arbi t rary selection of cause on part of the administrator of law. 
Namely the latter decides by interpreting the provision of law, i. e. by 
clarifying the intentions of the legislator, whether in the given case it is 
justified to desist f rom going back fur ther along the chain of causality. 
4. The causality of negligence 
To determine the na ture of negligence emerges as a special issue in con-
nection with t h e question of causal nexus. I. e. the question whether or not 
negligence can be evaluated as a nexus of causality. Two opposed views are 
known in socialist l i terature. One rejects the possibility of the causality of 
negligence, the other considers it possible. 
14 Eorsi Gy.: Causality. 
15 E. r. IIIapropoflCKHH, <&jieHimm, AHTHMOHOB. 
16 IIIapropoflCKHH M. R. 1. c. 
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The opponents of the causality of negligence are to be found usually 
among the followers of the discrimination of inevitable f rom accidental.15 
They insist that the na ture of cause can be at t r ibuted only to 
things that produce effect. The effect is caused not by negligence, 
but by some other circumstance. Negligence can be qualified as unlawful , 
entails liability, because measures have been omitted by which the ha rmfu l 
effect could have been prevented.16 And the nexus between negligence and 
effect is accidental at most.17 It is argued, too, that those advocating the cau-
sality of negligence are actually /adopting the views of philosophical ideaUsm. 
They shift the objective category of causal nexus to the subjective sphere, 
as they evaluate the causative force inherent in non-feasance depending on 
what importance is attached to this by the provisions of law.18 There are 
some views according to which the causal nexus in case of non-feasance is 
no longer existing in reality, but is quasi presumed to exist.19 
Concerning the causality of negligence, those taking the position of re-
jection are making substantially t he same mistake as is made in connection 
with the theory based on the discrimination of inevitable f rom accidental. 
The outcome is either that calling to account does not take place in a consi-
derable proportion of cases without good cause, or that calling to account 
requires the introduction of other factors. In my opinion we must start f rom 
the premise that non-feasance is also activity. I shauld like to add that, 
within the scope on universal context, the same conduct, even if manifest 
as non-feasance in the one aspect, will be active by any judgment in the 
other. Hence it is not possible to remove it f rom the causal nexus as 
a nonexistent factor. On the other hand, the circumstance whether this nexus 
is a mat ter of necessity or accidental, is irrelevant in respect to liability for 
damage, as has been shown in the foregoing. 
VI. 
COMPENSATION 
1. The scope of liability for damage 
After defining the basis of liability, the next step we must take is to 
clarify how the person held liable must answer, to what extent he must repair 
damage. The answer to this question is the definiton of the scope of l ia-
bility. 
In defining the purpose and function of liability for damage, we have 
said that liability for damage reforms through reparation. Thus compensa-
tion has two facets: one, it repairs damage caused; two, it is a sanction for 
unlawful conduct. From the conclusion that liability for damage reforms 
through reparation, and reparation means the removal of the disadvantage 
caused, it follows that reparation must consist in ful l compensation for the 
damage caused. 
The principle of full compensation, which ensures reparation to the ful l 
17 Флейпшц E. A.: Basic issues. 
18 Шаргородский M. Д. 1. c. 
Иоффе О. С.: Liability. 
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extent, satisfies in principle also the other — sanctionative-reformative — 
aspect of liability, since full compensation also means a sanction of ade-
quate weight. To depart from the principle of full liability can therefore 
be justified in cases only where education, influencing require a milder 
sanction, and the purpose of reparation can be served by such milder sanc-
tion, i. e. the departure from full liability, as well. (This is the case of 
damage caused by employees.) 
2. The damage 
a) The concept of. damage 
Provisions of law usually do not define the concept of damage. The 
general point of view in jurisprudence is that damage means some disad-
vantage, and that the latter must materialize with the person suffering f rom 
unlawful conduct. But this conclusion provides no sufficient orientation. Na-
mely disadvantage may affect, the person of the injured (e. g. his corporeal 
integrity is affected, or he suffers some moral injury), or some of his belon-
gings or his property. Disadvantage may be manifest also in that the exer-
cise of the injured person's right becomes impossible, or can be exercised 
only delayed or incompletely. 
Yet not all disadvantages resulting from unlawful conduct can be taken 
into account; only those can be considered which can be repaired, compen-
sated for, by the means of liability for damage. 
Repair within the scope of liability for damage means that the person 
causing damage is under the obligation to restore the original state through 
repair, or make replacement in kind; if he is not able to do so, he must 
make replacement —. give compensation — expressed in pecuniary means 
and ensuring the restitution of the original state. This is possible only if 
the disadvantage can be expressed in terms of the legal tender, i. e. in 
money. Hence damage must be a disadvantage that van be expressed in 
terms of money. The consequence of unlawful conduct can be both pecuniary 
and non-pecuinary disadvantage; but within the scope of liability for da-
mage, only disadvantages of pecuniary nature, i. e. those that can be ex-
pressed in terms of money, are taken into account. Hence the concept of 
damage for the purpose of liability is narrower than the everyday meaning 
of the term. 
b) Damage of non-pecuniary nature 
It follows from the aforementioned restriction of the concept of damage-
that non-pecuniary damage cannot be regarded as damage for the purpose 
of liability for damage. The term pecuniary damage is not to mean t h a t 
the infringement of rights must affect some property directly. The unlawful, 
conduct may affect, for example, the injured person's health, corporeal in-
tegrity, or may prevent the exercise of his rights of non-pecuniary charac-
ter — e. g. the right to work. What is essential here is that .the disadvantage 
resulting from the injury must be expressible in terms of money. 
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As concerns the reparation of damage of non-pecuniary character, the 
unanimous stand taken by jurisprudence and legal practice is that no re-
compense or solatium can be granted in such cases. Whether in cases where 
the consequences of non-pecuniary damage can be removed by material 
means (e. g. correction of some deformity by surgical intervention or pros-
thesis) the costs of the latter can be refunded is another matter. 
But this already constitutes pecuniary damage. 
c) The scope-of pecuniary damage 
As we have seen, only pecuniary damage is considered in connection 
with liability for damage. The definition pecuniary damage applies not only 
to cases where the damaging act affects some of the injured person's things, 
or, in everyday usage, some of his property. E. g. the person causing damage 
smashes a window, wrecks some machine, and the like. Pecuniary damage 
arises also if the person of the injured is assaulted, or the exercise of some 
of his rights is frustrated, if this results in a reduction of the injured per-
son's means. 
In respect to their nature, pecuniary damages can be divided into se-
veral groups. In certain types of damage, existing means are reduced as a 
consequence of the damaging effect (property is destroyed, damaged, expen-
ses, costs have to be borne, etc.). In the other group the damaged person 
is deprived from some future increase of his means, some income, possibly 
without the simultaneous reduction of his available means. The first group 
is damage suffered. The second is profit lost. 
Cases belonging to the sphere of damage suffered are again divided into 
two groups. One comprises the reduction of available means resulting from 
the. damaging conduct. The other comprieses expenses. The latter are not 
the primary consequences of damage caused, they are usually of an inciden-
tal character. Many of them serve the purpose of mitigating the cosnequen-
ces of the damaging act. Another difference should be pointed out in this 
connection. Damage usually occurs independent of the damaged person's 
will. Yet expences — although consequences of the damaging act — are 
incurred in the majority of the cases only upon the damaged conduct. Yet 
whether or not this reduction materializes, actually depends on the damaged 
person's decision to hire somebody. It may .happen that he finds no suitable 
help, does all the household work by himself, even if this implies difficulties. 
No help is being paid for in this case, thus the reduction of available. means 
does not take place. 
Profit lost means an increase in means of which the damaged person 
has been deprived because of the damaging act. A causal nexus must exist 
between the damaging conduct and the damage caused, and, within the da-
mage proper, between the various factors of damage. In case of profit lost, 
the damaging act has cut through the causal nexus. (But regarded from 
another angle, causal nexus exists in that the unlawful conduct caused the 
interruption of the chain of causality.) When the case of profit lost is es-
tablished, this is actually an attempt at constructing the non-realized part 
of the chain of causality. Inference is made from the existing situation how 
the fu ture would have worked out. Hence while damage suffered is usually 
a measurable, existing reality, lost profit is a mere presumption how the 
future would have taken its turn if damage had not interfered. Thus the esta-
blishment of profit lost always involves a certain measure of estimation. To 
reduce this instability as far as possible, efforts should be taken in such cases 
to establish available factsas accurately as possible for providing a f i rm basis 
of estimation and presumption. Hence the case of profits lost can be established 
only if there exists a realistic basis for presuming that an increase of means 
would have materialized to the advantage. of the damaged person in the 
absence of the damaging conduct, and if the pecuniary value of this incre-
ment can be assessed in a realistic manner. 
In the beginning, it was a matter of controversy in socialist law whether 
lost profits can be refunded within the scope of liability for damage. Yet 
this initial attitude has changed in the course of progress, and the possibility 
of refunding lost profit is recognized in socialist law by now. 
In connection with damage caused within the scope of employment there 
is an exception to this principle. If damage is caused by the employer, the 
employee is entitled to claim refund of lost profit. But if damage is caused 
by the employee, the employer has usually no title to claim <?uch refund. 
d) Inclusion of incomings 
Damage means the reduction of the damaged person's available means. 
It logically follows from this that incomings, increase of means, which result 
from damage, or from the consideration of damage, to the advantage of the 
damaged mitigate the damage suffered. Two types of case belong here. One 
is the services or sums received from the insurance system; the other is the 
sums that the damaged has saved or received in some other way in connec-
tion with the damage. 
In this respect the concept of insurance comprises social insurance, life, 
accident insurance or insurance against damage. In case of social insurance 
and insurance against damage, the damaged can only enforce claims for da-
mage in excess of the services received, in case of life, accident and pension 
insurance, the services received on the basis of insurance cannot be included 
in the assessment of damage, except for payments made by the insurance 
system for a specified purpose (e. g. medical expenses). 
The other group comprises cases where certain savings emerge as the re-
sult of damage caused, or the damaged may draw certain profit. Gains 
resulting from the sale of material, etc. left over after objects have been 
damaged, or cases where the damaged is set free from regular expenses, 
belong to this category. One example is the discontinuance of travel to the 
working-place when the employee gets disabled. 
The third group of cases resulting in savings comprises situations in which 
the damaged can draw some income by utilizing his working ability or some 
of his belongings as a result of damage suffered. E. g. the employee dismissed 
unlawfully can utilize his worktime and do work elsewhere. 
Savings and incomings materialize partly independent of the damaged 
person's will, but they are partly conditional on his decision, like expenses. 
But when the opportunity of saving or profiting arises, it cannot be made 
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conditional exclusively on the damaged person's decision to avail himself of 
the opportunity, or not to do so. It follows from the principle of mitigating 
and preventing damage that if damage can be mitigated by some saving or 
other measure, the damaged is obliged to avail himself of such opportunity. 
If he fails to do so — although he was in a position to do so — this will be 
charged to him in accordance with the rules govering the contributory action 
by the damaged. 
e) Assessment of damage 
If damage cannot be redressed by repair or in kind, the sum of money 
required for redress must be paid as compensation. For this purpose it must 
be clarified how the value of damage expressed in money should be calculated. 
If, as a result of damage caused, some object is damaged or destroyed, 
tjhe calculation of the amount of damage must start from the amount for 
which the damaged can obtain or repair the object. The question is how this 
amount can or must be determined. Obviously, the basis of departure is the 
prince of the damaged or destroyed object, or the prince of material required 
for its repair. (We speak of destruction if the object can no longer be used 
properly as a result of damage, and of damaging if the object can be used 
properly again after. repair.) But in determining theprice, the problem is 
that the same object may have several prices (retail trade price, cost price, 
etc.), and that in case of price fluctuation there may be different prices at 
different times, e. g. at the time the damage has been suffered, or a,t the time 
of adress. 
For solving these questions we must start from the principle that the 
purpose of liability for damage is reparation. The principle of reparation is 
statisfied only if the possibility is created for the damaged to obtain for the 
sum received as compensation the object that has been lost or destroyed. 
In the damaged person wishes to replace his destroyed thing he can obtain 
it only on the market. Consequently the market price must be taken as the 
basis in such cases. 
If we agree that the amount of damage must be assessed by taking as a, 
basis the market price, it is still to be decided which price is to be understood, 
i. e. the production price, the wholesale price, retail price, etc. Considering 
that the purpose is to ensure reparation, a price must be taken as the basis 
for. which the damaged is able to obtain the thing in question. Hence if he is 
in a position to buy at factory or wholesale price, the basis should be this 
price; if he only can obtain replacement at retail price, the basis should be 
the latter. 
It may happen that certain things are obtainable in retail trade at two 
different prices, i. e. there is an official price for which the thing in question 
is available only in limited quantities, possibly on allocation, and there is a 
higher, so-called free market price, too. What has been said above applies 
to such cases as well. If the damaged can buy at fixed price, the latter must 
be taken as the basis. If there is no such possibility, the amount of damage 
must be assessed on the basis of the free market price. 
Having clarified all this, one more question arises: the price of what time 
must be considered. Prices may change during the time that passes from 
damage to compensation. So it must be becided whether the amount of da-
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mage should be calculated on the basis of the price valid at the time damage 
was caused, or at the time of compensation. The positions taken in this 
respect are not uniform, nor is judicial practice. There are two views at 
present. One is that the price at the time of damage should be taken as the 
basis. It starts from the fact that damage has arisen at the time the damaging 
act was committed; hence that price must be taken into account, which was 
represented by the thing in question at that time. The subsequent change of 
price was entirely indenpendent of the person causing damage, so it would 
be unjustified to hold him liable also for such change. The other view is that 
the price valid at the time of compensation should be considered. This starts 
from the premise that reparation can be ensured only if the amount of damage 
is calculated in such a manner that the damaged person is actually enabled 
to replace his lost thing. And this is made possible only by a price valid at 
the time of compensation. 
In my opinion the view that disregards the price valid at the time of 
damage and takes as the basis the price at the time of compensation in case 
of price changes, is correct. But this should be applied not only if" there is a 
rise in price, but also if the price has dropped meanwhile. Consequently, if 
the price has dropped, the damaged person should only be entitled to com-
pensation based en the price valid at the time of redress. This is the solution 
that serves the principle of reparation to the full. If we accepted the view 
that the person causing damage has caused not more damage than was arising 
at the time the act was committed, and that subsequent changes of price are 
therefore independent of him, he ought to be freed, by the same token, 
from the expenses that have arisen later. Although it is a fact that at the time 
of the act only damage of a lower amount was caused, the circumstance that 
the damaged was at the time of compensation not any more able to obtain the 
lost thing at the former price must also be imputed to the person causing that 
damage. Namely the latter could have repaired damage at once. No one had 
prevented him from doing so. If he failed to do so because at that time it 
was not possible any more to clarify the actual amount of damage (state of 
unconsciousness, attempted repair, etc.) these circumstances are in causal 
nexus with the damaging conduct and so it is justified to charge them to the 
person causing damage. And if the latter failed to repair the damage at once 
for reasons imputable to him (delay, etc.) it is absolutely justified to charge 
the change of price to him. This is the method that fully ensures the restitu-
tion of the state existing at the time of damage. For this is always to be 
understood as the restitution of the actual state, and not the price situation. 
To take into account the price at compensation even if there was a drop 
in price since damage occurred, is also in conformity with the principle of 
reparation. The person suffering damage is entitled to compensation equivalent 
to his loss, but not to more. But if he were given compensation on the basis 
of the price at damage in case of a drop in prices, he would be able to buy 
more than his loss. And to profit from such a solution would not be justified, 
To depart from taking as a basis the higher price at compensation should 
be possible only if the damaged without reason delays the enforcement of his 
claim, and the increase in price takes place meanwhile. In such a case it is 
the attitude of the damaged that accounts for the circumstance that he is not 
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able to replace his lost thing at the price valid at the time of damage. To 
charge this to the person causing damage would not be justified. 
It may happen — is even typical in case of damage caused by the employer 
within the scope of employment — that the object damaged or destroyed is 
not new, but used. The amount of damage must be calculated on the basis of 
the market price in such cases, too. If a similar second-hand objects are avail-
able on the market, the amount of damage should be determined on this basis. 
If there they are not, the amount of damage should be determined on the 
basis of the market price of the new thing, taking into account the degree of 
wear. The conclusions made in connection with the change of prices are 
valid also for such cases. Hence the market price at the time of compensation 
should be taken as the basis for calculating the amount of damage, be it 
higher or lower than the price at damage. 
Considering expenses incurred as a result of damage, it should be noted 
that this usually requires some activity, not included in the causation of 
damage, on the part of the damaged or some other person. But this activity 
must be in causal nexus with the damaging act or the damage suffered. 
Consequently no expenses can be taken into account which have become 
necessary not because of the damage, but because of the used condition of the 
object. It follows from this, too, that the person causing damage cannot be 
charged with expenses without due deliberation. The person suffering damage 
is evidently under the obligation to do his best to mitigate damage, or to pre-
vent the increase of damage. He is even obliged to bear expenses to this end. 
At the same time he is entitled to make every effort to remove the disadvan-
tages he is suffering as a result of unlawful conduct, and in doing so he may 
incur expenses. 
In case of expenses it should always be considered whether they were 
necessary and justified. As concers the question of necessity, the first thing 
to ascertain is if the expenses, the measure resulting in expenses, was suitable 
for mitigating the damage, for removing the consequences of damage. This is 
not to mean that the desired effect must actually materialize; the measure 
may happen to be was unsuccessful. But this does not affect the possibility 
of charging the expenses. The requirement is that the measure taken be 
objectively suited for mitigating the damage, for removing its consequences. 
It may happen, too, that the measure taken is not objectively suited for 
mitigating the damage, i. e. was not necessary, but the damaged person was 
not aware of this (Maybe his knowledge was limited, or he had no sufficient 
graps of the situation when suffering damage.) Since, therefore, outlays proved 
to be unnecessary, the inference might be that these expenses cannot be 
charged to the person causing damage, and they must be borne by the 
damaged. Yet this would not be fair in every case. In the last analysis, the 
expense was induced by the fact that the person causing damage had displayed 
unlawful conduct. And the damaged is actually the victim of assault, and 
acted in defence. Hence, as long as the damaged is not acting mala fide in 
spending money unnecessarily, these outlays must be included in the damage 
and charged to the person causing damage. But if the person suffering damage 
is guilty of neglect, he must bear these expenses. 
In respect to necessity, not only the suitable nature of the measure and 
outlay must be considered; it has to be decided whether these were necessary 
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in the manner and to the extent they were carried out. In doing so our 
departure must be that everybody is expected to act with the greatest possible 
economy when managing his affairs. Only measures and spending to the 
absolutely necessary extent are permissible. If this is overstepped, the excess 
must be judged as an unsuitable measure. Hence if the damaged was meg-
ligent, he must bear the excess. But as concerns the extent of spending, 
there exists an objective limit. Namely spending mitigating damage is not 
permissible to such an extent that the total value of the damage still existing 
and the money spent be in excess of the amount of damage which would 
have occurred in the absence of measures mitigating the damage. As concerns 
the manner of measures and spending, here the principle is directive, too, that 
only the most economical measures are considered as justified. So it is not 
permissible to make luxury spending. The limit on spending, i. e. that the 
amount of damage must not be exceeded, does not apply to cases where health 
and corporeal integrity are injured by damage caused to the employee. This is 
based on the principle that the greatest value of society is human life. 
Everything must be done to protect and maintain corporeal integrity and 
health, irrespective of cost. 
f ) Changes occurring subsequently in the extent of damage 
In the foregoing we have discussed how the pecuniary value of damage 
can be calculated. We started from the understanding that damage is known 
in. its entirety by the time the claim for damages is enforced. But it may 
happen after the enforcement of the claim that consequences arise which 
affect the extent or amount of the damage. This may be the case if, for 
instance, the employee causes damage by delayed action as a result of which 
the employer has to pay penalty. The employee causes damage by delayed 
action as a result of which the employer has to pay penalty. The employee 
is held liable for it. Claim for damages is advanced against the employer in 
addition to penalty later on, from which the employer suffers fur ther damage. 
Thus a new consequence of the damaging action — not foreseen at the time 
the claim for damages was enforced — emerges. A comparable situation may 
arise if the employer causes damage. The change of prices also belongs to the 
sphere of subsequent changes; this problem was discussed in connection with 
calculating the amount of damages. 
The solution in connection with subsequent changes is that these have 
to be taken into account if their causal nexus with the damaging act can be 
proved conclusively. 
g) General compensation 
Determination of compensation can take place after the accurate assessment 
of damages. Resulting from the principle of reperation, compensation must 
not be in excess of the damage suffered, so assessment of damage is a 
prerequisite in determining compensation. It may happen, however, that — 
although the occurrence of damage is beyond question — the amount cannot 
be assessed accurately. This often happens in cases where expense and outlays 
emerging in the fu ture are involved. General conpensation serves the elimina-
tion of difficulties involved in determining such expenses. 
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As concerns general compensation, we often see instances of wrong 
conclusions and application in practice. First it should be mentioned tha t 
general compensation is determined also in case of non-pecuniary damage. 
Essentially, this is the substitute for incorporeal compensation or solatium 
for the violation of rights attached to the person, as applied in the practice of 
the past. But such application of general compensation is wrong, since to 
establish incorporeal damage is incompatible with socialist morals. 
The other hazard, also appearing in judicial practice, is tha t to determine 
a general compensation only conceals some leisure in taking evidence and is 
applied also in cases where the amount of damages could have been established 
accurately. Even if general compensation is established, the factors of which 
damage is composed must be revealed. If this is omitted, general compensation 
tends to shift to the category of incorporeal damage. 
Thus great care must be taken whenever general compensation is to be 
established. It ought to be applied in most exceptional cases only. As regards 
the occurrence of damage, no uncertainty is admissible. It can only arise in 
respect to the extent of damage. The ruling that the amount of pecuniary 
damage cannot be assessed accurately must be based on the preceding action 
of the court by which it tried to take all available and expedient evidence 
for ascertaining the amount of damage.1 
It should be understood clearly that general damage is pecuniary damage. 
It only differs f rom other types of pecuniary damage that the amount is 
uncertain. Hence general compensation is essentially a lump sum. It follows 
f rom its na ture that claiming back is not possible on the grounds tha t the 
actually incurred expenses did not amount to the sum of the general compen-
sation granted.2 But if general compensation is to be paid as an annuity, and 
it turns out subsequently that the expenses taken as the basis need not be 
paid, or smaller sums must be paid only, or over a shorter period of time, a 
reduction of compensation can be applied for. The contrary may happen, too, 
and an increase of general compensation may be granted. Moreover, if addi-
tional expenses have to be paid subsequently, and it can be established 
accurately tha t they would considerably exceed the sum granted as a general 
compensation, the latter may be increased. 
1 Supreme Court P. tôrv. II. 21233/1963. 
2 Supreme Court 804/10. 
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THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE 
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I. Introduction 
Damage caused by the employer can be divided into four groups. These 
are the following:-
a) Damage caused by preventing from doing work, i. e. by violating the 
right to work; 
b) damage resulting from injuring the employee's life, health or corporeal 
integrity; 
c) damage occurring in the employee's belongings brought to the premises; 
d) damage resulting from the violation of other rights arising out of 
employment. 
Of these types of damage, the first three are of consequence in practice; 
the cases in the fourth category are rare. 
The general principles governing the employer's liability for damage have 
been stated in Part I. In the following we shall study to what extent,these ge-
neral principles are materializing in the various types of damage. Thus, subs-
tantially, we have to answer the question whether in case of a given type of 
damage the principles laid down in Part I. are really suitable for . ensuring 
reparation and for influencing the person causing damage. At the.same time, 
we must find an answer to the problem that in cases where the general 
principles would permit several solutions which of them would prove correct 
for the given type of damage. 
In the following we shall consider the various types of damage, one by one 
for the sake of lucidity; only questions will be discussed which depart from 
the general principles of Part I., or which relate to details that have not 
been mentioned in Part I. 
II. Damage caused by preventing from doing work 
A) Introduction 
A number of cases belong to this category of damage. These can be 
subdivided into several groups: 
a) The first group comprises cases where the employee cannot choose but 
to terminate employment immediately because of the employer's breach of 
duty.' Such cases are 
— the employee quist employment immediately because of direct and 
grave endangerment of his life or body; 
— the employee quits employment immediately because the employer fails 
to employ him in the post agreed upon in the social study contract. 
b) The second group comprises cases where the employer withholds, or 
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hands over belatedly, at termination of employment the employee's work-book 
or other documents which are required for accepting other employment, or 
hands over them to the employee in due time but not made out as required. 
c) The third group comprises cases of unlawful termination of employment. 
d) The fourth group comprises cases where the negligent measure of the 
employer does not affect the maintenance of employment, but the employer 
fails to meet certain conditions as a result of which the employee cannot 
perform his work or can rightfully refuse to do work (e. g. the employer 
fails to provide a safety belt for work to be done high above ground). 
Cases of damage by injury to health and corporeal integrity leading to 
temporary or permanent diasbility would seem to belong here; but these will 
be discussed in a special chapter since they raise a number of other problems. 
In the cases listed above, the damaging conducts show dissimilarities. 
But their common feature is that damage results f rom the non-performance 
or faulty performance of duties undertaken in the contract of employment, 
and that the employee suffers damage because he is not amle to exercise his 
right to work, is not able to perform work. (I shall not discuss here those 
types of damage which usually occur incidentally — expenses connected with 
obtaining the withheld work-book, for instance — but may occur also 
independently in the absence of other damage.) The situation in which the 
employee is unable to work may arise within the scope of existing employ-
ment, or at its termination, or may materialize in not getting possible fu tu re 
employment. These differences are of no consequence as concerns principles, 
they only are of importance in certain questions of detail (e. g, to determine 
loss of earnings). 
The cases of the employee's refusal to work listed in paragraph d), as well 
as those listed in pharagraph a) differ f rom the other cases to some extent. 
Namely in these cases the nonperformance of work seems to be the con-
. sequence of the employee's conduct. It was the employee who refused to do 
work, who terminated employment immediately. This is apparently so, but 
essentially it is not. It is the employer who displays unlawful conduct, a con-
duct that violates the contract of employment. So it is the employer who fails 
to provide conditions making possible for the employee to perform his duties 
undertaken in the contract, to do work. Hence it is the employer's conduct 
that hinders performance of work. In such cases the employee is entitled to 
demand performance, i. e. the provision of conditions making work possible, 
and has the right to terminate employment if his efforts are unsuccessful. 
These cases will not be discussed here since they are beyond the scope of 
liability for damage. (If, however, the employee suffers damage in addition, 
he can claim reparation. This is expressed in cases mentioned under o) and d).) 
Upon a closer' study of the four groups listed above, it will appear that, 
regarded f rom the angle of liability for damage, there are pairs of groups 
which show a certain indentity. This consists in the following. In cases men-
tioned under a) and b) the employee's employment has been terminated, and 
the annulment of termination is out of the question. The employee has to find 
a new employment. He suffers damage because finding a new employment 
encounters difficulties in cases under a), and because it takes some time in 
cases under b) and might be possible under less favourable conditions than 
those of the former employment. Thus damage realizes in the loss of earnings 
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first of all, but may arise also as actual damage suffered, (expenses). In cases 
mentioned under c) employment has been terminated, but is restored auto-
matically after annulment of the unlawful terminating measure, and the 
employee continues working. Since employment is restored, and restored 
reatroactive to the time of the unlawful measure, the employee is entitled 
to demand his wages he has not received during the period in question. This 
will be a claim to performance. In cases mentioned under d), employment does 
not cease, only the performance of work is suspended until the prescribed 
conditions are met. The employee is entitled to wages for the time passing till 
the cessation of the unlawful state, since employment had existed during that 
time. Consequently, the claim to wages for the time lost in cases under c) 
and d) does not belong to the sphere of liability for damage (This is not 
altered by the circumstance that the employee does not wish to return to his 
former employer by the time the unlawful termination is annulled. The wages 
due for the period following unlawful termination are due by the title of per-
formance also in such cases.) The employee's damage in such cases is usually 
damage suffered, mostly expenses. Loss of earnings occurs seldom, usually. 
within the scope of secondary employment or parttime occupation. 
The differences outlined here warrant . a separate discussion of cases 
belonging to groups a) and b), and to groups c) and d). The former may be 
called damage caused by preventing the employee from doing his work, the 
latter damage caused by terminating employment unlawfully (this latter 
definition does not refer exactly to paragraph d), but it would seem advisable 
to take as the basis the more frequent and more typical cases when applying 
the term.) 
B) Damage caused by the prevention from doing work 
1. The system of liability 
a) Factors determining the system of liability 
In Part I, in connection with the system of liability, I have concluded 
that in cases of damage caused by the employer the system to be applied 
. should be principally the one which rests on the requirement. of increased 
protection and where the employer's dereliction is not prerequisite. But 
discharge. from liability may be different within this scope at the various 
types of damage, and liability based on dereliction may be employed in some 
cases. I have adduced two factors for justifying the primariness of liability 
irrespective of dereliction. One is the importance of reparation. The second 
is the circumstance that dereliction would have no sufficient influencing 
effect as a rule. Let us now consider to what extent these factors can be 
efficient in case of damage caused by violating the right to work. 
First I have mentioned the importance of reparation. The injury suffered 
by the employee in the cases just discussed is very serious. The right to work 
is one of the most substantial personal rights. On the one hand, the basis of 
livelihood in our social system is work. If, therefore, somebody is prevented 
from working, he and his family are deprived from the source of livelihood 
thereby. On the other hand, work is not only the source of livelihood, but is 
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becoming increassingly one of the necessities of life in the course of progress. 
Work provides the opportunity to people to improve their capabilities, to 
become useful, creative members of society. Deprival of the possibility to work 
impairs all this. 
The other factor we considered was that dereliction would not have 
sufficient influencing, mobilizing effect. The reasons were explained in detail 
in Part I. The conclusions drawn there fully apply to the cases discussed now. 
In connection with the type of damage just mentioned, the grave violation 
of the interests of society as a whole must be emphasized in addition to the 
two factors mentioned above. Society can make sound progress only if its 
able-bodied members praticipate in the work, take their share in the creation 
of the national income. Any factor that prevents the sharing of work is 
counteracting these requirements. 
Thus it is evident that in case of damage caused by the prevention of 
work, the importance of reparation is extremely high. Measures to be taken 
against damage of this nature are of special importance also because of the 
grave injury the interests of society suffer. And the inadequate efficiency 
of liability based on dereliction exists unchanged at the same time. All these 
circumstances combined justify the conclusion that in the cases discussed here 
the system of liability should rest on the requirement of increased protection, 
and dereliction should be disregarded. 
b) Discharge from liability 
Concerning liability irrespective of dereliction, we have concluded in 
Part I. that the employer can be discharged from liability only if damage 
has been caused by an unpreventable external cause, or exclusively by the 
unpreventable conduct of the damaged employee. The question is whether 
discharge on this basis serves our purposes in the types of damage discussed in 
the foregoing. 
As concerns the reason for discharge mentioned second — exclusive 
causation by the damaged — the answer is easy to give. In Part I. we have 
shown that in case of the employee's unpreventable and exclusive causation 
damage is caused solely by the employee. No right or obligation arising, out of 
employment is violated by the employer in such cases, so there is no reason 
for holding him liable for damage. Nor can this be justified by considerations 
of equity. Whoever causes damage to himself must bear the consequences, 
and cannot expect of society to compensate him for his loss. (If we wish to 
give some relief is such cases all the same, this can be accomplished within 
the scope of some insurance scheme.) Hence the employee's unpreventable 
and exclusive causation results in the employer's discharge from liability also 
in case of damage caused by the violation of the right to work.1 
The other possibility of discharge, i. e. causation by an unpreventable 
external cause, is much more problematical. The problem is not whether da-
mage caused by some „external cause" can or cannot occur in the cases 
discussed above; the question is whether it is justified to discharge the em-
ployer from liability on the allegation to such a cause. This consideration 
arises because of the importance of reparation. 
1 Mt. 62. §. 
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We concluded in the foregoing that the violation of the right to work, 
deprival of the possibility to do work, is one of the gravest injuries the em-
ployee can suffer within the scope of employment. This jeopardizes in the 
most direct manner the employee's and his family's subsistence at the same 
time. It is at this point that the requirement arises to ensure the employee's 
livelihood in every case where the interference with working is not the result 
of the employee's, conduct. It would not be fair to deprive the employee of 
the sums required for subsistence only because the performance of his work 
comes up against obstacles due to some external cause, and not because of 
some activity or omission of the employer. (E. g. his work-book is lost in 
postal delivery, or cannot be handed over to him because of some elementary 
damage.) 
There is much to be said for this reasoning. It is desirable, indeed, that 
society should provide for people in case they are not able to work. (The only 
exception to this rule is where the employee has caused prevention from wor-
king himself.) Yet it is to be asked if this should be solved within the scope 
of liability for damage. Would such a solution not be in contradiction with 
the principle of employing liability for damage only in cases where the causer 
of damage can be reformed, influenced thereby? For if the employer would 
be held liable also for damage caused by an unpreventable external cause, 
would be punished because of an outcome he was. not, and will not, be able 
to perevent, the institution of liability will certainly have no reformatory 
effect. So it would be advisable to ensure the employee's livelihood by some 
other means in such cases. 
In my opinion, this argument is well-founded. It is because there is no 
reason to burden the employer for events whose prevention is beyond his 
power. The solution must ..be sought for outside the sphere of liability for 
damage. (It may happen that to provide livelihood for the employee will be 
charged to the employer even so, but this will be no liability for damage.) 
This conclusion requires some addition in cases where doing work, is 
hindered by the circumstance that the employer has not handed over to the 
employee his work-book or some other certificate. It may happen that after 
the failure to hand it over and prior to or during the employee's requiest 
in this respect some external cause arises which makes handing over im-
possible. For example, the employer does not hand over the work-book at 
the termination of employment. The next day the employers office is burg-
led and the work books found there are stolen, including the withheld book 
Or the employer fails to hand over the work-book is destroyed in a rail-
way-accident. The employer is obliged to hand over the work-book or other 
certificates to the employee upon termination of employment or upon notice 
given by the employer, on the last day spent at work.2 If he fails to do so, 
he is at default as concerns the performance of his obligation. The conse-
quences of this conduct must be borne also in respect to liability for damage. 
If the employer is not able to excuse the failure to hand over the 
work-book, i. e. this failure is not the result of some unpreventable external 
cause or of the employee's unpreventable conduct, the employer creates 
a situation in wich the employee is not able to take possession of his work-
book in due time. If some subsequent external action (e. g. burglary) ren-
2 MT. V. 32, § 
ders the handing over of the work-book impossible, this is the consequence 
of the employer's conduct amounting to breach of duty. So it would be un -
fair to place the burden of loss on the employee. The employer must bear 
the disadvantages, and this must realize in that his possible allegation to 
unpreventable external cause will not be accepted. This is clearly so, since 
the cause was not actually unpreventable: if performance would have taken 
place in due time the handing over of the work-book would not have been 
thwarted by the external factor. Hence performance in due time would 
have prevented the action of external factors. 
One more conclusion follows f rom this. If the external factor would 
have acted in the same way also in the absence of default while the work-
book was already in the possession of the employee (e. g. both the em-
ployer's offices and the employee's house collapse in a flood and the emplo-
yee's work-book is lost) there is no reason to make the employer bear the 
total loss. 
Summing up we may conclude that in case of damage caused by preven-
ting the employee from working, liability must be based on the system 
where dereliction on the part of the employer is no prerequisite of estab-
lishing liability. The employer can excuse himself of liability if he is able 
to prove that damage has been caused by unpreventable external causes or 
esclusively by the emlpoyee's unpreventable conduct.3 In cases where wor-
king is made impossible by the belated issuance of some certificate, an un -
preventable external cause acting after the deadline of performance does 
not exuse the employer, except for cases where the external cause would 
have had the same effect on the employee. 
2. The employee's contributory act 
a) The scope of the contributory act 
In Part I we have discussed the reasons for which the employee's con-
tributory act must be taken into consideration, as well as the basis of evo-
lutnion. It follows from the conclusions drawn there that the employee's 
contributory act must be considered also at the types of damage discussed 
in the foregoing. In view of the fact that the employer is liable for damage 
caused to the employee by preventing him from working, and such liability 
exists irrespective of dereliction, two conducts are present in such cases: 
liability without dereliction of the part of the employer, and the conduct 
of dereliction of the employee. Since these conducts are not homogeneous' 
it will not be by a comparison of these two that the portion of loss f rom 
which the employer can be excused will be established. In such cases the 
basis for determining the portion of loss to beborne by the employee will 
be the degree of the employee's dereliction.4 
In the cases discussed here the employer caused damage by failing to 
meet certain conditions, to comply with prescriptions, preventing thereby 
the employee from working. We have agreed that also the damaged must 
do everything in his power to prevent and mitigate damage. In these cases 
3 Mt. 62. §. 
4 Mt. 62. §. 
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such activities must be directed at removing . obstacles to working, arid at 
making use of given possibilities to work. Ar a consequence, the employee's 
act contributing to, or increasing damage usually materializes in two res-
pects. One, he does not take all possible efforts to remove obstacles to wor-
king. Two, he does not work, although he is in the position to do so. Let us 
study these cases in more detail. 
b) Removal of obstacles to working 
Measures aimed at removing obstacles to working will differ with the 
subtype to which damage belongs. 
In case of immediate termination for good reasons, or because of breach 
of the social study contract, the obstacle is removed by the act of termina-
ting and quitting employment. So there is no necessity of other action to 
remove obstacles. 
In cases where the work-book or other certificates (e. g. record of ser-
vice) are not handed over or not issued to the employee, or there is delay 
in their ussuance, or they are not made out as required, the employee is 
obliged to take without delay every measure necessary for obtaining his 
work-book or other certificates, or for correcting wrong entries. If he is 
faul ty of omission in this respect, he must bear the consequences5 I t fol-
lows f rom this that if the employee fails to take over his work-book despite 
the employer's demand, he will have to bear the consequences. Especially 
so if a longer t ime passes af ter his fai lure to take over the work-book. This 
conduct of the employee cannot be excused on the grounds tha t the em-
ployee has brought an action of appeal against the employer,, and wished 
to wait for its outcome. The employee is not. entitled to refuse acceptance: 
of his work-book even if the entry in the work-book is incorrect; he must 
take over the work-book also in such cases.6 (That the employee can request 
the correction of the wrong entry in the course of action for appeal, and can 
enforce his claim to compensation for damage resulting f rom such entry, 
is another matter.) The employee is under the obligation to request the 
employer to hand over the work-book, the certificates, to correct entries; 
moreover- if this is of no avail, he must take more efficient steps, e. g. to 
tu rn to the supervisory organ, or the labour dispute arbitration board. De-
lays in this field are charged to the employee.7 The more so if the employee 
caused delay in correcting wrong entries in the work-book, e. g. fails to 
hand over his work-book for this purpose.8 
All practical rules relating to work-books apply also to other certifi-
cates accordingly. 
c) Failure to do work 
The purpont and scope of the damaged person's obligations connected 
with the utilization of his working capacity, of his participation in the work 
of society, have been defined in a most comprehensive manner in practice. 
5 Supreme Court 796/9. 
6 Supreme Court Pf. II. 22 130/1951. 
7 Supreme Court Pf. IV. 20 587/1955. 
8 Supreme Court Pf. IV. 21 995/1954. " 
It should be noted that in considering such cases, the main problems present 
themselves in difficulties of proving. It is difficult to ascertain whether the 
employee has actually tried without delay to. get an other employ ement, 
has taken measures to this end. It often happens, too, that the employee is 
unable through no fault of his own to present adequate evidence, despite 
the fact that he had done everything in his power to find employment 
without delay. (E. g. the enterprises, naturally, do not issue certifications to 
people contacting them for some post, etc.). Since the causer of the unlaw-
ful state was the employer enterprise, the organs acting in such cases collect 
proof from the enterprise concerned to show that the employee could have 
entered new employment at once, or how much time it would have taken 
to do so. Moreover, a general certification to the effect that there is man-
power shortage at several enterprises, or in certain industrial branches, will 
not suffice; the enterprise must specify the openings where the former 
employee — considering his circumstances — could have met his obligati-
on to accept a post. The failure to accept such a post can be imputed to the 
employee only if in case of diligent search he could have been informed of 
openings in due time, and if it was due to his neglect that he did not actually 
enter new employment. Neglect of his obligation to enter new employment can 
be established only if available proof shows conclusively that the former em-
ployee was neglectful. It ought to be noted here that all this does not relieve 
the organs settling labour disputes of their responsibility to take all possible 
steps to disclose the facts of the case. Also these organs are under the obliga-
tion to act in order to bring to light the truth. But what is of importance here 
is that if proving by the former employer, or possible additional official inqui-
ries are unsuccessful, the neglect of the obligation to enter new employment 
may not be imputed to the former employee. 
In connection with finding openings and entering new employment, it must 
be clarified first of all within what period of time the damaged employee is 
obliged to try to find new employment or work. The situation will differ 
according to the case, i. e. whether withholding of the work-book or certifi-
cates —" or their incorrect execution — is involved- or the employee quits his 
post immediately. 
In the first case, the employee may reasonably expect that as a result 
of his request or complaint the obstacle to working — e. g. the incorrect 
entry in the work-book — will be removed shortly, after which he will be 
able to get a post similar to his former employment. Consequently the em-
ployee is not obliged to try to find employment during this time. For instance, 
if he has filed a complaint with the labour dispute arbitration board because 
of an incorrect entry in his work-book, he may wait for the decision of 
the board before taking other steps. The period of time involved in . such 
cases is short, a few days, during which the annulment of the unlawful mea-
sure can be expected. But to wait longer than until the arbitration board pas-
ses its decision of first instance is not permissible. (In this respect it is irre-
levant whether the. board decides to the advantage of the employee or the 
employer. Namely if the board dismisses the appeal, or grants it, but the 
employer declares that he would not comply with the decision and resorts 
to legal remedy, protraction of the case must be taken into account. The 
former employee is not supposed to wait longer is this case, but must try 
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to f ind a new post. (He is under the obligation to do so even before the deci-
sion of first instance is passed if the case is likely to be protracted because 
of some other circumstance, e. g. the outcome of a criminal procedure.9 
The situation will be different in the latter types of case, i. e. when the 
employee quits his post immediately. The employee cannot expect re-employ-
ment at his former post, so he is under the obligation to take, steps immedia-
tely for f inding new employment. 
Difficulties may arise f rom the employee's circumstances, or regarding 
his person, which prevent him f rom finding new employment. E. g. delay in 
this respect can be escused if it resulted f rom the circumstance that the em-
ployee's children -were taken ill and the employee has to at tend upon them. 
Likewise, the employee is under no obligation to find new employment while 
h£ .is ill, or undergoes rehabilitation af ter an accident. It should be noted in 
this connection tha t delay must not be imputed to. the former employee if he 
is able to prove that he could not have found new employment anyway.10 
The next question to be clarified in connection with a new employment 
is what kind of activity is to be expected f rom the employee having suffered 
damage. The general rule is that, depending on his circumstances and quali-
fications, the damaged person must make use of all means available to him 
in order to work. So he. is obviously obliged to contact, f irst of all- the local 
employment agency,11 all local or nearby enterprises where he may expect 
employment. He is not obliged to contact enterprises that are far f rom his 
home,12 especially not if, considering his disease or age, working at a distant 
place would be a disproportionate burden to him. Exception to this rule are 
cases where the person concerned usually works at distant places because 
of the type of his occupation, and has worked so also in his former employ-
ment, (e. g. has moved f rom the country to a town, and probably would 
have to do so again over a similar distance, between similar or the same pla-
ces), or is not likely to f ind a post at his place of residence because of his 
qualification- This requirement is limited by personal circumstances (e. g. 
a. pregnant woman), as a result of which the person concerned is not obli-
ged to accept work outside his residence, or could reach his reach his place 
of' work only by a long walk — for lack of adequate transport facilities — 
which might, put an excessive burden on his health.13 
Another problem to be considered within this sphere is the extent to 
which the former employee can be obliged to utilize his working capacity. 
One extreme view is that the damaged person is not obliged to accept em-
ployment, working conditions and wages other than those of ' his former 
employment where he suffered damage, and until he finds such employment 
he is not obliged to work. The other extreme view is that he is obliged to 
accept any type of work, anywhere and for whatever- wages, legal, wages 
of course. That neither of these views is correct, is evident. All the less, 
since in many cases it is not possible to find a post equivalent to the former 
employment, e. g. for lack of the work-book or other certificates. The gene-
9 Ministry of Labour, decision № 158. 
10 Nagy L.: Liability. 
11 Ministry of Labour, decision № 158: 
& Supreme Court Pf. III. 21 791/1955. 
13 Ministry of Labour, decision № 158. 
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ral governing principle is that , in order to prevent loss of earnings, the fo r -
mer employee is obliged to accept even such posts as are below his quali-
fication and inferior to his former scope of work' provided this implies no 
considerable disadvantage to him if all his circumstances, including age, 
physical fitness, preservation of his skills of qualification, etc., a r e consi-
dered.14 
It follows f rom the above principle tha t nobody is obliged to accept 
work that might endanger his health or corporeal integrity. For instance, 
it happened in a labour dispute that an employed woman was not blamed 
for having established herself in an easier job — carrying lower wages — 
because the advanced stage of her pregnancy would not have permit ted her 
to do her original work.15 
If often gives rise to disputes whether extraordinary strenuous work, 
efforts may be expected f r o m employees in order to utilize their working 
capacity in the best possible manner. It can, and must be expected f rom any 
citizen to display average conduct for participating in, and is the course of, 
the work of the community. (Obviously, this average changes, increases as the 
self-respect of people is growing, as woork is increasingly becoming one of tho 
necessities of life.) Nobody can be obliged permanent ly to do strenuous work, 
efforts, above the average. Hence if the person concerned does not accept 
such work, he does not violate his obligation to f ind employment.16 
3. Compensation 
a) The components of damage 
The type of damage discussed here — i. e. damage caused by prevention 
f rom working — is mocposed of the loss of earnings, as well as of expenses, 
outlays. Damage resulting f rom an earlier outlay, the non-realization of some 
former order may occur in addition. 
Legal regulat ion does not cover the definition of damage. Legal provisions, 
if dealing at all with cases discussed here", only state that the employee is 
entitled to compensation for his damage. Hungarian labour statutes also adopt 
this position.17 
The conclusions I have drawn in Par t I in connection with assessing 
damage and determining compensation, are directive also in the cases dis-
cussed here. But the general conclusions drawn there need some addition, 
especially as concerns the calculation of lost earnings. 
b) Damage suffered 
1. Reduction of available means 
Reduction of available means in connection with damage caused by pre-
vention f rom working is no f requent occurrence. Such a case may occur if the 
countervalue of some payment made by the employee is lost. E. g. the employee 
14 Ministry of Labour, decision № 158. 
15 Municipal Court of Budapest 49. Pf. 23 859/1958. 
Eorsi Gy.: Indemnity. 
17 Mt. 62. § 
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enrols for an evening course at a school, but must change his place of work 
because of the employer's conduct, is not able therefore to attend the course, 
whereby the fees paid for the semester are lost. Or it may happen tha t the 
employee is not able to enter new employment because his work-book is being 
withheld, and cannot travel to the health- resort for which he had paid because 
he must find employment and get back his work-book. 
The conclusions in Par t I. relating to the reduction of available means fu l -
ly apply to the cases considered here, need no addition, so there is no need to 
discuss this problem fur ther . What I should like to emphasize is that the 
damage resulting in the reduction of means can be considered only if it is 
in causal nexus with the damaging conduct. 
II. Expenses, costs 
Expenses and costs incurred in the cases we consider here can be divided 
into two groups. One group comprises expenses incurred in connection with 
enforcing the claim. The other group is made up of expenses for compensating 
disadvantages resulting f rom damage suffered. 
Expenses connected with the enforcement of claims comprise correpspon-
dence costs, incurred in the course of the labour dispute. Within the scope of 
the latter, the fees of the counsel representing the employee, as well as the 
employee's travel expenses can be charged to the damager (counsel's fees may 
not be charged in addition to those adjudged in the labour dispute). 
Expenses resulting f rom damage comprise those which the employee has 
to pay because of the absence, of employment — e. g. the employee had to 
quit his post, or his work-book or other certificates are withheld, or incorrect 
entries have been made in them — as a result of which the employee is not 
able to receive medical care, t reatment , etc. otherwise due to him under social 
insurance scheme. Such expenses can be charged only if they were unavoidable 
during the period in question . For instance- costs of an operation cannot be 
charged if the operation had been indicated earlier, but the employee postponed 
it, and to perform the operation within the period in question was not 
justified by medical opinion. And to charge such expenses is permissible only 
for services and for the time they would have been due to the employee as 
a result of insurance.18 
This category also comprises expenses which the employee has to bear for 
the issuing of various documents, e. g. a new work-book. 
. c) Loss of income 
I. The scope of loss of income 
In the cases discussed here, the category of incomes lost comprises the 
following: 
a) loss of wages and other allowances due on the basis of employment; 
b) loss of income outside the scope of employment. 
In the following I shall only discuss the f i rs t group. The lat ter wi l l .be 
dealt with in connection with damage resulting f rom in jury of health and 
corporeal integrity. 
18 Ministry of Labour, decision № 158. 
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II. Loss of earnings proceeding from employment 
The loss of incomes proceeding from employment can also be divided into 
two groups. The one is the loss of incomes possibly proceeding from employyer's 
unlawful measure. The second is loss of incomes due to the impossibility to 
enter new employment or to do work. 
aa) Loss of earnings proceeding from employment that exists at the time 
of the unlawful measure. 
If, as a result of the employer's unlawful conduct, the employee had to 
terminate employment it may happen that as a result of termination the 
employee will lose some benefits based on the time he has spent in employ-
ment, but falling due later. For instance, the profit-sharing regulations may 
prescribe that profit shares can be paid only to persons who have spent a 
certain time with the enterprise and are still employed there at the close of 
the calendar year. If the employee quits employment and does therefore not 
fulfil the above condition, he may lose his profit share. Reparation of the 
consequences of tne employer's unlawful conduct will be complete only if 
the employee is placed in a position as if such conduct had not taken place 
at all. Hence the employee must be regarded as if he had fulfilled the con-
ditions. Since, however, his employment existed only until termination, he 
will be only entitled to the proportion of the benefit — profit share in our 
example — that is due till termination. (The problem of determining incomes 
lost during the time following termination of employment will be discussed 
later.) 
Needless to say, claims can be raised in such cases only if the basis for 
such claim had existed in fact. The employee terminating employment with 
immediate effect is not entitled to compensation on the allegation that if he 
did not have to terminate employment he would soon have received a special 
bonus or a reward. Nor can a claim for compensation be raised if the employee 
would not have been entitled to benefits for some other eason. 
bb) Loss of earnings due to the impossibility to work 
The basis of compensation in such cases is the circumstance that the 
employee was prevented f rom doing work because of the employer's injurious 
measure. There is work to do, the objective possibilities of doing work exist, 
only the employee is deprived of them. It follows from this that a refund of 
lost earnings is possible only if the damaged can prove that the possibility of 
working existed and that he had been deprived of this possibility by the 
employer's damaging conduct. 
Yet in the cases mentioned above this principle is not realized uniformly. 
There may be differences depending on whether the work-book and other 
documents are withheld or not issued as required, or the employee terminates 
employment with immediate effect. This dissimilarity has been mentioned in 
Per t I, but the underlying reasons must be discussed in brief also here. 
Cases belonging to the first group are connected with the termination of 
employment. In cases where the work-book is withheld, or wrong entries are 
made, termination itself is not necessarily unlawful, and the employee may 
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have lost his job in a lawful manner. Having lost it, is doubtful whether he 
can find one soon. Yet compensation for the loss of earnings can be granted 
only if it is established that the former employee was deprived of the 
possibility to enter a new employment actually because of the damaging 
•conduct that materializes in withholding his work-book- etc. Thus the person 
concerned did not actually work at the time the damage was caused, con-
sequently wages proceeding from future employment can be taken into 
account only if conclusive proof is adduced that such opening existed for the 
former employee. On the other hand, the possibility to do work exist in 
reality in cases where the employee legally terminates employment with 
immediate effect. The damage the employee has suffered is not the thwarting 
of some prospective employment, but interference with the continuation in a 
given post. If damage had not been caused, the employee could have continued, 
or started his work, according to. the social study contract. It follows therefore 
from the difference between these two situations that if the work-book or 
some other prerequisite is missing, it must be proved that an opening existed 
and that the employee was deprived of making use. of it by the lack of his 
work-book, etc. On the other hand, in cases of quitting with immediate effect, 
the fact of lost earnings can be established without any proof of available 
openings. (It may happen in such cases that the employer tries to prove that 
an appropriate opening was. available to the employee and that the latter 
•neglected his obligation to enter employment by not making use of it.). 
III. Determining the earnings lost 
When non-realized earnings are to be determined, it must be considered 
in every case what it is the employee has been deprived of as a result of the 
damaging act. As has been mentioned in Part I, cases will differ also here, 
i. e. whether the employee was prevented from continuing in his employment 
under the same conditions, or was hindered from entering into a new employ-
ment. The former category comprises cases of quitting with immediate effect 
because of direct and grave endangerment of life and body, the latter includes 
cases such as withholding the work-book. Consequently, if the amount of the 
lost income is to be determined in the first category of cases, the point of 
departure must be the earnings which were due to the employee prior to the 
event causing damage. The presumption is justified here that the employee 
• would have had such income in normal circumstances, in the absence of the 
damaging event. If, on the other hand, the result of damage materialized in 
that the employee was deprived of the possibility to enter a new employment-
reparation must consist in ensuring him those earnings of which he was 
actually deprived as a result of unlawful conduct. This may be more, or may 
be less than the former earnings, as the case may be. (It follows from this that 
if the employer has withheld the work-book, but the former employee could 
not have found new employment even in the possession of his work-book 
because there were no openings, the employee will not be entitled to compensa-
tion.) 
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C) Damage caused by unlawful termination of employment 
1. Types of damage 
Two groups of case belong to this category of damage. One group com-
prises cases, where damage is the result of the unlawful termination of 
employment. Termination of employment is unlawful if, for instance, 
— the reasons give by the employer in the dismissal notice do not actually 
exist, or notice could not have been given because of some prohibition or 
restriction, 
— the formal requirements are not met in giving notice, 
— the employer declares summary dimissal in the absence of disciplinary 
decision to this effect, or in the absence of disciplinary offence, or if the 
disciplinary decision of dismissal has been passed with a substantial violation 
of the rules of disciplinary action. 
The other group comprises cases where the employer fails to provide some 
working condition, or the employee is unable to do work because of inadequate 
instructions (e. g. he is requested to do work other than his scope of duties, 
or the instruction violates some provision of law), or the employee rightfully 
refuses to do work. 
This type of damage shows close relationship to the type discussed in 
the foregoing, i. e. damage caused by preventing the employee from doing 
his work. This has been mentioned in. the introduction. The difference lies 
solely in the character of damage, or, perhaps more exactly, in the fact that 
in case of the type discussed here the wages lost because of the absence of 
working are compensated for not within the scope of liability for damage. 
Thus in these cases damage usually materializes as damage suffered, and, 
within this definition, mostly in the form of costs and outlays. Thus- for 
instance, as costs incurred for removing obstacles enforcing claims (correspon-
dence, travel expenses, counsel's fees), and outlays resulting from the loss of 
social insurance benefits in case employment is terminated (e. g. medical 
treatment fees). Reduction of available means happens seldom within the scope 
of damage suffered. This may be the case when some earlier outlay becomes 
useless (e. g. university tuition fees). 
Claims for profit lost are encountered even less often in this category 
of damage. This may happen in cases where e. g. the termination of employ-
ment prevents the employee from working in his spare-time job or secondary 
occupation.. 
2. The system of liability 
As appears from the nature of damage belonging to the type discussed 
here, the problem arising in connection with damage caused by prevention 
from working does not present itself, i. e. whether liability should be made 
stricter as compared to the general principles laid down in Part I. In the 
cases discussed here, damage evidently affects the employee's and his family's 
living standars, as the latter is affected by any unexpected, extraordinary 
expense. But the employee's basic subsistence is not jeopardized (taking for 
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granted here that he will receive his lost wages, even if belatedly). This 
conclusion applies also to cases where the unlawful termination of employment 
materializes also in the loss of the employee's other incomes (To cite the above 
example, if he has to give up his secondary occupation as a result.) Namely, 
basic substence is provided for by the first employment and incomes from 
secondary occupation are only of a supplementary character.) 
Consequently, in case of damage caused by the unlawful termination of 
employment, the general conclusion applies, i. e. the employer is held liable 
under liability requiring increased protection. He- can excuse himself by 
proving that damage was caused by unpreventable external cause, or ex-
clusively by the employee's unpreventable conduct. 
3. The employee's contributory act ._•.„.-
Here the situation is entirely similar to the cases discussed in the fore-
going, i. e. damage caused by prevention from working. 
The employee's contributory act materializes mainly in two spheres also 
here. One: he does not make efforts to remove the obstacle to working. Two: 
he does not avail himself of the opportunities to do work. This latter is 
realized only in cases where the employment is determinated because of the 
employer's conduct. 
As concerns judgment and evaluation of how the employee is obliged to 
act in order to remove obstacles and make use of opportunities, the conclusion 
drawn for the type discussed before are f-ully valid also here. So this need 
not be repeated here. 
4. The damage 
As concerns the assessment of damage suffered by the employee- the 
conclusions drawn for the type discussed before are directive also here. They 
require no addition, so they will not be discussed here again. 
III. Damage caused to the employee's belongings 
brought to the employer's premises 
1. Introduction 
The problem of the employer's lability for damage in respect to the 
employee's belongings brought to the premises is rather unclarified, both 
theorectically and practically, and gives rise to many controversies. Even 
the very existencé of this liability, its nature and scope are open to debate. 
So it will be useful to sum up the principles underlying this type of liability. 
Considering the fact that even the basis of such liability is often challen-
ged, let us first clarify whether the employer is under any obligation within 
the scope of employment in respect to the employee's belongings. 
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2. Obligation arising out of employment in respect to movables 
a) The basis of obligation of safekeeping movables 
In studying whether the employer is under any obligation arising out of 
employment to provide safekeeping of the employee's movables, we must s tar t 
f rom the premise that it is the employer's duty not only to employ the employee 
in a sphere of work as stipulated by the contract and to pay him the wages 
and grant him other allowances as stipulated, but also to create the most 
favourable possibilities to do his work. This is obvious if we keep in mind 
that the employee's basis of livelihood is the wages paid to him. So the 
employee must be given the opportunity to work with the full employment 
of his creative capabilities. Favourable conditions include not only labour 
safety devices, sanitary establishments, etc. but also the awareness tha t the 
employee's belongings brought to the premises be safe during work. If the 
employee is worrying during work because he had to leave his belongings 
somewhere else, this distracts his attention, which results in a decrease of 
performance, may lead to inferior work, even to accidents. But if the employee 
is worrying of the destruction or damage of his belongings kept on him, this 
may have the same inhibiting effect. These dificulties can only be overcome 
if the employer is obliged under employment to create circumstances in which 
the employee's belongings are in a safe place. 
Arising from this obligation, the employer has two measures to take. 
One: to provide adequate facilities for the employees to put clothing and other 
belongings which are not being kept on them during work in safe places-
Two: to provide adequate guarding, watching, etc. for keeping such belongings 
safe in the cloak-rooms and safes, and, in addition, to see that also other 
movables be protected from damage while the employee is staying at the 
premises. 
As concerns the first d u t y i. e. to provide adequate facilities for keeping 
clothes and other belongings, the realization, may vary with the na ture of the 
employer enterprise, with the type of the employee's work. If the employee's 
working-place, scope of duties are of such a na ture that the can keep his 
things at his place of work, e. g. a clerk, the employer need not take any 
special measure for protecting the room. But if the employee cannot keep 
his things near him, the employer must provide adequate facilities for keeping 
them safe. The fact that the employee cannot keep his things near him may 
have several reasons. For instance, the type of work requires the wearing of 
working-clothers or protective clothes, the working-place is small, j ammed, 
the employee changes his place during work, etc. 
As concerns the second duty of the employer, i. e. to keep the employees' 
belongings safe and to prevent damage to these belongings in the premises, 
this requires measures in two directions. 
One is to create safety of the employee's deposited belongings.1 Safe ty 
can be provided in various ways, just as the employer can provide room 
for depositing clothes and other movables in various ways depending on the 
. 1 For many years judicial practice has held the position that the provision of 
the Code of Labour pursuant to which the employer is obliged to provide cloak-
rooms for the employees involves also the duty to provide safekeeping of the 
belongings in these rooms. (Supreme Court, P. I. 303 602/1952.) 
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nature of the enterprise, the employee's work, etc. The important thing to do 
is to see tha t loss and damage of the movables be prevented. In cases where 
the employee can take care of his belongings without interfering with his 
work or the regulations of the enterprise, the employer is not required to 
take special safety measures. E. g. the clerk keeps his coat and briefcase in 
his room, the driver keeps his briefcase in the car. But even in such cases 
the employer is obliged to provide safekeeping if the employee has to leave 
his regular place of work for some reason (e. g. has to take files somewhere). 
This means that the employer is obliged to make doors of rooms locking and 
provide in addition a guarding system to prevent pilfering by incoming 
outsiders. For example, if the room locked by the employee is broken open 
and his coat is stolen only because there was no adequate guarding of the bu-
ilding, the employer will be liable for damage. To keep belongings watched by 
the employee it is not necessary that he works in an enclosed room. E. g. there 
is no need for special measures in case of agricultural outdoor work if the wor-
kers can place their things in such a manner that they can always watch 
them and there is no such coming and going of people that such watching 
would be impossible. If, however, the employees cannot keep their belongings 
watched, the employer is obliged to take special measures for safekeeping.2 
Such facilities may consist of locking cupboards, cloak-rooms, parking-place 
for bicycles, guardsmen for dressing-rooms, etc., depending on the circum-
stances of the employer enterpise. The solution is lef t to the discretion of 
the employer, but if it is inadequate, he must be held liable. I should like to 
emphasize once more that this obligation of the employer arises out of employ-
ment, and that this is not a case as though employer and employee had 
tacitly entered a contract of safekeeping outside . the scope of "employment. 
The other obligation to take measures is that the employer must ensure 
that the employees' movables — also those which are not deposited in cloak-
rooms — be protected f rom damage, destruction in the premises. This requires 
provision of adequate inspection, and other necessary conditions. Filthy, 
contaminating materials must be stored and handled properly, potential dangers 
should be made known, regulations must be observed in loading and transport 
work, and provisions must be made to prevent endangerment of the em-
ployee's belongings by incoming outsiders. The employer's obligation of pro-
tection does not include wear and soiling involved in the na ture of work as 
usual in the enterprise (e. g. in an alumina factory or a railway engine-
house the soiling of the employee's clothes by dust or smoke in the air). 
Namely, such circumstances must be taken into account by the employee 
by the time he accepts employment. If, however, wear and soiling are of such 
a degree that they would result in disproportionate burden to the employee, 
the employer is usually under the obligation to provide working-clothes fo r 
sparing the clothing of the employee 1. (1. Pursuant to Section 80/A of the 
Code of Labour, working-clothes must be made available if the work involves 
a high degree of soiling and wear, or if this is justified by protection f rom 
weather or other circumstances inherent to the operations of the enterprise.) 
2 E. g. a court has granted compensation to a cashier for his coat that was 
hanging at the siede of the pay-box in a shop and was stolen from there. The court 
has ruled that while performing his duties the cashier is not able to watch his 
coat, so the employen ought to have provided adaquate facilities for keeping the 
employee's belongigns safe. (Supreme Court P. I. 24 132/1955.) 
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b) The scope of obligation 
We have agreed that it is the employer's duty arising out of employment 
to take measures for protecting the employees' belongings brought to the 
premises. But in establishing the employer's liability we have to clarify not 
only the nature- the basis of the employer's obligation, but also its scope 
and limits. 
I. Categorization of movables 
A position often taken in practice is that the employer can be held liable 
only for certain pieces of clothing and outfit that are usually taken to the 
place of work. This discrimination of things from those usually taken to the 
premises is intended to serve the restriction of the employer's liability. This 
discrimination between movables, and the resulting restriction of liability, is 
usually supported by two arguments. One is that the enterprise's primary 
duty is production and not the safekeeping of the employees'belongings. So 
it is only to be expected from the employer to keep safe those belongings of 
the employees which they necessarily take with them to work. The other 
argument is that it would result in a lot of abuse if the employer were held 
liable for any belongings of the employee since — after a possible loss of 
things — the employee might insist that he had had in the cloak-room or 
his briefcase some piece of jewelry, camera of high value, etc. 
Indeed, there is much to be said for these arguments. The employer 
cannot be charged to an excessive degree with safekeeping the employees' 
belongings, and it is equally true that a comprehensive liability — comprising 
all ad any belongings — might give rise to corrupt practices. Yet — in my 
opinion — the restriction of the category of movables as indicated above 
would not be acceptable. 
If the employees' belongings are considered from the angle of how 
frequently they are taken to the place of work, we may categorize them as 
follows: 
A) Belongings which are necessary for appearing at the prace of work; 
these include: 
aa) Objects which the employee usually wears or keeps on him during 
work, i. e. which he does not deposit in the cloack-room. These are e. g. 
shoes, shirt, watch, necklace, etc. 
ab) The employee's other pieces of clothing and outfit which he usually 
takes with him to his place of work. These include e. g. overcoat, hat, 
umbrella, briefcase. Pieces of clothing and personal belongings belong here 
irrespective of quality, i. e. not only those of average quality. It should be 
kept in mind here that the employees often attend at their place of work 
various events after working hours, go to the theatre or other gatherings. 
They are often unable to go home for changing, so. they show up at the place 
of work dressed for the event, and bring with them clothing of better quality, 
gold watches, pieces of jewelry etc. 
ac) The employees' vehicles. Part of the employees go to work using 
vehicles of their own. In. many cases this is not only a matter of comfort or 
saving, but a necessity since the place of work cannot be reached in other 
ways (e. g. at some mining plants in the country, or building sites). The 
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undisturbed working of employees requires the safety of their vehicles brought 
to the premises. 
B) It often happens that the employee has to bring to the place of work 
belongings in addition to those mentioned under A). Housewives often do 
shopping while going to work. It may happen that certain things require 
repair and the employee has no choice but to take them with him since there 
is no time after working hours to fetch them from home and to reach the 
repair shop before it is closed. Thus belongings of this group are not in the 
category of things usually taken to the place of work, but they are taken 
there very often nevertheless, since the employees would otherwise not be 
able to do shopping, have them repaired, etc. and to run their households as 
required. 
C) Finally, employees' belongings should be mentioned which do not 
belong in any of the above categories. The necessity of bringing them to the 
place of work does not arise in connection with these as a rule. 
This categorization may from the basis of our further considerations. 
I should like to add right away that this categorization is of importance not 
in the exclusion of liability, but rather in the nature of liability, and in the 
prohibition of bringing to the premises certain things. 
II. Restrictive measures of the employer 
As we have seen, a very wide range of movables is implied here. The 
question may arise therëfore whether the employer can restrict in some way 
or other the limits of his obligations. Possibilities to this end are if the emplo-
yer prohibits bringing in certain objects, or orders the employees to deposit 
such objects at specified places, or issues orders to report the bringing in of 
certain objects. Let us study these possibilities. 
a) To prohibit bringing in certain objects may be necessary because there 
are no facilities for their safekeeping or adequate guarding, or because certain 
things may represent some hazard to production (e. g. explosives, contami-
nation). The employees' belongings were categorized into there groups in the 
foregoing. The first group contains things which are necessary for going to 
work, the second comprises things whose taking to the place of work, is often 
necessary for running the household and for the employee's activities outside 
his place of work, the third group consists of the employee's other belongings. 
In case of the first group — pieces of clothing and personal outfit, 
vehicles — no prohibition of bringing them in can be issued since these are 
necessary for going to the place of work. Vehicles represent a certain excep-
tion here Namely in case of vehicles that are usually left in the street 
without special attendance — cars belong here — the employer may prohibit 
to bring them to the premises. But in case of vehicles which cannot be left 
without attendance for a longer time without risking their stealing or da-
maging — especially bicycles -r- the employer is not entitled to prohibit their 
bringing in, except if sufficient facilities for their safekeeping are provided 
outside the premises. As concerns the second group of belongings, these are 
not necessary for going to work- i. e. for performing the duties of employ-' 
merit. It may happen that the protection of these from damage or loss repre-
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sents disproportionate, possibly unsurmountable, difficulties to the employer. 
So it may be justified to prohibit bringing in these, or some of them. But in 
doing so it must be taken into account that such a measure might place the 
employees in a very difficult position. To attend to the duties of the household 
and to other duties outside the scope of employment may be rendered much 
more difficult. This, in turn, may affect their performance, may result in 
asking for short leaves more often, which interferes with efficient working, 
etc. Considering all this, the'bringing to the premises of movables belonging to 
this group can be prohibited only if bringing them there would represent 
hazards to production, to the storage and handling of products, if the, pro-
vision of facilities for safekeeping would mean disproportionate burden to 
the employer, or if the movables in question cannot be kept adequately 
because of their large dimensions or other properties. As concerns the third 
group, bringing to the premises of the objects belonging here is usually not 
necessary and not justified, so the employer may prohibit their bringing in at 
any time.3 
b) The employer may prescribe that things brought in be deposited at a 
specified place. This may be in the interest of better attendance, protection 
from damage, safety of production, etc. (the typical case is the placing of 
clothing in the cloak-room provided by the enterprise). Such a measure does 
not violate the employees' interests. The employer may therefore prescribe in 
respect of any movables that the employee is obliged to deposit them in the 
cloak-room or some other specified place. This does not apply to things that 
are usually worn while doing work.4 
c) It may be prescribed that certain specified movables must be reported 
before bringing them to the premises. This serves the purpose of preventing 
abvuses, subsequent disputes. Such orders can be issued in respect to any 
object, including those worn during work. The requirement of preliminary 
reporting is usually justified in case of things representing high value.5 
On the basis of what has been explained so far, the scope of the em-
ployer's pertinent obligations may established as follows: 
a) Except for certain types of vehicle, things required for going to and 
doing work (pieces of clothing and personal outfit, vehicles of transport) 
cannot be subject to restrictions of bringing them to the premises. But the 
employer can prescribe that movables — except those usually worn or kept at 
hand also during work — be deposited in specified places (cloak-room, safe, 
parking area), and that movables departing f rom the average, or representing 
high values, must be reported before bringing them to the premises. 
b) If it is justified by circumstances of production, disproportionate burden 
entailed in safekeeping, etc. the employer may prohibit to bring in things 
required for running the household or for activities outside the scope of 
employment. The obligation to report in advance and to deposit things at 
specified places can be prescribed in any case in this category. 
c) Bringing to the premises employees' belongings not coming under the 
above categorization may be prohibited by the employer without giving any 
3 Mt. V. 100. § (3). 
4 Mt. V. 100. § (3). 5 Mt. V. 100. § (3). 
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reasons. If no prohibition is issued, the obligation of reporting in advance 
or despositing in specified places (e. g. at the porter's lodge) can be prescribed. 
I should like to stress that the restrictions enumerated above do not 
affect the employer's liability existing in respect to safekeeping the things 
brough to the premises. If, however, the employee fails to observe the rest-
rictions, this will have its effect on the employer's liability. 
3. The system of liability 
a) The principle of establishing the system of liability 
In Part I, we have çonculded that the employer's liability for damage 
should usually, be constructed on the basis of the system of liability requiring 
increased protection and not requiring the employers' dereliction, and that 
departures from this principle are possible in case of certain types of damage. 
One factor affecting the system of liability is the importance of reparation. 
If belongings are damaged or lost, the cost of repair or replacement affect 
the employee's and his family's living standards considerably, although the 
basic subsistence is not jeopoardized. Thus the weight and importance of repa-
ration is greater than average in such cases. Considering this, the application 
of a stricter system of liability, not requiring the condition of dereliction, 
seems justified. 
Yet the case is not so simple if considered from the angle of the employer. 
On the one hand, the employer's obligation to protect belongings is not of 
equal consequences in every case. And, on the other hand' the employer's 
influence to prevent damage is not the same in every case. 
As concerns the weight and importance of the employer's obligation, the 
latter is stricter in case of belongings of the first category, i. e. things that 
are necessary for going to and doing work. If these would not be taken to 
the premises, the employee would not be able to meet his obligations of emp-
loyment, whereby he is proctically forced to take them with him. At the 
same time, the employee is expected to concentrate all his attention primarily 
on his work, so he cannot be engaged in watching and protecting his belon-
gings. It is exactly therefore that protection and safety of these must be pro-
vided by the employer in the entire area of the premises. He is obliged, to ta-
ke all possible measures to this end. The case is different with belongings of 
the second and third category. As has been shown, the employee's situation is 
not so pressing here as in case of belongings of the first category. The same 
applies especially to belongings of the third category. Hence it would not be 
justified in the two latter cases to demand more from the employer in meeting 
his obligations than the possibilities available to other enterprises of similar 
type for meeting such obligations. 
If the possibilités to exert influence on the prevention of damage are 
studied, we also find differences between the three categories. As concerns 
the first, the employer is usually in the position to anticipate what kind of, 
and how many things will be brought in as a routine. So he can prepare for 
taking adequate measures to protect them. This must be taken into account 
already at the stage of establishment and organisation. In case of the second 
and third category the fluctuation is much greater as concerns both quantity 
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and type of belongings, and it is difficult to anticipate them. In the organi-
zational stage of the enterprise or production, it is difficult to prepare for 
circumstances arising from the bringing in of such objects. So it is justified to 
make differences in the sphere of the employer's liability for damage. But no 
difference arises in this respect if the employer provides locking cloak-rooms 
or special places for safekeeping such movables. Namely in such a case the 
employer has actually taken charge of the direct safekeeping of these objects. 
He is then in the position to take all measures for preventing damage. So in 
such a case the category to which movables belong is irrelevant. 
So we may conclude that to apply the system of liability irrespective of 
dereliction is justified in case of belongings of the first category, i. e. things 
required for going to and doing work, as well as in cases where the employer 
has provided locking cloak-rooms or other places of safekeeping, or has ordered 
to deposit movables in specified places. On the other hand, in case of belongings 
of the second and third category, it would be justified to hold the employer 
liable for damage only in case of his dereliction.6 
Hence the employer is liable irrespective of dereliction, and can be dis-
charged of liability only if damage has been caused by unpreventable external 
cause, or the employee's unpreventable conduct, in the following cases: 
a) for movables belonging to any of the categories if these are deposited 
in cloak-rooms- places of safekeeping or other places specified for this purpose 
by the employer (whether the thing is lost or only damaged makes no differ-
ence in respect to liability); 
b) for movables belonging to the first category even in cases where these 
are not deposited in cloak-rooms, etc. 
On the other hand, the employer will be liable only in case of dereliction 
on his part for movables belonging to the second and third category, expect 
if these are deposited in cloak-rooms, etc. as this circumstance entails liability 
irrespective of dereliction. (A fur ther problem may arise in oases where the 
employee violates the prohibition of bringing in certain things, or has not 
complied with the requirement of preliminary reporting; this will be discussed 
later.) 
It may be asked whether to be liable for any and all belongings of the 
employees kept in the cloak-rooms, etc. is not a disproportionate burden to 
the employer. This objection is not well-founded, as to provide these faci-
lities is not specially burdensome. It is the employer's obligation to provide 
adequate safekeeping of the employee's belongings deposited in the cloak-
room. It makes no substantial difference in this respect whether there is 
only one suit and watch in a locker, or somebody puts also his camera or 
stamp collection there. If the cloak-room is guarded adequately, or can be 
locked as required, the more expensive things will not be lost either. If, by 
contrast, the safekeeping of a gold whatch or camera is not arranged for 
as required, any employee would run the risk of losing also less expensive 
belongings. Moreover, if the employer feels that things of higher value can-
not be kept safely in the cloak-room, he may order to keep them in a safe, 
or may even prohibit to bring them to the premises within the limitations 
discussed before. 
6 Mt, V. 100. § Cl)— 
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b) Discharge of liability 
In part I we have concluded that the employer can be discharged of 
liability for damage if damage has been caused by unpreventable external 
causes, or exclusively by the employee's unpreventable conduct. No reasons 
have emerged in our foregoing discussion that would call for generally dif-
ferent reasons of excuse in the cases considered above. 
In Part I we have shown that if the causation is within the sphere 
of the employer's operations, this is not an external cause. Three additions 
must be made here in this respect. All apply to cases where the employer 
is liable for damage to movables which are necessary for going to work 
but are not deposited in cloak-rooms or safes. These additions are connected 
with the activities of the employer. 
One addition is connected with doing work, and with wear usually 
involved in the routine operations of the employer enterprise. In connection 
with the employer's obligation to protect, I have mentioned that this obli-
gation does not comprise protection f rom dangers closely connected with 
the operations of the enterprise and with doing work there. (It may happen 
to a driver that there is a breakdown, a blown tyre. In the course of repair 
the driver's clothes are soiled, possibly torn. But this the driver must have 
taken into account when he chose this occupation. Or if somebody is em-
ployed as a clerk in an engine-house or alumina factory, ha cannot hold 
liable the employer for the soiling of his clothes from smoke or dust in 
the air.) In these cases damage is • caused by factors inherent in the opera-
tions of the enterprise. And the employer enterprise cannot protect any-
body against these, so it would not be justified to hold it liable. Conse-
quently we must exclude liability for damage of this type, just as has been 
the case in the preceding chapter in connection with occupational diseases. 
The second addition relates to cases occurring on the premises of the 
employer when the circumstances are not entirely under the employer's 
control. This question has been discussed in connection with damage caused 
to health and corporeal integrity. It may happen that the employee suffers 
damage on the employer's premises while participating in some event orga-
nized by a community organ, or while taking his meal provided by the 
catering company. The solution here is identical with the conclusions drawn 
in the preceding chapter. If damage is caused by a circumstance that emer-
ges on the employer's side, the latter will, be liable for damage. Namely 
in such a case he employer has violated his obligation to protect the em-
ployee's belongings. Hence if the the employee's clothes are torn because 
the chair on which he was sitting was broken, the employer is liable for 
the damage. He will be liable equally if the porter failed to exercise ade-
quate control as a result of which outsiders entered the premises and stole 
some of the overcoats of the employees who where attending a trade union 
meeting. But the employer will not be liable if the damage occured because 
the catering company's waiter spilled food on the employee's suit. 
The third addition is connected with the area. In Part I we have said 
that a site of work outside the employer's premises must be regarded as 
belonging to the latter if it is under the employer's exclusive disposition 
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and control. It follows from this that if damage occurs to the employee's 
belongings in places other than those mentioned above, the employer can 
excuse himself of liability by proving unpreventability. An exception to 
this rule is if damage has been caused by a circumstance that emerged on 
the employer's side, like in cases of damage caused to health or corporeal 
integrity (e. g. the paint tank given to the employee was badly worn, burst, 
and the spilled paint destroyed the employees clothes.) 
c) The proof of dereliction 
In conncetion with the system of dereliction we have concluded in 
Part I that in case of the employer's liability for damage we must apply 
the exculpatory system. So we presome dereliction and it is up to the 
employer to prove his guiltlessness. This system must be applied also to 
cases of dereliction in connection with types of damage discussed here. 
d) The effect of violating rules relating to the bringing in and reporting 
of movables 
In the foregoing we have seen that the employer is authorized to issue 
orders relating to the bringing in and deposition, or reporting the bringing 
in of the employee's movables. It may happen that an employee violates 
such regulations. Thus, for instance, if a cloak-room is provided, he deposits 
his belongings not used during work not in the cloak-room, or does not re-
port the bringing in of certain objects, etc. In such cases the employee 
places the employer, in a position which the latter could not have antici-
pated, for which he is not prepared, or quite the opposite of which was 
expected when enterprise work, control and supervision was organized; 
on the other hand, the employee renders assessment of actual damage dif-
ficult or impossible (e. g. by his failure to report). The employee must bear 
the consequences of his conduct in such cases. This may materialize in that the 
case will come under ¡a milder rule of liability, or the burden of proof will be 
reversed, or the employee loses his title to compensation, or receives but partial 
compensation as the perpetrator of a contributory ast. (It should be noted that 
when the regulations for deposition, reporting, etc. are issued, the employees 
must be notified in every case of the consequences of violation, including their 
effect on liability.) 
a) If the employer prescribes the obligation to deposit things in the 
cloak-room or in some other specified place, he makes arrangements to meet 
his obligations of safekeeping accordingly. This is manifest not only in that 
he provides adequate guarding in such places but possibly also in that 
he makes fewer arrangements to this end in the other areas af the premises. 
If the obligation to deposit as prescribed is violated, the employer faces 
an unexpected situation. But the consequences will vary with the different 
groups of movables: 
aa) In case of belongings of the first category, i. e. things that are 
necessary for going to and doing work, the employer will be liable for da-
mage irrespective of his dereliction even if these belongings are not depo-
sited as prescribed. It would follow from this that the system of liability 
should not be changed, and that the violation of the regulations should be 
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valuated only as the contributory act of the damaged. But I think that the 
violation of the regulation to deposit has changed the situation to a greater 
extent. Namely, as has been indicated, the employer, considering the arran-
gements he has made for meeting his obligation of safekeeping, might have 
done less in this respect in other areas of the premises. Considering this it 
would seem more correct to employ liability based on dereliction — relating 
to belongings in the second and third category — also for cases where belon-
gings of the first category are not deposited as prescribed. 
ab) As concerns the immovables of the second and third category, the 
violation of the desposition regulations is qualified even more strictly. Na-
mely in case of such regulations, the employer makes no other arrangements 
for safekeeping, he is not even prepared for the presence of such things 
in places not reserved for deposition. So it is reasonable to mitigate the 
employer's liability in such cases. This is effected by holding the employer 
liable in case of his dereliction, but to shift the burden of proving dereliction 
to the damaged employee. The employee's sonduct may also serve as the 
basis of distributing damage in accordance with the rules of contributory 
acts. 
The violation of the deposition obligation does not affect the system of 
liability in the aforesaid cases if damage would have occurred anyway. This 
exception relates actually to two types of case. The one is the occurrence 
of an event, e. g. fire, which damages also things deposited properly. The 
other is the case where deposition could not yet be effected (e. g. damage 
occurs in the premises as the employee is walking toward his workshop), 
or if the deposited belongings are again with the employee (e. g. after wor-
king hours). 
b) The employer can prescribe the obligation to report in advance when 
things of higher value and the like are to be brought to the premises. This is 
intended primarily for preventing subsequent disputes, or possible abuses. 
If the employee fails to comply with the obligation to report, this has the 
following effects: 
ba) In case of belongings of the first category, it does not affect the sys-
tem of liability, but in case of loss or destruction the employee must prove 
that he had actually brought in the object in question; 
bb) in case of belongings of the second and third category, the situation 
is similar to the above, thus the burden of proving that the object had been 
brought in rests on the employee.7 
The reason why the solution for the two latter groups differs from the 
first is that the category of belongings indispensable for going to and doing 
work is much more limited and proving is easier thereby, whereas an extre-
mely wide range of objects enter in the latter two categories. It may happen, 
too, that objects of considerable value are brought to the premises among 
these; if the employer gets informed of this, he will probably take special 
precautionary measures, or, most likely, will give instructions to place these 
things in a safe. 
c) Employers can prohibit to bring certain objects to the premises. As 
has been mentioned, this does not affect movabables belonging to the first 
category. Such prohibitions are usually prescriped because the enterprise 
7 Mt. V. 100. § (3). 
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cannot keep certain objects for reasons regarding production, safety, etc. In 
some cases the reason of prohibition lies in the nature of the object (e. g. 
reasons of safety). Since the employer is not prepared for safekeeping such 
object, it is reasonable to mitigate his liability for damage. Consequently the 
employer's liability based on dereliction will be applied, but dereliction must 
be proved by the damaged employee. The employee's conduct may lead to 
splitting the damage in addition. 
IV 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY INJURY TO HEALTH 
AND CORPOREAL INTEGRITY 
1. Introduction 
As concerns the effect on employees, the most important type of damage 
is the one caused by injury to health and corporeal integrity. It should be 
mentioned in this connection that injury to health or corporeal integrity do 
not in themselves entail liability for damage, do not create a claim for 
compensation (disciplinary or criminal liability may of course emerge in this 
connection. Liability for damage emerges only if the employee suffers damage 
because of injury to his health or corporeal integrity. (E. g. he is not able 
to work for some time, his clothes are damaged, etc.). In connection with 
damage caused by injury to health and corporeal integrity not only the de-
finition of the system of liability must be studied. First we must decide 
to what extent certain activities of the employee can be regarded as having 
been displayed within the scope of employment, and whether it is justified 
to hold the employer liable for damage occurring during such activities. 
The problem is twofold: First, it must be decided whether a given acti-
vity is within the scope of employment, in other words, whether there exists 
a causal nexus between the employee's activity and his employment. Second, 
whether the employer can exert influence in the fu ture to prevent damage 
occurring in the course of these activities, i. e. whether it is possible to in-
fluence the employer by bringing into operation liability for damage to pre-
vent similar damage in the future. 
2. Activities belonging to the scope of employment 
a) Scope of the employee's activities 
I. Activities connected with doing work 
The typical case of usual activities is present if the employee performs 
at his place of work the duties specified in the contract of employment. In 
doing so, the employee is active within the scope of his employment beyond 
any doubt. In this connection I should like to remark that the term place 
of work comprises not only the working-place in the strict sense assigned to 
the employee (workbench, desk, sales counter, etc:) but the entire area of the 
employer's premises. The local relationship is actually established at the mo-
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ment the employee enters the premises. But the employer's premises must be 
distinguished clearly f rom the other areas of operation. Premises are the buil-
dings, ground, etc. where offices, workshops, etc., are located. The area of 
operation is that part of this country in which the employer enterprise is ac-
tive. E. g. the premises of the Budapest Automobile Transport Enterprise are 
the buildings which comprise its offices, workshops, etc., while the area of 
operation is the entire territory of the city of Budapest. One enterprise may 
have several premises. So the place of work in the broader sense are the pre-
mises which comprise the employee's place of work in the stricter sense (his 
workbench, desk). 
Whenever we speak of the employee's work performed within the scope 
of employment, this must comprise all connected activities which are among 
the preconditions of performing work. Thus if the goes to fetch material, 
tools, delivers the finished product, etc. 
It often happens that the employee goes beyond the limits of his em-
ployment, departs from the rules governing his sphere of work. Overstepping 
the limits or departing from the rules, non-observance of the rules, may be 
the result of the employer's instuctions, or may be based on the employee's 
decision. The former case is actually only a seeming departure, since the 
sphere of work is changing — temporarily or permanently — is modified, 
on the basis of the employer's instructions. Thus the employee is again 
within, the limits of his modified sphere of work, is acting in accordance 
with modified prescriptions. 
Going beyond the sphere of work or. departure from rules based on the 
employee's decision can be for the purpose of performing enterprise tasks, or 
may be in the employee's interest, i. e.. private interests. 
In addition to performing duties within the scope of employment, the 
employee has to display a number of other activities which are not connec-
ted with his work, but arise from the fact of his being one party to employ-
ment. A variety of activities can belong here.. For instance, the employee 
must show up periodically for medical checkup, is called to some office to 
have his data recorded, etc. These activities do not belong to the perfor-
mance of duties in the strict sense, but are results of employment. They are 
necessary for preparing to do work (e. g. medical checkup) or for meeting 
the employer's obligations . based on employment (e. g. recording of data). 
Thus these activities are indispensable for maintaining employment and for 
performing the duties arising out of employment. 
Another group of the employee's activities is connected with availing 
himself of the services due to him on the basis of employment. This com-
prises activities such as taking the meal, washing, rest, going to the dispen-
sary, collecting wages, etc. These activities make the exercise of various rights 
possible due to the employee on the basis of employment. 
In my opinion, the activities enumerated above must be regarded as being 
performed on the.b^sis of employment. Hence the employee's activities based 
on employment will be as follows: 
— performance of duties of work stipulated in the contract of employ-
ment 
— auxiliary activities necessary for performing his work (asking for tools 
from the store, taking over material, etc.) 
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— activities connected with the overstepping of the limits of assigned 
sphere of work, with the departure f rom rules, 
— activities necessary for maintaining employment (showing up a t the 
office for registration, collecting wages, showing up for medical chec-
kups, etc.), 
— making use of services due on the basis of employment (breaks, t a -
king meals, etc.). 
It should be mentioned here that the interpretation of activities consis-
ting in the overstepping of the limits of the sphere of work and in the de-
par ture f rom rules governing work is open to debate both in theory and 
practice. Let us make a brief survey of the reasons of pert inent views. 
There are views according to which activities consisting in the over-
stepping of one's sphere of duties are not within the scope of employment 
if they are wilful or criminal. These views are advocated in the l i tera ture 
on labour law in connection with the employee's liability for damage. But 
we must consider these also in connection with the employer's liability, since 
if these views are acceptable, their consequences must apply to the other 
par ty of employment, i. e. the employer, as well. 
The view that wilful or criminal activities cannot be regarded as be-
longint to the scope of employment are to found mainly in the Czechoslovak1 
and Soviet2 l iterature, but such opinions appear also elsewhere. There are 
differences of detail between these views. Opinions agree in cases of . wilful 
criminal acts and other wilful damaging acts, but differences appear in con-
nection with criminal acts through negligence. As concerns wilful acts, ihe 
reasons underlying these views can be summed up as follows: Any conduct 
can be within the scope of employment only if it is accomplished in the 
course of the regular performance of duties arising out of employment. Wil-
fu l criminal acts can never be part of performing work, and to abstain f rom 
them is a universal civic obligation, not an obligation arising out of em-
ployment. Nor does the employee's conduct by which he causes damage wil-
fully belong to the scope of employment. Namely this is in clear contradic-
tion to the nature and purpose of activities the employee is expected to dis-
play, since his activity is aimed at achieving ends that are just the opposite 
of the employer's intentions. The employee is thereby placed in social cir-
cumstances which have nothing in common with his employment. He acts 
not as an employed person, but rather as a private person, and his activtity 
is not within the scope of his employment. As concerns criminal acts of neg-
lect, the opinions are divided. Some make no distinction between wilful and 
negligent criminal acts, and hold the view tha t damage caused by a criminal 
act which involves the socially dangerous violation of the discipline of labour 
1 Kratochvill Z.: Nahrada skody v pracovnim pravu. (Praha, 1959.) 
Kratochvill Z.: Narada skody podle obcauskeho a pracovniho prava. (Pravny 
Obzor, 1957. 4.) 
Witz K.: Zavajek pracujiho к nahrade skodu zpusobone pri vykomu zamestnani. 
' (Pravnik, 1962. 1.) 
Witz К.: К otzkam obsahu a ruzsahu majetkova odpovednosti zamestnanee za 
skodu spusobanon zamestnavatali. (Stat a pravo, 1959. 5.) 
Witz K.—Tomes I. Nektere theoreticke otazky kodifikace ceskosloveriskeho pra-
covniho prave. (Stat a pravo, 1957. 2.) 
2 Александров H. Г.: Трудовое правоотношение. (Moscow, 1948.) 
110-
must be compensated for in the same manner as damage caused by any 
other criminal act. Others regard conducts qualifyed as criminal acts through 
negligence as belonging to the scope of employment. 
The opposite view is held by those who believe that to apply the pro-
visions of labour law to some cases of damage and those of civil law to 
others, is theoretically inconsistent.3 In the majori ty of cases, the pecuniary 
consequences of acts to be prosecuted under criminal law — e. g. stealing 
of materials, tools, etc. by the employee holding them on trust — are defined 
in labour statutes. Moreover, certain acts are qualified as crimes exactly be-
cause the employee has committed them in connection with performing his 
duties arising out of employment. This latter view is usually reflected by 
the rules of labour legislation of the socialist countries which contain provi-
sions on liability for damage caused wilfully or by a criminal act.4 
The views suggesting the exclusion f rom the scope of employment of 
conducts involving wilfulness or criminal acts are wrong in my opinion. The 
duties binding on the employee within the scope of employment cannot be 
divided into duties arising out of employment and general civic duties. Hence 
these arguments cannot serve as a basis for excluding certain conducts f r om 
the scope of employment. (But even if we were to accept them, solutions 
which would regard wilful criminal acts as being outside the scope of em-
ployment, but acts of negligence being within it, would be highly inconsis-
tent. If a criminal act constitutes the violation of general civic duties, this is 
always valid, no matter if violaion has been wilful or negligent). What is 
essential here is that whenever an employee causes damage wilfully or by 
criminal act, the basis of his conduct is always provided by employment. 
By his damaging conduct, the employee violates his obligations arising f rom 
employment in any case. (E. g. his obligation to protect social property.) He 
actually causes damage by acting contrary to instuctions, possibly by not 
observing instructions. In a lawsuit where the employer pleaded that the ac-
cident was caused by his employee because the latter oversepped his sphere 
of duties when he started the car, the Supreme Court ruled that damage 
caused in the course of activities based of commission or employment always 
entails transgression of the employee's r ightful duties, but that this circum-
stance in itself cannot serve as a basis for discharging the employer of his 
liability for damage. If this were not so, it would practically never be possible 
to hold the employer liable for damage caused by his . employees.5 And it 
will be exactly the transgression of the sphere of duties for which the 
employee might be held liable under disciplinary rules in addition. If this" 
conduct were outside the scope of employment, disciplinary liability could 
not operate either. 
The views outlined here study the problem from the fact of the em-
ployee's liability. Their untenableness appears even more clearly if the ques-
tion is considered in connection with damage suffered by the employee, i. e. 
f rom the side of the employer's liability. The employer enterprise is a juris-
tic person and its activities materialize through the activities of its employees. 
3 Каринский С. С.: Liability. 
Ривин Г. С.: Материальная отвественность рабочих и служащих за ущерб, принчи-
ненний предриятно, (Виюн, Moscow 1948 
4 Nagy L.: Liability. 
5 Supreme Court Af. II. 20 121/1957. 
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If we accept the above view that in case of damage caused wilfully or by 
a criminal act the employee's activities are not within the scope of employ-
ment, the conclusion ought to be drawn that such activitities cannot be re-
garded as the activities of the employer enterprise either. It might happen, 
for example, that the manager wilfully tears to pieces the employee's work-
book at termination of employment, or places it in his drawer and is not 
willing to hand it out. As a result, the employee cannot find new employ-
ment for some time. In the lawsuit for damages the enterprise might then 
plead that the manager has commited a wilful, even criminal act, that this 
cannot be regarded as an activity within the scope of employment, so the. 
enterprise cannot be held liable, and the damaged employee must turn against 
the manager directly. This would be clearly absurd. And the conclusions 
would be the same not only in such a case, but in any case of the employer's 
liability. 
II. The employee's social activitities 
Employees display social activities at their places of work in many cases. 
These activities are not the result of employment, are not duties arising f rom 
employment. The basis of these activities is membership in some social orga-
nization and the obligations involved in it, or the employee's spontaneous 
decision, and not the fact of omployment. (That the prerequisite of member-
ship might be employment, present another probleme.) It follows f rom thi:; 
that such activitities cannot be regarded as activities displayed within the 
scope of employment. But this, general principle requires a certain correction. 
There may exist activities based on the membership in some social organiza-
tion — e. g. trade union :— which are connected with enterprise work, or 
with the employee's activities performed within the scope of his employment. 
It may happen, for instance, that, upon the invitation of the trade union 
committe, several employees undertake to work on their off day to complete 
a complicated urgent job which otherwise would not be finished in due time. 
This activity of these employees is not based on duties arising out of their 
employment. Since, however, they are working for their employer — i. e. their 
activity is displayed at the place of work and in the interests of the employer 
— it must be regarded as one within the scope of. employment and the emplo-
yer will be liable for damage occuring in the course of this activity. 
In this connection I should like to mention cases where the employee 
acts on the basis of his membership in some social organization, but his 
activity concerns the employer. E. g. he attends the meeting of the works 
council upon his nomination by the trade union, or is appointed member of 
the concilition board. These are social organizations and the purpose of their 
formation is the promotion of the work of the employer enterprise. In my 
opinion, these activities, if performed at the place of work, must be regar-
ded as activities within the scope of employment. 
Finally, there are activities which the employee performs as the member 
of some social organization for accomplishing tasks set by the organization, 
but displays these activities at his place of work during breaks, or by short 
interruptions of his work. In this connection. Witz takes the position that to 
attend to some function as member of the works unit of some social orga-
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nization must be interpreted as an activity directly connected with the per-
formance of duties of employment.6 There is an element in this opinion that 
deserves consideration, namely that the work of the various social organiza-
tions set up at enterprises greatly promotes the operations of the enterprise, 
so their activities are connected with those of the enterprise to a, certain ex-
tent. And there are certain obligations the enterprise has to meet for promot-
ing these social activities. So this sphere of activity must be regarded as par-
tially connected with employment. 
b) The scope of the employer's liability 
In the foregoing we have defined the types of activity" which can be 
regarded as being within the scope of employment. The next thing to do is 
to decide whether it is justified to hold the employer liable for the damage 
suffered by the employee during any of these activities. 
There are several views both in theory and practice. All agree in that 
they apply various criteria in drawing the dividing line between cases within 
the scope of employment and outside it.7 As a whole, these criteria are ra ther 
manifold, since most of these theories try to answer not only the question 
of the causal nexus, i. e. belonging to the scope of employment, but a t the 
same t ime wish to exclude the category of cases in which the operation of 
liability for damage should not be warranted. 
There are several suggestions to apply as the dividing criterion the pre-
sence at the place of work. If only the place of work. If only the place of 
work is taken into account, then all activities of the employee's performed 
at the place of work must be regarded as connected with his employment. 
This conclusion is generally correct. But it may be objected that in many 
cases employees are staying at their place of work in connection with activi-
ties which are in a ra ther remote causal nexus with employment (e. g. spor-
ting, movie shows, dancing), and there may be cases where this causal nexus 
is doubtful, e. g. in case of movie shows advertised in the newspapers and 
open for the public. Hence the working-place criterion alone is no sufficient 
aid for drawing the limits. 
Another factor suggested as such a criterion is the working hours. Ac-
cordingly, any activity displayed by the employee during working hours 
should be regarded as being within the scope of employment. This solution 
has the same advantages and shortcomings as the former] It would draw into 
the sphere of the legal relationship of employment, solely on the basis of 
temporal connection, activitities not really connected with employment, while 
it would exclude pertinent activities if they are displayed af ter working hours 
(e. g. the employee stays voluntarily — without orders for doing overtime 
— at his place of work af ter working hours to complete some job and suf-
6 Witz K.: Odpovednost zamestnavetele pri pracovnim uraze a nemoci z povolani. 
(Pravnik, 1958. 2.) 
7 Weltner A.: Labour Law. 
Pietrykowski J.: Zasady odpowiedzalnosci materialnej zakladu pracy wipadki 
w zatrudnieniu wedlug. dkr. u. dn. 25. VI. 1954. (Nowe Prawo, 1954. 9.) 
Ojiefinnm E. A.: Basic issues. 
Schlegel R.: 1. c. 
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fers damage or an accident during that time). Hence this factor in itself is no 
sufficient basis for demarcation either. 
Another suggested factor is tha t the activity should serve the purpose 
of performing duties of employment. The suggestions requiring the jus t i f i -
cation of these activities, i. e. their compatibility with the employee's and 
the employer's interests, a re similar in purport . Generally speaking, it would 
seem correct to regard activities useful and justified for performing the duties 
as being within the scope of employment. Yet, at the same time, the cri-
terion of usefulness is not sufficient in itself for limitation. On the one 
hand, it would considerably narrow down the scope of the employer 's l ia-
bility. It often happens that some activity was not useful f rom the view-
point of the employer, but it was considered as such in the employee's judg-
ment. This difference may result f rom the fact tha t the employee had no 
such possibility of grasping the situation as is available to the manager . 
Consequently this criterion is both too nar row and too wide. 
In the last analysis w e may say that none of these opinions offers a 
satisfactory solution. 
In f inding a solution we must start f rom the premise that the emplo-
yee is entitled to healthy and safe working conditions during the ent i re 
duration of his employment. This applies not only to doing work proper , 
but also to auxiliary activities connected with working, and to the durat ion 
of activities connected with employment, with making use of services due 
on the basis of employment. This right exists also during social activities 
displayed on the premises of the employer. Social activities displayed on 
the employer's premises are partially connected with the employees' r ights 
to participate in management and in determining their working conditions. 
These activities a re so closely connected with employment that to guaran-
tee safe conditions — similar to working conditions proper — is just if ied 
also during these activities. This is necessary also, lest inadequate circum-
stances should prevent the employees f rom exercising their above rights. 
Another par t of social activities promote the improvement of the emplo-
yees' professional and general education, serve the improvement of their 
mental and physical abilities. To promote such activities is the employer 's 
duty arising out of employment. Obviously, this comprises not only the 
provision of means, facilities, etc. but also of conditions under which all 
these can be utilized in a healthy and safe manner . 
Considering all this, I believe that the at tempts at f inding the l imits 
of liability by classifying activités closely and less closely connected wi th 
employment are wrong and unnecessary. The employer is under the obliga-
tion to provide healthy and safe working conditions for the durat ion of 
employment, and not only for the duration of activities within the scope 
of employment but also during social activities connected with employment. 
The next question is — and this is of consequence in respect to liability — 
how to define the measures the employer is obliged to take for making 
possible these activities, and to what extent the employer is able to exer t 
influence for preventing damage to the employee' health and Corporeal in-
tegrity. Such influence on the employee's conduct or on circumstances m a y 
happen to be limited. If the employee's activities are considered f rom this 
angle, we obtain the following picture: 
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a) The employer can exert such influence to the fullest extent when 
these activities are displayed within his premises, or outside them, 
but in an area over which the employer has full control, and the 
employee is acting within the scope of his employment as prescribed 
or as can be anticipated. 
b) The employer's influence will be limited if the employee's activities 
— are displayed within the premises, but the employee is not doing 
his prescribed work, or does not display a conduct to be expected 
from him (e. g. starts a fight with a fellow-worker during the 
break); -. 
— are displayed within the premises but the employee or the circum-
stances are not under the complete control of the employer during 
this time (e. g. the meals in the canteen are privided and served 
by the catering company, or the trade union organizes an event 
on the premises); 
— are displayed not within the premises and not in an area under 
the employer's control. 
In my opinion, the consequences of the limited nature of the employer's 
influence and control must not be drawn by excluding certain activities f rom 
the scope of employment, or by excluding liability for some activities from 
the outset. Either of these solutions would be too inflexible. The employer 
would be burdened beyond the purpose of liability, or the employee would 
be deprived of reparation due to him. And if, in given cases, attempts are 
being made in practice — out of the awareness of these shortcomings — 
to bridge these difficulties, this creates uncertainty of principles in juris-
diction which is most harmful for practical trends. This appears clearly 
from the various views outlined in the foregoing. So the solution should be 
to consider these circumstances, within the scope of the system of liability, 
when the factors of discharge of liability are to be determined, or the 
employee's contributory act is to be valuated. 
• 3. The system, of liability 
a) The basic principles of the system of liability 
Let us consider how the conclusions drawn in Part I in connection with 
the system of liability can be applied to damage caused by injury to health 
and corporeal integrity. 
As concerns the causation of such damage, this brings about grave 
judgment. The fact of causing such damage is in itself condemnable, as it 
endangres human life. On the other hand, as a result of injury, the employee 
is often unable to work for shorter or longer periods, or cannot continue 
in his former profession at all. Thus his and his family's subsistence is 
fundamentally endangered. The employee might have to bear-considerable 
expenses in additon, which affect his livelihood, his living standars. 
These circumstances indicate not only that reparation in case of such 
damage is of greater than average importance, but also that the imposition 
of efficient sanctions is justified, considering the manner of causing damage. 
It follows from all this that the system of liability. based on the require-
8* 115 
ment of increased protection must be applied to such cases beyond any 
doubt. The idea may be raised, too, whether it would be necessary to restrict 
the possibilities of discharge of liability to a narrower field than has been 
established in Par t I. It would seem that this is necessary. But I believe tha t 
in reality we need not resort to such a method. The reason is that , both on 
the reparation and sanction side, other factors are acting as well, and tha t 
these amplify the effects of liability for damage. 
One factor to be taken into account on the reparation side is the provisions 
relating to social insurance and the rehabilitation of the injured. True, the 
employee might be in need of medical t reatment, because of in ju ry to his 
health or corporeal integrity, for a shorter or longer time, he might not be 
able to work for a certain time, or his capacity of work may be decreased 
permanently. But his t reatment is provided for within the scope of social 
insurance, and his subsistence is ensured through pecuniary benefits at the 
same time. The provisions of law relating to rehabilitation are helping the 
employee to find employment af ter his recovery where he can do work of 
full value. All this shows that the employee's and his family's subsistence 
is ensured, the most important expenses resulting f rom in jury are paid by the 
State outside the scope of liability for damage. Considering all this, reparat ion 
to be paid by the employer has only a supplementary character, and is of no 
greater importance than in case of other damage suffered by employees. 
In the foregoing, we emphasized the importance of sanctions. Support ing 
factors appear also here. One is the so-called claim for redress advanced by 
the social insurance system against the employer. This is a considerable sum, 
since it includes all services and benefits granted to the in jured by the 
insurance system; so it completes efficiently the reformative effect of the claim 
for compensation raised by the injured employee. An additional support ing 
factor is disciplinary and criminal liability. These act not on the employer 
enterprise, but on the persons responsible for the causation of damage, and 
complete the effect of liability for damage. Fur the r supporting factors are the 
provisions of law under which accidents are sanctioned in the field of the 
various pecuniary and moral incentives (e. g. premiums must be wi thdrawn 
in case of severe accidents, the title of outstanding factory cannot be awarded 
if a fatal accident has occured there in a given period, etc.). All these factors 
war ran t the conclusion tha t the sanctioning aspect requires no special consi-
deration in the field of liability for damage caused by in jury to heal th and 
corporeal integrity. 
As we have seen, neither the reparation nor the sanctioning aspect requires 
any departure f rom the general form defined in Pa r t I. Consequently the 
possibility for discharge of liability will be given by unpreventable external 
cause and the exclusive, unpreventable conduct of the employee also in cases 
of damage caused by in jury health and corporeal integrity: 
The stands taken by jurisprudence and by legislation in these problems 
are not in agreement, as has been indicated in Par t I in connection wi th the 
system of liability. The major i ty of Soviet writers8 advocates the system 
basced on dereliction. But there are opposite views, too.9 Legislation adopts 
8 Флейпшй E. A.: Commentary. 
Майданик JI. A;—Сергеева Н.Ю.: 1. с. 
9 Nagy L.: Liability. • 
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the position of liability .based on dereliction.10 Czeschoslovak jurisprudence11 
The situation is similar in the GDR12 and in Hungary1 3 Progress has abandoned 
and legislation establish the employer's liability irrespective of dereliction.14 
the principle of dereliction in the field of both jurisprudence and legislation. 
Even where liability is still based on dereliction, the standards for assessing 
the latter are objectivized to such a degree that they are actually very close to 
eliminating dereliction. 
b) Dicharge of liability 
I. The employer's sphere of activity 
We have concluded that discbarge of liability is possible in cases of in ju ry 
to health and corporeal integrity if damage has been caused by unpreventable 
external cause or exclusively by the unpreventable conduct of the damaged 
employee. The question of causes for discharge has been discussed in detail in 
Par t I. The conclusions drawn there rekuire certain addition in respect to ex-
ternal causes. 
When discussing the concept of external cause in Par t I, we have shown 
that this concept must be considered f rom the personal, territorial and ac-
tivity angles. We have found that activities to be regardes as those of the 
employer's do not constitute external causes for the employer in respect to 
the personal angle. Regarding the concept f r o m the territorial angle, we have 
drawn two conclusions. One: conduct of persons staying on the employers 
premises does not constitute external cause, except if these persons are 
staying there without the employer's permit or consent. Two: any place 
under the employer's supervision and control must be regraded as the em-
ployer's premises even if it is outside of the premises promer. Finally, consi-
dering the concept f rom the activity angle, we have found that external cause 
is out of the question if the cause of damage lies within the employer's ope-
rations. We have concluded in Par t I. too, — and I should like to emphasize 
this again — tha t this discrimination means at the same time that in cases 
where the causative factor cannot be qualified as external cause, the question 
of unpreventabili ty cannot be raised at all. The reason is that in such cases 
the causative factor is regarded as the employer's own activity. Unprevent-
abilitiy can be considered only where, the causative factor is actually „ex-
ternal". 
In connection with damage caused by in jury to health and corporeal in-
tegrity, several problems arise in respect to the employer's sphere of activitiy. 
Cases may occur where the employee suffers damage — although on the 
employer's premises — by some activity of some external persons. It often 
10 Decision of the commission of Labour — 22. 12. 1961. — § 1. 
11 Witz K.: Odpovednost zamestnavetele pri pracovnim uraze a nemoci z povo-
lani. (Pravnik, 1958. 2.) 
Witz K.—Tomes I.: 1. c. 
12 Schlegel R.: 1. c. 
98. §. 
13 Mt. 62. § 
14 Nagy L.: Liability. 
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happens that employees suffer damage in the course of work done outside the 
employer's premises. Another problem is presented by diseases, f irst of all 
occupational diseases. Let us consider these problems in detail. 
II. Activities performed on the employer's premises by external persons 
We have concluded that, regarding the employer's sphere of activity 
from the territorial angle, it cannot be interpreted as external cause if da-
mage is done by persons who are staying on the employer's premises, except 
if they are staying there without the employer's permit or consent. 
It may happen that certain external enterprises or organizations display 
activities in a certain sphere and on a regular basis on the employer's pre-
mises. The question is how the employee's damage connected with such acti-
vities is to be judged. The typical example of such activities is the case where 
a catering company provides and serves the meals in the canteen. The question 
is to what extent the employer can be held liable for damage suffered by 
employees during the use of the canteen. What is it that can be regarded as 
the employer's sphere of activity in this case? 
Making use of canteen meals is an activity within the scope of employ-
ment. It follows from this that it is the employer's obligation — in addition to 
providing the facilities for taking meals — to create healthy and safe con-
ditions also during the use of this service. The employer is under .this 
obligation within a sphere which is under his influence, his power of disposal. 
Consequently, since the canteen is on the employer's premises, and, moreover, 
is usually employed for other enterprise purposes in addition, the employer is 
under the obligation to see that making use of these facilities implies no 
hazard of damage to the employees. E. g. the floor of the canteen is defective 
and an employee fractures his leg as a result, the employer, will be liable for 
damage. He will be liable likewise for damage caused by furni ture or equip-
ment in the canteen (e. g. a broken chair causes injury). But the employer 
will not be liable for damage which results clearly from the activities of 
the catering company. E. g. the cook serves spoiled food, or. the waiter of 
the catering company scalds an employee. The enterprise employing the 
damaged person has no control over such activities of the catering company. 
The case is similar if injury is sustained at an event arranged by some 
external organization at the employer's premises. The activity of the em-
ployees iat this event does not belong to the scope of employment. The event 
is not the employer's activity, it is the activity of some other organization. 
Yet, at the same time, it is the employer's obligaion arising f rom employ-
ment to support the employees' social activities. It follows from this that the 
employer is obliged to make room, aquipment, etc. available for such pur-
poses. If the employer fails to fulfil this obligation as required (e. g. provides 
inadequate, poorely illuminated rooms, dangerous equipment) he violates his 
obligations as employer and will be liable for damage arising in this connec-
tion. Liability will apply to the sphere over which the employer has influence 
to prevent damage. If for instance, two employees start a fight in the course 
of a sporting event held within the premises, the employer will not be liable 
for the damage caused to the injured person. (Liability may possibly be 
imposed on the organ arranging the event.) By contrast, if a bench collapses 
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during a t rade union meeting and employees sustain injuries, or one of 
them breaks his leg because of a defect in the floor, the employer will be 
liable since he has control over devices made available to the employees for 
their social activities, and is therefore under the obligation to see that the 
condition of these devices does not endanger the employees' health and safety. 
The case is similar if the shower bath in the sport establishment within the 
premises is defective and an employee sustains in jury f rom hot water (the case 
is different if a sports association, not connected with the employer, is running 
the sport establishment). 
III. Activities outside the employer's premises 
It often happens that employees display activities within the scope of 
their employment but a places outside the employer's premises. If such place 
is under the supervision and control of the. employer's premises. If, however, 
the place is not under the employer's power of disposal, the factors causing 
damage here are „external" causes, for which the employer is liable only if 
their effect would have been preventable. 
Controversies arise in this connection in both theory and practice. Let 
us therefore study in more detial the activities displayed outside the em-
ployer's premise. Three types of activity are found in this sphere: 
— doing work 
— going to the place 
— waiting, meals, etc. 
Doing work outside the employer's premises can be occasional (e. g. an 
employee delegated there for some purpose) or on a regular basis where the 
employee performs his work regularly outside the employer's premises owing 
to the na ture of such work (e. g. porter, street sweepr). As concerns the em-
ployer's liability, the type of activity during which damage occurs is 
irrelevant. 
The difficulty in such cases arises f rom the fact that such working-
places are not under the control of the employer. Within the maintenance 
of order and discipline is entirely under the employers' control. He is in the 
position to exercise control and supervision not only over his employees but 
also over outsiders coming to the premises. In this way he is able to protect 
the employee's health and body f rom injury. In case of work done outside 
the premises, these possibilities do not exist to the full extent. A postman may 
skid on slippery stairs in an apar tment house, his bicycle may be damaged in 
the street, or the street sweeper miay be knocked down by a reckless driver. 
To prevent such damage is hardly possible for the employer. What he could 
do for prevention would be to reduce working outside his premises. But this 
is not feasible, since this would interfere with the planned operations. 
In view of these circumstances, several opinions have been formed. 
One is that in such cases the employer's liability is not warranted.1 5 
Another view is that it should be taken into account that a number of 
possibilités are available to the. employer to improve conditions, even if his 
influence to prevent damage is limited. (The employer can give more thorough 
instructions, can inspect the workings places in advance, can take precaution-
15 MaprojmH(c. Nagy L.: Liability.) 
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ary measures — e. g. white broom-sticks for street sweepers — can init iate 
regulations which improve the employees' situation — e. g. use of l i f ts fo r 
postmen, etc.)- Thus holding liable the employer would have actually p reven-
tive effects. The aspects of reparation should be considered in addition. This 
seems to present no problem. But in reality the employee's situation is not 
completely safe. He might be forced to carry on long lawsuits, to go about 
his business fa r f rom his residence. This may be extremely onerous to him. 
On the other hand it may happen that compensation cannot be collected 
f rom the person causing damage, and the employee's loss will remain un-
repaired. These circumstances war ran t to hold the employer liable for damage 
in order to improve the employee's position. It is argued in addition tha t the 
employee performs his work in the employer's interest. So it is a ma t t e r of 
fairness that the employer should accept responsibility for damage, suffered 
by the employee during such work, since if the latter would have done this 
work on the employer's premises, the employer would have been under the 
obligation to prevent such damage, or to be liable for it.16 
There are also views according to which in cases where, during work 
outside the employer's premises, damage is caused by the enterprise to which 
the employee has been sen to work, the lat ter enterprise and the employer 
should be liable jointly and severally.17 
In my opinion, a clear distinction should be made in such cases according 
tó the causative factors of damage: If damage results f rom the fai lure of the 
employer to provide adequate conditions under his control (e. g. gives the 
employee a defective tool which causes an accident, or fails to provide pro-
tective clothing, etc.) . he should be liable in the same manner as if damage 
had occurred on his premises. If, however, damage results f rom other circum-
stances (e. g. the employee slips on a stair while delivering a letter) the 
employer cannot be held liable (this case has to be judged as external cause, 
and it is only to be ascertained whether the employer could have prevented 
it).18 
Nor are the views well-founded that liability should be invoked in such 
cases, by considering the employee's financial conditions. This solution would 
be in cotradiction with the purpose of liability. The employer would be held 
liable for activities for the prevention of which he had no possibility, and 
will not have such possibility in the fu tu re either. If we wish to improve the 
employee's position in such cases, this should be done outside the scope of 
liability, in some other way. For that matter, employees are cared for by the 
social insurance system in such cases (their accidents, are regarded as indus-
trial accidents in this respect) and, beyond this, they can enforce claim for 
compensation f rom the causer of accidents. Such cases are governed by the 
Civil Code and not by the Code of Labour. It should be noted that the cir-
cumstance that the employer is not responsible for the accident, and is not 
16 Hromada J. :Prispevok k otázke novej právnej upravy náhrady skody vznik-
nutej z pracovnych urazov a chorob z pvolania a náhrady nákladov liecebnej starost-
livosti a dávok nemocenského pistenia a dochodkového zábezpecenia. (Právny obzor, 
1960. 2.) 
17 Krofta O.: Nové predpisy o náhrade skody za pracovni urazy v hospodárském 
tsyku mezi podniky socialistické sektoru. (Právnik, 1958. 3.) 
18 Nagy L.: Liability. 
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obliged to pay compensation, does not affect his obligation to f ind a, suitable 
post for his employee pursuant to the rules relating to rehabilitation. 
Another problem presents itself in case of working outside the employer's 
premises in connection wi th going to the working-place and spending t ime 
there without working. The various views in this respect differ in that it 
is problematical whether these activities can be regarded at :all as being 
within the scope, of employment.19 
In my opinion, if the employee is ordered to do work outside the em-
ployer's premises, then all his activities he has to display for this, purpose are 
within the scope of his employments This includes travelling to the working-
place, as. well as waiting there, taking meals, staying in a hotel. All this is 
necessary for performing his duties. If he suffers damage during these acti-
vities, the case is entirely similar to the one discussed above, i. e. if the dele-
gated employee suffers damage during work. Thûs the solution must be 
identical with the one mentioned above. The employer will be liable if he 
could have prevented damage.20 
IV. Travelling to and from the place of work 
Here the problem is connected with damage suffered during such travels. 
This activity is "in the interest of performing the duties of employment, bu t is 
not .yet within the scope of employment proper. Hence there exists no obliga-
tion for the employer to provide héalthy and safe working conditions. And 
the extension of liability to this field would be again in contradiction with the 
purpose of liability since the employer is not able to prevent damage in this 
respect. Thé confusion arising in proctice is the result of the circumstance 
that under the regulations of the social insurance system damage suffered du-
ring travel to and f rom the place of work is qualified as .an industrial acci-
dent. But this only applies to benefits due under the insurance scheme, it. does 
not entail the employer's liability for. damage. 
Soviet regulations differ f rom the solution I have described, i. e. the 
employer is held liable also for damage suffered during travel to and f rom 
the place of work.21 I think tha t this solution, which is otherwise at va-
riance with the nature of liability, has been warranted by considerations 
of welfare. In my opinion it would have been better to compensate within 
the social insurance system, by rainsing the sum to be paid by insurance. 
Compensation by the person causing damage would mean no difficulty, 
wuld be even eastier to a certain extent, as the social insurance agency 
advances claims anyway for refunding the sums paid by it. 
V. Damage resulting from causes within the employer's operation 
Such causes usually comprise factors of a na tura l character emerging 
within the operations of the employer enterprise: These are effects mater ia- . 
lizing in operating machinery, devices, use of materials, etc., in their regular 
19 Ignatowicz J. : Odpowiedzalnosc materialna zakladu pracy za wypadki. (War-
szawa, 1955.) 
3>JieHniHA E. A.: Basic issues. 
Eôrsi Gy.: Indemnity. 
Nagy L.: Liability. 
20 Mt. V. 99. §. 
21 Decision of the Commission of Labour (22. 12. 1961.) 
121-
or irregular working. These cannot be considered as external causes. So it was 
correctly ruled by the court that the employer enterprise had to r e fund lost 
earnings to the employee in an accident resulting f rom the explosion of a 
grinding-wheel because of a latent defect,22 or f rom the blowing up of a 
siphon bottle, in a store-room of a restaurant.2 3 
In connection with causative factors arising out of operations, we must 
discuss the question of occupational diseases. 
The term occupational disease denotes diseases which result f rom certain 
professions, jobs as a rule. 
Occupational diseases arise because in certain professions, types of work, 
the working conditions (e. g. humid atmosphere) or the materials used (e. g. 
lead) are detrimental to health, may give rise to disease, and because at the 
present standars of technology and medicine these effects cannot be comple-
tely eliminated. So if anybody chooses such a profession, type of work, he 
must anticipate that the given occupational disease will affect him sooner or 
later, to a more or less severe degree (The problem of causal nexus appears 
most clearly in this connection; It is an invariable rule that the detr imental 
effects hidden in certain types of work — e. g. inhalation of quartz crystals — 
cause changes in health, silicosis in the cited case. But this rule is a conc-
lusion drawn f rom a great number of cases. It materializes not in a uni form 
•manner, but through a number of chance events. There are workers who will 
not be affected, or hardly affected; and there will be persons in whom the 
disease becomes manifest much earlier than in others. Thus occupational 
diseases are the result of objective circumstances. Attempts are made at 
reducing to a minimum, or possibly preventing altogether, such consequences 
by creating healthy and safe conditions of working, by taking precautionary 
measures in addition if necessary (protective devices, protective food, medical 
supervision, etc.). And if the disease arises nevertheless, it is justified in any 
case that society alleviate the disadantages the worker has to suffer . This 
principle is realized in that the employees affected enjoy the same benefi ts of 
insurance as the persons having sustained industrial accidents. 
As appears f rom the foregoing, occupational diseases arise f rom factors 
inherent in the type of enterprise operations. Namely the causative factors are 
the effects of material used, of the manufactur ing process specified, are the 
consequence of given working conditions. And if this is so, the employer 
should be held liable for damage pursuant to our above conclusions — 
and cannot excuse himself by pleading unpreventabil i ty since the causative 
factors entangled are not „external" ones. Yet we are contradicting the pr in-
ciples of liability for damage in this way a t the same time. For we would 
try to hold the employer liable for damage which he is not able to prevent . 
Consequently the institution of liability for damage could not have any inf lu-
encing, reformative effect in this case. 
To hold the employer liable for damage resulting f rom occupational 
disease is not warranted in my opinion. We have drawn the limit at the point 
22 Nagy L.: A dolgozót baleset folytán ért károk megtérítésére vonatkozó ren-
delkezés végrehajtásának tapasztalatai. (Experiences of the orders concerning to 
the indemnity of. the damages caused by the industrial accidents.) (Munkavédelem, 
1965. 12.) Abr.: Experiences. 
23 Nagy L.: Experiences. 
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where — at the given standards of technology, etc. — the possibility to 
prevent damage exists, and implies no disproportionate burden on society. 
This is not the case. with occupational diseases. Compensation for damage 
in case of occupational disease should therefore be ¡ensured not trough lia-
bility for damage, but by other means, within the insurance scheme first 
of all. (Provisions of law on the rehabilitation of employees having suffe-
red accidents, or affected with occupational diseases, and on the employ-
ment of persons suffering from silicosis, lay down rules to this effect.) 
I should like to note that these conclusion apply not only to occupational 
diseases enumerated in social insurance regulations, but also to other diseases 
connected with occupation which are not yet figuring on the list (e. g. 
rheumatic fever in miners, diseases of the eye in welders). So our conclusion 
is that in laying down the rules of the employer's liability for damage the 
liability for occupational diseases should be excluded.24 
The case will be different, of course, if the occupational disease arises 
because the employer fails to take prescribed precautionary measures (e. g. 
protetoctive food, exhaustors, t ranfer to some other job upon meclal indica-
tion)). In such a case the damage has not been unpreventable in respect to 
everybody, so it is justified to hold the employer liable. This will have its re-
formative effects. The employer's liability was established accordingly in a 
case where workers erecting freshly miniated parts of a bridge suffered lead 
poisoning, since it was found that these workers, who had never handled such . 
material before, had not been instructed for protection, and no precautionary 
measures had been taken. 
Certain difficulties will arise-in practice also in connection with cases as . 
mentioned above. This is the result of some uncertainty in judging the causal 
nexus. 
The course, time of manifestation, intensity of occupational diseases vary 
widely with the given cases. There are instances where the disease becomes 
manifest only after many years have passed. 
In dase of an employee who had worked for a long time in several em-
ployments, all of which involved the hazard of an occupational disease, it 
will be very difficult to decide — in case of a disease with a long period of 
incubation — how far the violation of rules of labour safety at his last place of 
employment, where he has worked for a shorter time, has contributed to the 
development or severity of his disease. So it is not possible to take the same 
stand as in case of an industrial accident, and to declare that the employer, 
or one of them, is liable for the entire damage the employee has suffered. To 
judge the employer's liability, it has to be decided to what extent the given 
employer's conduct has changed the expectable course of the disease, and the 
employer can be held liable only for the difference that can be clearly imputed 
to him. For instance, if it is ascertained that the employee has become 
disabled ten years sooner because precautionary measures have not been taken, 
the employer will be liable for the difference between disability pension and 
former earnings for these ten years, but not for more since the employee 
would have been disabled after ten years anyway. To decide how far the 
expectable course of the disease was altered by the employer's conduct, we 
24 Mt. V. 99. § (2). 
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must always start from the investigation of the employee's actual circum-
stances (constitution, state of health, other relevant circumstances, etc.). For 
instance, if disability usually occurs ai ter 25 years at a given degree of gas 
contamination, but takes place already after 20 years in a given case, it 
cannot be declared right away that the employer is obliged to pay the diffe-
rence of incomes for 5 years. The employee must be examined, it must be 
ascertained what course the disease* has taken in him, what-his other circum-
stances have been. It may happen that the employee has a constitution stron-
ger than the average, and was less affected by the circumstances usually 
detrimental to health, and the medical opinion is that disability would have 
occurred not sooner than after 30—35 years of work, provided the prescribed 
precautionary rules have been observed. But the opposite may happen, too. 
Thus it is always the thorough investigation of a-given case that decides the 
extent to which the employer can be held liable. (I should like to remark 
that this is not a case of some inference similar to adequate causal nexus. 
The occurrence and course of an occupational disease is an objective process. 
So it must be investigated and decided how the given objective factors, the 
employee's constitution, absence of precautionary measures, etc. have affec-
ted, or still affect, the development of this objective process.) 
Consequently, I cannot agree with the view that in case of an occupational 
disease the employer's'liability should be discarded even if he had failed to 
carry out the measures prescribed for prevention. And the view cannot be 
accepted either that in such cases the employer should be held liable for 
the occupational disease, or, more exactly, for all its consequences. The correct 
position is that the employer is liable for damage if the failure to take the 
prescribed measures has affected the course of the occupational disease, but 
is only liable inasmuch as the employee has suffered additional damage as a 
result. This must be decided on the basis of investigating all concrete circum-
stances of the case. To reach a decision will be very difficult in many cases, 
and will be possible only after consulting experts. But these difficulties must 
not deter us from reaching decisions that are fair and just. Correct decisions 
can be promoted greatly if systematic records are kept on the results of 
medical examinations of employees exposed to the hazard of occupational 
disease, since on this basis it is possible to judge with fair accuracy the changes 
in the employee's state af health, the features and rate of development of 
his disease. All this will help in deciding to what extent the employer's un-
lawful conduct has contributed to the impairment of the employee's health. 
VI. Unpreventability 
In Part I, we have concluded that for judging the question of unpre-
ventability we have to study two circumstances. One: whether adequate means 
and ways had been available to prevent the damaging act. Two: whether 
there had been time enough to put these into operation. We have concluded, 
too, that in evaluating these two circumstances we must start not f rom the 
actual organizational pattern, the standards of technological equipment, and 
prevailing conditions o f . the given employer enterprise, but rather f rom 
the possibilities of preventing such damage at the present standards of 
technology, organization, etc. in general. 
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These conclusions apply also to cases of damage caused to health and 
corporeal integrity. Accordingly, an accident cannot be considered as un-
preventable if it occurred because the employer consented tacitly to the per-
formance of a task requining special qualification (e. g. crane operator) by 
an employee having no such qualification,25 or in cases where the employee 
was not given adequate technological instruction for doing some work,26 
or if employees were not given instruction in labour safety.27 Similarly, an 
accident cannot be regarded as unpereventable if it resulted f rom the fáct 
that the employer failed to amintain order, and safety in an area required for 
working.28 The accident was not regarded as unpreventable in a case where 
the beginner, an untrained worker, cleaned a machine without stopping it f irst 
and the machine caught and crushed his hand,29 since the accident could have 
been prevented by adequate supervision of work. The employer enterprise was 
held liable for damage in a case where a worker was welding by neglecting 
regulations and suffered an accident as a result, since it was found that 
welding in this manner was usual practice at the enterprise with the know-
ledge and consent of the leaders,30 consequently the accident could have .been 
prevented if the management would have prohibitied this wrong practice. 
The employer enterprise was held liable likewise in a case where the accident 
resulted f rom the use of an inadequate ladder and the handling of barrels 
was contrary to prescriptions,31 and in a case where the accident resulted 
f rom the use of unf i t tools, because the management was aware and tolerated 
these practices in both cases.32 
The circumstance in itself that to obtain a certain tool, device, etc. 
encounters difficulties does not constitute an absolutely unpreventable cause. 
In a case where the accident resulted f rom the circumstance tha t the employee 
was cutting wire with shears that had short handles the court ruled that the 
fact that technological instructions prescribed the use. of short-handled shears 
cannot be qualified as an unpreventable causative factor, since the employer 
should have tested these instructions for safe working.33 (As a mat ter of fact, 
the technological instructions were modified af te r the accident.) 
In Par t I, I referred to the obligation that measures aimed at preven-
tion must not be merely formal, they must be actually suitable for preventing 
damage by utilizing given possibilities. Accordingly, instruction of employees 
in the mat tér of safe working does not mean that the employer has done 
everything to prevent accidents. It is especially no escuse if instruction was 
only formal, or was not in itself sufficient to prevent an accident in a given 
case.34 
25 Municipal Court of Budapest 56. Pf. 31 639/1962. 
26 Municipal Court of Budapest 41. Pf. 20 756/1963. 
27 Supreme Court P. torv. II. 20 729/1962. 
28 Municipal Court of Budapest 41. Pf. 20 460/1963. 
29 Nagy L.: Experiences. 
30 Nagy L.: Experiences. 
. 31 Nagy L.: Experiences. 
32 Nagy L.: Experiences. 
33 Nagy L.: Experiences. 
34 Supreme Court Pf. II. 20 085/1953. 
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4. The contributory act of the damaged 
a) Introduction 
We have concluded in Part I that the damaged' employee's contributory 
act is to be taken into account only in case of dereliction on his part. The 
Hungarian Code of Labour adopts this principle in the provisions relating 
to damage caused by injury to health or corporeal integrity.35 
In connection with the employee's blameworthy contributory act, it should 
be noted that in cases of damage caused to health and corporeal integrity it 
often happens that the employee contributes to the occurrence of damage 
by violating precautionary regulations. It should be kept in mind here that in 
many cases the employee's conduct constitutes not only a violation of obliga-
tions to prevent and mitigate damage, which are binding on every citizen, 
but violates also the employee's duties connected with the manner of working 
and arising out of his employment. This must be emphasized because the 
principle of using less rigorous standards for judging the damaged person's 
contributory act — i. e. nobody can be expected to concentrate all his 
áttention to preventing possible damage — cannot be applied to the above 
cases any more. It can reasonably be expected f rom employees to do their 
work in accordance with the obligations they have undertaken, pursuant to 
regulations and inductions. Thus, in evaluating dereliction in cases where the 
contributory act involves the violation of obligations arising out of employ-
ment, we must apply the same standards as to other cases of the employee's 
breach of duty through dereliction. 
We hâve concluded in Part I, too, that in every case where no uniform 
basis of comparison is available, tue proportion of damage to be borne by 
the damaged persom will not be determined by evaluating the conduct of 
the causer and the sufferer of damage. This applies also to the cases discussed 
above. The employer is liable for damage caused to the employee's health and 
corporeal integrity, irrespective of the employer's dereliction, whereas the 
employee's contributory act is taken into account only in case of the em-
ployee's dereliction. Consequently, two uniform, comparable instances of con-
duct do not exist. It is therefore that we must appraise the degree of the 
employee's dereliction, and decide on this basis what proportion of the damage 
he has to bear, i. e. for what proportion of the damage the employer need 
not compensate him. 
b) The sphere of contributory acts 
In connection with injury to health and corporeal integrity, the employee's 
contributory act may materialize mainly in his failure to do everything in 
his power for the purpose of healthy and safe working, for removing obstacles 
to working, and for the purpose of working in accordance with his capability 
and qualification. In connection with damage caused by preventing the em-
ployee f rom working, we have discussed in par t : the acts of neglect connected 
with removing obstacles to working, and making use of opportunities of 
working. The conclusions drawn there apply also to damage caused by injury 
35 Mt. 62. §. 
to health and corporeal intgrity, but — owing to the partially d i f ferent na ture 
of the consequences of damage — some additions are necessary. 
In connection with the type of damage discussed here, working is often 
impossible because of some defect of health or body resulting f rom damage. 
If this can be eliminated or improved by medical t reatment, the damaged 
employee is obliged to submit himself to such treatment.3 6 If the defect 
can be corrected by a surgical intervention or some other therapy, the damaged 
employee is obliged to submit himself to these. If he fails to do so, he will 
be entitled to compensation only inasmuch as such claim would be valid 
af te r performing the operation or therapy, e. g. he would only be able to do 
inferior work even af ter the operation. The employee cannot be obliged to 
submit himself to an operation tha t endangers life, but he can be obliged to 
submit himself to a simpler one. Allegation that the operation or t reatment is 
inconvenient and painful cannot be accepted as an excuse. 
The sphere of these considerations includes the problem to wha t extent 
the employee can be expected to acquire new skill or qualification by which 
he can do work that differs f rom his former employment. This problem 
arises especially in cases where the employee's capacity for work decreases 
as a result of damage suffered. In other cases , where the hindrance is usually 
of a temporary nature, there is no need to acquire new skill or qualification. 
In the former case the employee's obligation will be different, depending on 
the temporary or permanent character of his decreased capacity for work. In 
case of shorter prevention — e. g. if a n accident causes decrease of capacity 
for. 2—3 months — it cannot be expected f rom the employee to acquire some 
other qualification. This period would not suffice for doing so. But in case of 
permanent decrease of capacity — e . g. a waiter 's leg is permanently paralyzed 
by an accident — the employee is under the obligation to acquire a qualific-
ation which enables him to utilize his working capacity in the most favourable 
manner . (This does not necessarily mean that he is obliged to complete a course 
of some school; training as a skilled worker, or for some administrative work 
— e. g. pay-roll accounting — will suffice.) Considering the fact tha t this is 
not simply a case of mitigating damage, but the obligation to share the work 
of society, to realize one fundamenta l principle of our social system, is also 
involved, the damaged person is under the obligation to do increased efforts 
for rehabilitation, for acquiring a new qualification. But, despite this, the 
employee can only be expected to acquire skills and qualifications of which 
he is actually capable and whose acquisition represents no disproportionate 
burden (e. g. an aged person cannot be obliged to graduate f rom a scholl af 
higher education). As concerns the removal of obstacles of working, I .should 
like to remark that if this entails expenses these must be counted in when 
the damage is assessed. 
Concerning the utilization of opportunity to work, or the fai lure of ut i -
lization, the case will be different according to thue temporary, protracted, or 
permanent character of the hindrance. 
Hindrance is of temporary character if the hindering circumstances are 
likely to cease in a few weeks, or a few months at the latest. Cases in which 
the working capacity is likely to re turn to normal in such a short, t ime belong 
ss Supreme Court Pf. II. 20 085/1953. 
to this category. Concerning the obligation to enter employment, the conclusions 
reached in connection with damage caused by prevention from work have full 
validity in such cases. 
If, however, the hindrance is lasting — cases of protracted or pernament 
decrease of working capacity belong here — the situation will be different. 
Here we must keep .in mind that our State grants the right to work to all ci-
tizens. But, at present, the means of production are not developed sufficiently, 
and the qualification standards of the employed population are not comprehen-
sive enough, so this means at present and in general that some kind of emp-
loyment is ensured to every citizen, but this is not employment corresponding 
to the employee's. qualification in every case. Hence the citizens cannot pos-
sibly demand to be employed according to their qualifications in every case; 
it also follows from this that nobody is entitled to draw benefits at the cost 
of society — and compensation, if paid by the State, is such a benefit — for 
a long time only because he is not able to find a post that suits his acquir-
ements. 
Society imposes increased requirements on persons whose working capacity 
is decreased for a long time, or permanently. This requirement is that such a 
person must adapt himself to the changed situation and make efforts to share 
the work of society accordingly in the future. The other aspect of this require-
ment is that society should give substantial help in finding the best suited 
employment for such a person. This conclusion means that in case of protracted 
or permanent decrease of working capacity, the obligation to find employment 
is of a much wider scope than has been discussed in the precending chapter 
iri connection with withholding the work-book and other similar damage. The 
only limit on the obligation to find employment is the case if the employee 
— in view of his state of health, including the need of medical care — is 
not able to accept certain types of employment (he has the right, at the same 
time, to demand within the scope reparation any measure or training which 
makes him fit for working.) 
The degree to which working capacity is decreased is a substantial 
yardstick for judging the obligation to find employment. To determine the 
degree of decreased capacity is a medical task first of all. It should be kept 
in mind, however, that the medical finding is. of an informative character 
only, gives a basis of departure, and may not be applied mechanically." The 
reason -is that medical judgment considers principally the physiological aspect, 
whereas in employing liability for damage,. in considering the obligation to 
find employment, the decrease of working capacity is allawys appraised in 
relation to a given sphere of work, a given occupation. A slight defect of 
hearing resulting from an accident is usually interpreted as a minor decrease 
of working capacity, but the valution will be different in case of a musician 
and a blacksmith. Similarly, the loss of both legs is usually considered as a 
severe decrease of working capacity, still it will be appraised differently in 
case of an accountant and a waiter in respect to find employment. 
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5. Compensation 
a) The legal regulation 
We have concluded in Par t I that the principle of compensating for 
damage in ful l is dominating in the field of the employer's liability. This 
applies also to damage caused by in jury to health and corporeal integrity.. 
The conclusions drawn in Par t I in connection with the principles of 
compensation are directive also in cases of damage of the above type, but 
require some addition because of the nature of such damage, especially in 
respect to expenses and incomes lost. 
b) Damage suffered 
I. Material damage 
Reduction of the employee's available means can occur also in cases of 
in jury to health and corporeal integrity. This usually consits in the damage 
or loss of clothing or other belongings in the course of an accident. 
In calculating the amount of such damage, Hungarian legislation acts in 
accordance with the principles presented in Part I Accordingly, the consumer 
price valid at the time of assessment of damage must be taken into account 
for compensation. Exception to this rule is if the employee is able to obtain 
the things in question at a lower price on the basis of a preferential purchase 
scheme of enjoyed at the employer. If damage occurs to used things, the 
amount of dagame must be assessed by taking into account depreciation.37 
If damage caused to things can be repaired without resulting in a reduc-
tion of value, the repair cots must be compensated.38 
II. Expenses and outlays 
A very wide range of expenses and outlays may emerge in connection 
with damage to health and corporeal integrity. First to be mentioned in this 
group are expenses connected with the restoration of health. Medical and 
hospitalization expenses must be refunded in this sphere. I t ought to be noted 
in this connection that if the damaged employee receives social insurance be-
nefits or insists on his discharge f rom hospital, despite medical opinion.39 The 
will not be entitled to charge such expenses. The mere circumstance tha t so-
mebody is in need of medical t reatment because of a damaging act does not 
war ran t to request t reatment other than is usually due to employees under so-
cial insurance: The less so, since today medical t reatment afforded under the 
social insurance scheme offers the best possibilités for an early recovery. Nor 
is it permissible to sharge payments not based on legal obligation, such as 
non-obligatory fees and presents given to doctors and nurses.40 When charging 
justified and necessary medical expenses, the actually chargeable and charged 
fees of consulation and t reatment must be taken as the basis. 
37 Order of the Ministry of Labour [2/1964. (IV. 3.) Mu. M/| 
38 Order of the Ministry of Labour [2/1964. (IV.3.) Mu. M.] 
39 Supreme Court P. torv. 21 003/1957. 
40 Supreme Court Pf. II. 23 337/1955., P. 21 758/1960. . 
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During t reatment — including the period of hospitalization — an 
improved diet may become necessary, which results in additional expenses. 
Juidicial practice is not uniform in this respect. Some decisions have taken into 
account thèse expenses at assessing the amount of - damage. Some have not, 
arguing that hospital feeding makes any completion unnecessary. In m y opi-
nion, allowing such expenses should be possible if improved diet has been gi-
ven upon medical advice. 
Expenses of hospitalization include expenses incurred with seeing the 
patient during the time of hospitalization. 
Such expenses can be harged if visiting of the sick employee is war ran -
ted by his condition or by other circumstances (long hospitalization, personal 
affairs requiring urgent talks, etc.). Judicial practice reflects this view. In 
one case the court has found the staying of the wife at the place of hospitali-
zation until danger to life was over41 or the parents ' stay at the place of 
their boy's fatal accident42 was found warranted ton. The costs of justif ied 
telephone inquiries, made instead of visits, can also be charged. 
Not only hospital charges, but also additional expenses incurred by home 
nursing must be taken into account. Obviously, only to the extent they 
Were-necessary, and if no hospitalization was available. The question has come 
Up several times in practice whether expenses of nursing can be charged only 
if a person has been hired, or also if nursing is done by the spouse or some 
other family member. Expenses connected with nursing a helpless person are 
allowed in judicial practice even if nursing is done by the spouse. But the 
principle that only actual expenses or loss can be charged must be observed 
also " in such cases. It follows f rom this that for refunding such expenses the 
bajsis should not be the fees which would have been paid to a professional 
nurse in lack of a family member, bu t how the nursing family member could 
have utilized his or her working capacity if there had been no need for doing 
the nursing. 
Judicial practice is not entirely uniform in cases where nursing is not 
done by the spouse, but by a family member who is not employed. In m y 
opinion, if the nursing family member had not been employed before, it should 
be considered whether such member has lost some income because of having 
to . do nursing. Thus in case family members," who had been working in the 
household only and had no income of their own, expenses cannot be charged 
for nursing. 
Taking into account the family member 's loss .of earnings would seem 
to appear as if the claim of a third par ty were involved, a case of incomes lost, 
and not expences of nursing. But this is only seemingly so. We have to 
depart f rom the premise that the sick person must pay the costs of nursing 
in some way or other. Hence if nursing is done by a family member, this 
.member's loss of earnings must be refunded. So this is always the damaged 
person's claim. 
Home nursing of the injured, or his subsequent condition may require a 
special diet. Additional expenses arising with this must be taken into account 
when assessing the damage. 
41 Supreme Court Pf. II. 22 007/1953. 
42 Supreme Court Pf. II. 20 293/1953. 
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Heme nursing of the injured may. require more laundering and bedding. 
Additional expenses can be charged. 
During the disease it may become necessary to transport the patient for 
t reatment, for the doctor or the therapist to travel to the patient's home. 
The expenses incurred here must be taken into account when assessing the 
damage. This is the case even if it turns out — at a later examination — 
that the presence of the doctor or therapist (e. g. for removing the plastering) 
would not have been necessary.43 
The in jured person may be in need of some therapeutical aid. Such 
expenses can be charged — included expenses of periodic repair provided the 
injured had not received the required device f ree of charge under the insu-
rance system. There are even instances of judicial practice where additional 
claims were allowed for the sake of the injured person's comfort. E. g. the 
court did not consider as exaggerated the claim for two pairs of orthopedic 
shoes every year, ruling that it is necessary for the injured person to have a 
change of shoes.44 Judicial practice expresses the principle of the best possib-
le restoration of health most forcefully. This is manifest also in the circumstan-
ce that the courts do not apply distribution of damage in respect to the costs 
of therapeutical aids. 
As a consequence of the damaging act, the injured person may incur 
additional expenses not only in the field of t reatment , but also in connection 
with everyday life, connected with his state of health, his physical condition 
resulting f r o m the damage suffered. It happens very often that the injured 
has to rely on help for certain activities which he used to perform himself. E. 
g. working the garden, doing household work, etc. It may happen in such ca-
ses, too, tha t these duties are attended to not by a hired person, but by some 
family member. The same rules apply to the charging of such expenses as 
have been discussed in connection with nursing. 
Additional expenses may been incurred in connection with heating and 
lighting, since the injured is staying at his home all the day, or because his 
condition requires an increased room temperature, or the use of some equip-
ment consuming more electric current. It appears f rom judicial practice tha t 
in cases where the injured person is unable to participate in social, cultural 
life because of his bodily defect resulting f rom the accident (e. g.- has lost 
both legs) it is considered as justified to purchase' for him a television set 
and to charge these costs to the person having caused the damage, since the 
disadvantages resulting f rom damaging act can be eliminated to a certain 
extent only in this way. 
Additional house-rent may have to be paid in cases where the na ture of 
the in jury sustained (e. g. infectious disease) makes necessary the isolation of 
the patient, not to keep him together with other family members, but in a 
separate room. 
Disease — especially hospitalization — may result in additional expenses 
if compared "to the usual outlays of the family. E. g. the wife is under hos-
pital t reatment , and the husband may not be able to run the household 
smoothly, has to take meals at a restaurant, or to buy conserves, all of which 
usually result in additional costs. The care and provision of children may be 
43 Supreme Court Pf. II. 20 075/1953. 
44 Supreme Court Pf. III. 22 813/1956. 
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hindered for the same reason. This can be only remedied by hiring a help, 
or by placing the children in a crèche or nursery, or a similar place. All these 
additional expenses can be charged. (Like in case of saving because of hospital 
board, the sums by which the costs of feedling the children at home are 
reduced because of their keeping elsewhere, must be deducted f rom the 
amounts chargeable. Such expenses can be charged also if the maintenance of 
children encounters difficulties because the mother has to see her in jured 
husband at the hospital. If children kept outside the home are visited by the 
parent, the expenses incurred also belong the amount of damage. 
Additional travel expenses may be necessary as a sequence of damage. 
These emerge principally in case of some bodily defect. For instance, an em-
ployee has suffered injury of his leg thus far he used to go to work partly 
walking, partly by tramway or bus, but now he has to travel by bus over 
the entire distance. Or somebody used to go to work by bicycle, but suffered 
an injury of his leg, as a result of which he. has to mount a bicycle engine 
which involves costs such as fuel, etc. The case is similar if an employee 
loses his legs and is given or obtains a suitable powered vehicle. 
Expenses may be incurred with instruction and learning. If the injured 
employee had pursued studies during his employment and, because of his 
disease or bodily defect he can continue them only by. employing a private 
teacher, such expenses must be taken into account when the damage is 
assessed. The case is similar if the injured employee begins learning because 
he will not be able to do his former work as a result of his bodily defect. 
But such expenses cannot be charged if the employee can perform the duties 
of his particular employment without such learning. 
III. Savings 
We have indicated in Part I that if the person suffering damage is freed 
from some usual ontlay as a result of suffering damage, this must be taken 
into acount as saving. This conclusion applies also to the cases discussed here. 
One example is the absence of travel expenses to the place of work in case 
of a person becoming invalid. A similar case emerges if the employee used 
to hire a help for the care of his children but having become invalid, is 
staying at home and cares for his children himself. (This applies only if 
invalidity does not prevent him from doing so.) 
Saving may emerge also if the injured is in a hospital. During the time 
of hospitalization he will save costs of board. This saving must be deducted 
from hospital charges taken into account at assessing the damage, i. e. the 
amount of damage must be reduced by the costs of board saved. In doing so 
the departure must be not from the part .of hospital charges that cover feeding, 
but the sums the injured has saved, or could have saved, actually. In calcula-
ting these savings, the procedure may not be always the same, savings must 
not be determined mechanically as a certain proportion of hospital charges. 
Namely the possibility of saving depends on the circumstance whether or 
not the injured person 's household was maintained during hospitalization, how 
large the family is, what the circumstances of the household are. The possibi-
lity of saving is reduced if the household was maintained. Judicial practice 
adopts the position in case of persons with a family that the fact that the 
injured receives board in the haspital represents no particular savings. 
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I should like to call the attention to the fact once more tha t .— as follows 
f rom the principle of preventing and mitigating damage — if damage can 
actually be mitigated by some saving or in some other way, the in jured is 
under the obligation to avail himself of this opportunity. If he fails to do so 
although he could have done it, this will be imputed to him pursuant to the 
rules governing the damaged person's contributory act. In such case the sums 
that , could have been saved, or the income that could have been gained, must 
be regarded as though they had been saved or received actually. Hence only 
reduction of means in addition to these can be considered as belonging to the 
amount of damage. 
c) Incomes lost 
I. The sphere of incomes lost 
In Par t we have concluded tha t incomes lost consist of increase of means, 
fu tu re incomes, of which the damaged person is deprived because of damage 
suffered. This principle is adopted also in Hungarian legislation. Hence, in 
accordance with the conclusions drawn in Par t I, the category of incomes lost 
comprises the following: 
— loss of earnings due on the basis of employment, including spare-time 
work and secondary occupation, bu t not including allowances due only if 
work is actually performed; 
— incomes received outside employment, including incomes f rom activities 
protected by copyright, and incomes received by the employee as rent or hire, 
or on the basis of some other legal relationship. 
II. Earnings lost 
In determining earnings lost, it must be considered in every case what 
the damaged person has lost as a consequence of damage. Damage caused by 
in jury to health and corporeal integrity prevented the employee f rom continu-
ing in his employment in t he circumstances prevailing so far . Consequently, 
in determining the amount of earnings lost, we must start f rom the earnings 
which have been due to the employee until the damaging event took place. 
The assumption is warranted tha t if the damaging event had not taken 
place, the employee would have drawn the same earnings uninterrupted. 
In cases of damage we are discussing now, the employee in not able 
to continue his former work usually for a very long time, possibly even per-
manently. This requires that in calculating the earnings lost we must pro-
ceed in a most circumspect manner . This warrants to take into account 
earnings received for a longer period of time. Under Hungarian legal pro-
visions, earnings received during twelve calendar months must be taken as 
the basis.45 In my opinion, Hungarian regulations seem to be appropriate. 
F luc tua t ions of earnings are more or less compensated during one year. 
To take as a basis a period longer than one year would not be advisable, 
because during such a long period several changes may occur (changes in 
the scope of work, general raise of wages, changes of place of work, etc.) 
43 Order of the Ministry of Labour [2/1964. (IV. 3.) Mu. M.] 
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which would render the calculation of average earnings difficult, and would 
lead to unreal results in many cases. 
For calculating earnings lost, the month in which the circumstance en-
tailing the claim to compensation has occurred must be considered as the 
current month. This is usually the time at which injury to health for cor-
poreal integrity has occurred, e. g. the month in which the employee has 
suffered the accident. But different cases may occur. E. g. if the decrease 
of the employees working capatity is not manifest immediately af ter the 
accident, and he suffers no damage as a result, and this decrease becomes 
manifest only after some time. (E. g. the employee is hit on his head during 
loading, but this has apparently no serious consequences, so he is not placed 
on the sick-list. After a few months, however, equilibrium disturbances 
emerge, the employee must be placed on the sick-list, his working capa-
city decreases, he can do his former work no longer.) In this case the cur-
rent month will be the month in which the employees damage resulting 
from the decrease of his working capacity occurred.) I should like to em-
phasize that this example is not a case in which the employee's disease has 
not yet devedoped, and so it is not possible to determine the degree to 
which his working capacity has decreased. In such a case damage has been 
caused, only the assessment of damage takes some time. In the case mentio-
ned here, recovery takes place after the accident — he was possibly not at 
all unable to work — and the decrease of working capacity becomes mani-
fest only later, in causal nexus with the accident.) 
III. Incomes received outside employment 
In Part I we have concluded in connection with asessing damage that 
in case of several employments or other legal relationships existing in ad-
dition to employment, all incomes lost must be taken into account when 
assessing damage. Incomes not realizing in a second, or fur ther employment, 
or some other legal relationship, can be taken into account for determining 
compensation for a period of time beyond the duration of these relation-
ships only if these incomes have been of a regular character. It is a requi-
rement in any of these cases, too, that a causal nexus must exist between 
the damaging act and the loss of income occurring fithin the scope of other 
employments or legal relationships. 
These conclusions apply also to the types of case discussed now. 
IV. Considering the degree of decrease in working capacity 
In the case of earnings lost, damage consists in expectable incomes that 
are lost as a result of damage suffered. Consequently, the upper limit of 
compensation to be enforced as earnings lost is the income the employee 
can possibly draw from his employment (as we have seen, the amount is 
determined on the vasis of the average of a longer period). In case of da-
mage caused by injury to health and corporeal integrity, there is another 
resttriction within this limit for determining the earnings lost. This is the 
consideration of the degree to which the employee's working capacity has 
decreased. The degree of decrease is determined for this purpose. The un-
derlying principle is that the employee actually is able to work to the deg-
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ree of his working capatity which has been left intact. So the causer of 
damage ' will 'not ! be•'liable- for- th is proportion of the*-working capacity. Con-
sequently, only that par t of the former average earnings can be considered 
as earnings lost, which is proportionate to the degree of decrease in wor-
king capacity. 
It should be mentioned that Soviet legislation makes a distinction bet-
ween professional skill and general working capacity in determining the deg-
ree of decrease in working capacity. The former is the determination of 
the degree to which the injured person has lost his working capacity requi-
red for his special t rade or profession. The latter is he degree to which 
working capacity in the general sense — the working capacity of an ordi-
nary person — ha been lost. (E. g. if a violinist of the opera house loses 
the little f inger of his left hand, the decrease of his professional working 
capacity will be 100 per cent, as he will be no longer able to conti-
nue in his ar t . . On the other hand, his general working capacity is hardly 
affected, as the loss of the little f inger of the left hand is usually, no ob-
stacle to entering employment and doing work.) Accordingly, Soviet sta-
tutes make a distinction on the basis of the two types of decrease in wor-
king capacity when amounts claimable as earnings lost a r e . to be deter-
mined.46 
Chechoslovak provisions of law are different.4 7 Sums to be granted as 
earnings lost cannot be higher than would be due to the employee as the 
highest disability pension under the social insurance scheme. 
Hungarian statutes make no reference to the consideration of the deg-
ree to which working capacity is decreased. Considering, however, the fact 
that in earlier practice the courts determined compensation for damage to 
health and corporeal integrity by taking into account the degree of decrease, 
and that in actions for damage under civil law this practice is still followed, 
the requirement of taking into consideration also the degree of decrease is 
given due consideration in present judicial practice, even af ter the recent 
statutory regulation. 
Restriction according to the degree of decrease in working capacity does 
not always lead to statisfactory results in practice. 
On the one hand, the degree of decrease is inaccurate as a basis for 
decision in two respects. First, it is not quite certain that the decrease of 
working capacity is actually of such an extent as reflected by the medical 
opinion. The loss of one leg represents a considerable decrease of working 
capacity in general; yet in case of an accountant it hardly affects the per-
formance of his work proper. Second, the inaccuracy of determining dec-
rease may have the opposite effect. It very often happens in case of a higher, 
degree of decrease that — although some of the working capacity has been 
left intact theoretically — it is almost impossible for the person concerned 
to do any work because of his other severe bodily infirmities. Actually, in^ 
tact working capacity suffiees in many cases for no more than for the per-
son concerned to see af ter himself. This is reflected also by judicial prac-
tice which regards cases of 20—30 percent intact working capacity — es-
pecially at older age — as the practical disablity of the person concerned. 
46 Decision of the Commission of Labour (22, 12, 1961.) 
47 1 50/1961. Sb. 
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On the other hand, it should be taken into account, too, that the deter-
mination of the degree of decrease in working capacity, i. e. the determina-
tion of the degree to which working capacity has been left intact, is by no 
means a guarantee for the injured to get some employment which is really 
in accordance with his defect. So this would have the effect to reduce the 
liability of the causer of the damage to a certain extent, and to place addi-
tional burden on the injured person, who is in a difficult position anyway. 
The case is different, of course, if there exist provisions of law which pro-
mote in such cases, even make compulsory, the suitable employment, retrai-
ning, etc. of the injured person. 
Summing up what we have discussed above, to attach the compensation 
for earnings lost to the degree of decrease in working capacity is wrong and 
unnecessary in my opinion. The causer of damage should compensate for 
the earnings lost, no matter to what degree the employee's working capacity 
has been lost. Decrease of working capacity should be considered f rom quite 
another angle, in the appraisal of the employee's obligation to find employ-
ment. This may serve as a basis for determining whether the injured per-
son has done everything to be expected f rom him in order to find employ-
ment. But even within this scope, this would be but one — although most 
important — help in reaching correct decisions. 
V. Considering incomes received after suffering damage 
aa) The sphere of incomes to be taken into account 
In Part I, we have concluded that in determining earnings lost, the in-
comes which reduce the employee's loss must be taken into account as re-
ducing factors. We have shown that these incomes can be divided into three 
groups: wages received within the scope of employment, incomes drawn 
from other legal relationships, and benefist received under the social in-
surance scheme. All these conclusions apply also to damage caused by in-
jury to health and corporeal integrity. 
bb) Allowances received within the scope of employment 
We have concluded in Part I that if the employee is able to utilize his 
working capacity af ter his recovery, the wages received by him must be 
taken into account, and only the loss appearing after such deduction must 
be compensated for as earnings lost. We also have seen that there are two 
exceptions — or, more correctly, only seeming exceptions — to this general 
rule. 
One is where — although there in no actual working =— earnings lost 
are not compensated for because, for example, non-working was the result 
of the employee's conduct, or no possibility to work existed, and the emplo-
yee suffered no damage as a result. 
. The other exeption is the case where the employee makes his income 
by extraordinary performances. 
In connection with the type of damage we are discussing now, we must 
study the latter question in detail, since it is of high practical' importance 
and the solutions applied have give rise to many a controversy. 
As appears from the positions taken in both theory and practice, the fol-
136-
lowing reasons would seem to justify to disregard or to restrict the consi-
deration of earnings drawn from extraordinary performance: 
| a) if working capaticy decreases to a considerable degree, it cannot be 
f expected from the injured — especially not at older age — to find employ-
[ ment or to work; if he would do so nevertheless, this must be regardes as 
i an extraordinary performance; 
f b) in addition to those belonging to category a), it may be assumed 
reasonably that everybody whose working capacity is decreased has to make 
¿ greater efforts to do work, to provide for his subsistence, than a healthy 
person; 
c) it must not serve the advantage of the causer of damage if the injured 
person draws a higher income by extraordinary performance or by acqui-
ring new skills, or if earnings rise in general in comparable jobs. 
1 The question is, what t ruth is there in these ideas? Let us first consider 
the problem of the invalids. It is a fact, also supported by judicial practice, 
that persons who suffered a severe decrease of their working capacity often 
encounter difficulties in finding employment and in doing work. But, even 
so, this cannot be stated with general and invariable validity today — as is 
reflected clearly also by examples taken from judicial practice — and will be 
even less characteristic of the future. The case is obviously different if re-
garded in dependence upon the particular occupation, the character of the 
bodily defect, the family circumstances, etc. of the employee, as to find em-
ployment will be more difficult for a person doing hard physical work, less 
difficult for a brain worker, etc. In considering this problem, we must s tar t 
f rom the conclusion that the decrease of working capacity is always relative 
in two respects. On the one hand, it is always related to general medical 
experience.. On the other, it is in relation to the employee's position, circum-
stances. Working conditions, under which work of full, or nearly full, value 
can be performed, can be found for any person who has suffered decrease 
of his working capacity. This applies not only to cases where special profes-
sional capacity is decreased, but also to cases of decrease in general working 
capacity. The social aim is to ensure for everybody the opportunity to parti-
cipate in the work of society. This requirement arises not only because it is 
of advantage to society to have few people who are in need of support. What 
is of primary importance here is that no one should feel himself slighted as 
a useless member of society because he is not any more able tó work. If we 
keep in mind that work is increasingly becoming a necessity of life, we may 
say that such a feeling might be even a worse disadvantage than the pecuni-
ary loss. Namely the latter might be remedied by the family members even 
if no compensation is granted, but if somebody is left helpless and is not able 
to do his share of work, there is no remedy. (Actually, complete reparation 
of dámage would be accomplished if the injured is brought into a position 
where he becomes able of work at 100 per cent. The costs implied must ob-
viously be borne by the causer of damage.) It is a fact that — at present — 
all preconditions are not yet ensured to give every person who suffered a 
decrease of his working capacity that kind of employment or work at which 
his decreased capacity plays no role; yet there are numbers of opportunities 
all the same, and with mechanization, progress of technology, rise of cultural 
^ standards, there will be ever more. Any regulation that might induce people 
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to be inactive today, when it is exactly the love of work that should be 
increased, is basically wrong. Hence any regulation, which would grant com-
pensation in case of disability without investigating the actual opportunities 
of doing work, should be rejected as wrong. As has been referred to briefly 
in the foregoing, the opportunity to work shows a most varied picture depen-
ding on the nature of the defect of disease causing the decrease of working 
capacity, on the age and bodily condition of the injured person, the character 
of his occupation and qualification, the possibilities to acquire new skills and 
qualifications. The medical opinion can serve as a basis in this respect. But 
as concerns medical opinion, i. e. the medical determination of the degree 
to which working capacity is decreased, it should be considered that medical 
finding is essentially based on the physiological aspect, and that the delibera-
tion whether a decrease of working capacity has occurred, and, if so, to what 
degree, is conditional on this aspect. So the doctor only considers some of 
the viewpoints I have outlined in the foregoing. Hence his opinion is only 
a helping criterion, but cannot be a decision in itself. Generalizations, percen-
tage determinations drawn from judicial practice can only serve as auxiliary 
bases for the same reason. All these are helpful in appraising the proofs 
emerging in a given case and displaying a most manifold nature, as I have 
shown in the foregoing. 
The suggestion that reckoning in of earnings should be restricted in 
cases where the injured employee draws a higher income by having acquired 
new skills, should be given careful consideration. Indeed, if the efforts of 
the injured person to acquire new skills, quailification or other knowledge 
would have the effect that his income does not increase, or increases insig-
nificantly, because in view of his higher earnings he would be deprived par-
tially or altogether of the annuity granted as compensation, this would deter 
him in many cases from fur ther training that means additional work. Thus 
the reasons adduced are correct in this respect. So it would seem justified 
that the injured person should receive compensation for a while also in cases 
where his incomes rise because he has acquired new skills or a qualification 
of higher degree. The period of time for which such compensation should be 
granted might vary with the time devoted for acquiring the new qualifica-
tion, but should be not longer than the time actually spent with training. 
As concerns the increase of intensity of work, contracting to do work 
detrimental to health, these seem indeed to be extraordinary performances 
in view of which the annuity ought not to be reduced. I believe, however, 
that in reality it would not be proper to appreciate these. Work detrimental 
to health, or the increase of intensity of work, might be an excessive burden 
even on a healthy person. It may be even more harmful to a disabled person, 
or one with decreased working capacity. Hence it would seem better to reject 
this suggestion despite its seeming advantages lest it encourage to do such 
work. The objection might be that the causer of damage would enjoy unde-
served advantage in such a case, and that the employee would be prevented 
from improving his living conditions. The reply may be that the livelihood of 
the working population — including people of decreased working capacity — is 
being served by more and more opportunities, and that if anybody avails 
himself of the opportunity to acquire new qualification in addition, he will 
usually find suitable employment without imperiling his reduced health. True, 
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the causer of damage might come off somewhat better in this case, but this 
would be not too significant, as he would have to bear the costs of a possible 
acquisition of new aulification. And, what is most important, we must ensure 
the protection of people's health — be it against their intentions. Despite 
what has been said here, it should be permissible for a certain period to dis 
regard the total incomes drawn in this way if, for instance, the person con-
cerned had no other possibility than to accept such work. 
As concerns the suggestion to extend the concept of extraordinary perfor-
mance to cases where the employee's wages are raised in general, this seems 
to be acceptable. Or, more correctly, the idea in . itself is good, only it should 
be realized not within the scope of extraordinary performance. 
The extrem vacillation experienced today in connection with judging ex-
traordinary performance can be ascribed not only to the highly varied cha-
racter of the given situations. Two points of view render such judgment es-
pecially inconstant. One is that both jurisprudence and judicial practice try 
to relax the inflexibility resulting from the percentile determination of the 
decrease of working capacity in this way. The solution I have suggested would 
have the effect that the percentile determination of the decrease of working 
capacity would cease to be the basic determinant of the earnings lost, espe-
cially as concerns their upperr limit, and that the degree to which working 
capacity is decreased would become one basis for judging the injured person's 
conduct in respect to his obligation to find employment; consequently the 
above factor of vacillation could be eliminated. In this way the percen-
tile determination would lose its present dominating role, and there would 
be no need for correcting its shortcomings by occasional extensions — 
or probably restrictions — of the conpect of outstanding working perform-
ance. The other factor -giving rise to uncertainty and vacillation is the circum-
stance that the expenses designed for eliminating the disadvantages resul-
ting from damage are very often sneaked in the bag of extraordinary per-
formance. The rulings in judicial practice, as well as the reasons given 
for theoretical suggestions, have repeatedly pointed out that persons who-
se working capacity is decreased have always greater difficulties in me-
naging the affairs of everyday life, in maintaining social relations, than 
healthy people, even if they find employment in which they attain their 
former incomes. And this requires not only greate efforts, but also additional 
outlays, and it is the latter hat must be covered by the income drawn from 
extraordinary performance which is therefore not to be taken into account. 
As appears from the reasoning, certain additional expenses are incurred here 
in fact. These, i. e. their, actual amount, must be determined and made part 
of the compensation, not as earnings lost, but rather as actual outlays. There 
is, of course, no special difficulty in paying for such expenses in monthly 
instalments rather than in one sum. Moreover, if the amount cannot be deter-
mined exactly, general damage can be assessed instead. The essence is that 
this should be damage suffered, and not profit lost. This distinction has prac-
tical consequences, too. Namely if the injured person attains higher incomes 
after some time, the amount allowed as earnings lost can be reduced or dis-
continued. But amounts allowed for additional outlays may not be reduced 
in such a case. (They can be reduced if no such additional expenses are in-
curred any more because the condition of the injured is improving. But this 
may be the case irrespective of extraordinary performance.) 
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I believe that if these two factors, wich at present disturb the consistent 
appraisal of extraordinary performances considerably, would be eliminated 
according to my suggestion, the vacillations experienced now could be elimi-
nated for the most part, and the disregard of earnings drawn from extraor-
dinary performance would be effected as fits the purpose, and within rea-
sonable limits. 
d) Consideration of subsequent changes 
I. Changes in the state of health, employment and earnings 
We have concluded in Part I that if after the assessment of compensation 
changes occur in the damaged person's state of health or circumstances, both 
the damaged and the causer of damage may request modification of the com-
pensation, its raising or reduction. This conclusion applies also to the type of 
case discussed here. Hungarian statutes also contain provisions to this effect. 
They state a t the same time that if the increase of the employee's wages is 
the results of acquiring a new or higher qualification, this increase can only 
be taken into account af ter one year has passed since the acquisition of the 
qualification. 
II. Compensation due to juvenile employees. 
Determination of earnings lost in case of juvenile employees is substan-
tially connected with the preceding set of questions. This, too, will represent 
a problem only in case of lasting decrease of working capacity. Namely the 
juvenile employee's working capacity is not yet fully developed. His earnings 
are smaller at the time the damage is suffered than they would be at his 
adult age. If the general principle were applied that the damaged person is 
not entitled to compensation for earnings lost if he earns as much as at the 
time he suffered damage, the juvenile employees would be deprived of com-
pensation at adult age in most cases. And this would be unjust in many 
cases, since as a result of their decreased working capacity they often will 
earn less than other employees in comparable jobs. Consequently, compen-
sation can only be determined with a temporary validity in such cases. Final 
assessment can only be made after the age of full earning capacity has been 
attained. 
In my opinion, the correct solution would be to set the age of full ear-
ning capacity uniformly at 18 years: Rules governing the protection of ju -
venile workers also draw the limit at the age of 18. Below this age the young 
person is still in the developmental stage, so it would be utterly wrong to 
take such young age as the basis for determining a final amount of compen-
sation. It is equally proper that if the injured person is learning to get some 
qualification at this age, the decision concerning his compensation should be 
reached only after he has acquired this qualification. But I should like to 
draw the attenion to the fact that in such cases the injured person will not 
always be at disadvantage compared to employees in similar jobs. So — in 
many cases — this should not be an assessment of earnings, lost, but rather 
payment for additional, periodically recurring outlays, possibly in the form 
of an annuity. 
140-
C O N T E N T S 
Par t I 
General Principles of liability for damage 
caused. within the scope of employment 
I. Introduction 5 
1. The concept of liability for damage 5 
2. Liability for damage caused within the scope of employment 6 
3. Delimination of liability for damage caused within the scope of 
employment 9 
a) Delimitation from other consequences of breach of duty 9 
b) Delimitation from violation of obligations arising from other 
legal relations that exist between the subjects of employment 10 
c) Delimitation f rom liability for damage caused to or by a third 
party 12 
4. Types of damage caused within the scope of employment ...... 13 
II. Employmeint : 15 
A) Introduction 15 
B) The existence of employment 15 
1. Breach of promise to establish employment 15 
2. Causing damage within the scope of employment based on a 
contract of employment null and void 16 
3. Damage caused during the period between creating employ-
ment and actual starting of work 16 
C) Damage becoming manifest after tehe termination of employ-
ment ; 18 
D) Damage caused within the scope of employment 19 
E) The subject of employment .20 
1. The employee aspect 20 
2. The employer aspect 22 
III. Unlawfulness 25 
1. The concept of unlawfulness 25 
2. The proper exercise of rights 25 
3. Release from unlawfulness 27 
a) Concept and effect of release 27 
b) Exercise of rights and performance of duties 29 
c) The damaged person's consent 29 
141-
IV. The system of liability 31 
A) The basis of principle for the system 31 
1. Introduction 31 
2. Views relating to the system of liability 32 
3. Definition of the system of liability under labour law 34 
a) The system of liability in general 34 
b) The system of the employer's liability 38 
I. The importance of reparatio 38 
II. Determining the system of liability 39 
B) Liability of increased protection 42 
1. The concept of discharge from liability 42 
2. Conditions of discharge in case of liability for damage caused 
by the employer within the scope of employment 43 
3. The concept of. „external cause" 43 
4. Unpreventability 45 
a) The concept of unpreventability 45 
I The conditions of unpreventability 45 
II Wiews relating to the determination of unpreventability 46 
-'b)-The - manner• of- • prevention • .v. .v.v.v.v..v...'..'.. 47 
c) Temporal possibility of prevention 48 
d) Via maioi' 48 
C) The system of liability based on dereliction 49 
1. The concept of dereliction 49 
2. Differentiation of dereliction from guiltlessness 49 
3. The proof of dereliction 54 
D) Taking into account the damaged person's conduct 55 
. 1 . Introduction 55 
2. Exclusive causation by the employee 55 
3. The employee's contribution to causing damage 57 
a) The concept of contribution 57 
b) Violation of the social requirement 57 
c) Dereliction on part of the damaged person 59 
4. Valuating the employee's contributory act 61 
5. Determining the degree of the contributory act 62 
V. Causal nexus 64 
1. The importance of causal nexus 64 
2. Socialist theories relating to causal nexus 65 
3. Criticism of theories relating to causal nexus 67 
4. The causality of negligence 70 
VI. Compensation 71 
1. The scope of liability for damage 71 
2. The damage 72 
a) The concept of damage 72 
b) Damage of non-pecuniary nature 72 
ç) The scope-of pecuniary damage. . . 73 
142-
d) Inclusion of incomings 74 
e) Assessment of damage 75 
f) Changes occurring subsequently in the extent of damage .. 78 
g) General compensation 78 
Part II. 
The employer's liability for damage 81 
I. Introduction 83 
II. Damage caused by precenting from doing work 83 
A) Introduction 83 
. B) Damage caused by the prevention from doing work .85 
1. The system of liability 85 
a) Factors determining the system of liability 85 
b) Discharge from liability 86 
2. The employee's contributory act 88 
a) The scope of the contributory act 88 
b) Removal of obstacles to working 89 
c) Failure to do work — . . . . . . . . . . 89 
3. Compensation 92 
a) The components of damage 92 
b) Damage suffered ; 92 
I. Reduction of available means 92 
II. Expenses, costs .'. 93 
c) Loss of income 93 
I. The scope of loss of income 93 
II. Loss of earnings proceeding from employment 94 
aa) Loss of earnings proceeding from employment that 
exists at the time of the unlawful measure 94 
bb) Loss of earnings due to the impossibility to work 94 
III. Determining the earningst lost,. 95 
C) Damage caused by unlawful termination of employment 96 
1. Types of damage 96 
2. The system of liability '. 96 
3. The employee's contributory act 97 
4. The damage 97 
III. Damage caused to the employee's belongings brought to the 
employer's premises 97 
1. Introduction 97 
2. Obligation arising out of employment in respect to movables 98 
a) The basis of obligation of safekeeping movables 98 
b) The scope of obligation 100 
I. Categorization of movables 100 
II. Restrictive measures of the employer 101 
3. The system of liability 103 
143-
a) The principle of establishing the system of liability 103 
b) Discharge of liability 105 
c) The proof of dereliction 106 
d) The effect of violating rules relating to the bringing in and 
reporting of movables 106 
IV. Damage caused by injury to health and corporeal integrity* 108 
1. Introduction 108 
2. Activities belonging to the scope of employment 108 
a) Scope of the employee's activities 108 
I. Activities connected with doing work 108 
II. The employee's social activities 112 
b) The scope of the employer's liability 113 
3. The system of liability 115 
a) The basic principles of the system of liability 115 
b) Discharge of liability 117 
I". The employer's sphere of activity 117 
II. Activities performed on the employer's premises by 
external persons , 118 
III. Activities outside the employer's premises ... 119 
IV. Travelling to and from the place of work 121 
V. Damage resulting from causes within thé employer's 
operatio 121 
VI. Unpreventability 124 
4. The contributory act of the damaged 126 
a) Introduction 126 
b) The sphere of contributory acts 126 
5. Compensation 129 
a) The legal regulation 129 
b) Damage suffered 129 
I. Material damage 129 
II. Expenses and outlays 129 
III. Saving:! 132 
IV. Considering the degree of decrease in working capacity 134 
c) Incomes lost 133 
I. The sphere of incomes lost 133 
II. Earnings losi 133 
III. Incomes received outside employment 134 
IV. Considering the degree of decrease in working capacity .. 134 
V. Considering incomes received after suffering damage .. . 136 
aa) The sphere of incomes to be taken into account 136 
bb) Allowances received within the scope of employment 136 
d) Consideration of subsequent changes 140 
I. Changes in the state of health, employment and earnings 140 
II. Compensation due to juvenile employees 140 
144-
